Second, "the owners and holders of such claims in good faith are also permitted to complete their entries." Chotard v. Powe, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 586, 588 (6: 737, 738); Rector v. United States (Hot Springs Cases"), 92 U. S. 698, 712, 713 (23: 690, 696); Bowman v. Torr, 3 Iowa, 571, 574. "Unless some ground can be found in the statute for restraining or enlarging the meau ing of its general words, they must receive a general construction, and the courts cannot arbitrarily subtract from or add thereto." Tynan v. Walker, 35 Cal. 634, 642, 95 Am. Dec. 152. "There is then no reason, founded in the language or policy of the clause, to insert a restriction and locality which have not been expressed by the legislature. United States v. Coombs, 37 U. S. 12 Pet. 72, 79 (9: 1004, 1007); Demarest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 129, 142, 68 Am. Dec. 467; Torrance v. McDougald, 12 Ga. 526, 531. Plainest rules of propriety and justice require that the courts should not introduce an exception, the legislature having made none. Galloway v. Finley, 37 U. S. 12 Pet. 264, 293 (9: 1079, 1093). Again, the construction contended for by appellant would practically engraft a proviso on the general language of the act. United States v. Dickson, 40 U. S. 15 Pet. 141, 165 (10: 689, 698); Minis v. United States, 40 U. S. 15 Pet. 423, 445 (10: 791, 799); Ryan ▾ Carter, 93 U. S. 78, 83 (23: 807, 809). the United States and the Chippewa Indians of Lake Superior and the Mississippi? 10 Stat. at L. 109. To answer this question satisfactorily requires the consideration of the exact terms of the treaty and the proceedings thereunder. By the 1st article the Chippewas of Lake Superior ceded certain territory to the United States, theretofore owned by them in common with the Chippewas of the Mississippi, and the latter assented and agreed to such cession upon certain terms, unnecessary to be specified. By art. 2 the United States agreed "to set apart and withhold from sale, for the use of the Chippewas of Lake Superior." certain tracts of land described in six paragraphs, all of which tracts lie in the neighborhood of Lake Superior, and within the states of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. The 7th paragraph of article 2 provides that "each head of a family or single person over twenty-one years of age at the present time of the mixed bloods, belonging to the Chippewas of Lake Superior, shall be entitled to 80 acres of land, to be selected by them under the direction[607 of the President, and which shall be secured to them by patent in the usual form." Article 3 provides that the reserved tracts shall be sur veyed; that the President shall make assignments to the parties entitled to the lands in severalty, and issue patents as fast as the occupants become capable of transacting their own affairs, with such restrictions upon the power of alienation as he may see fit to impose. The other articles of the treaty cut but a small fig. With respect to the public domain, the Constitution vests in Congress the power of disposi-ure in this case. tion and of making all needful rules and regula tions. That power is subject to no limitation. Congress has the absolute right to prescribe the times, the conditions, and the mode of transferring this property, or any part of it, and to designate the persons to whom the transfers shall be made. As a means of identifying the persons who, under the 7th paragraph of the 2d article, were entitled to the lands, certificates were issued to such persons, which became known as Chippewa half-breed scrip. These certificates provided that any sale, transfer, mortgage, assignment, or pledge thereof, or of any right accruing thereunder, would not be recognized as valid by the United States, and that patents for lands located by authority thereof should be issued directly to the person named in the Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 92, 99 (20: 534, 536); United States v. Gratiot, 39 U. S. 14 Pet. 526, 527 (10: 573, 574); Hosmer v. Wallace, 97 U. S. 575, 581 (24: 1130, 1132). Upon issuance of the patent the presump-certificate and should in nowise inure to the tion obtains that all the requirements preliminary to its issue have been complied with. Poire v. Wells, 6 Colo. 406, 409. The necessary previous steps here being an order from the secretary to the register to offer the land for sale, we are bound to presume that the order was given. Minter v. Crommelin, 59 U. S. 18 How. 87, 89 (15: 279, 280); St. Louis Smelt. & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 646 (26: 875, 879). benefit of any other person or persons whatsoever. This seems to be conceded in this case. Notwithstanding this provision, which was intended to secure to the holder of the certificates the land itself, they were made the subject of purchase and sale, through the device of powers of attorney signed by the person to whom the scrip was issued, authorizing some person, whose name was left blank, to locate the scrip upon lands to be selected by him, and to sell and convey the lands so se Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of lected. On the patent being issued to the perthe court: by such person as the attorney in fact of the person named in the certificate, to the actual purchaser. Of course this scheme was in the nature of a fraud upon the act. son named in the certificate, the name of the This case turns upon the proper interpreta-attorney was filled in, and the deed executed tion of the act of Congress of June 8, 1872, subsequently incorporated into the Revised Statutes as 2368, authorizing the Secretary of the Interior to permit the purchase of such lands as may have been located with Chippewa half-breed scrip, provided that such locations have been made in good faith, and by innocent holders of the same. Did this authorize the purchase of land which had been located outside of the territory ceded to the United States by the treaty of September 30, 1854, between There was no legal restriction against the conveyance by the half-breed of the patent title when once acquired; and no provision upon the face of the scrip limiting its purchasing power to any particular portion of the unappropriated public lands of the government. In fact, it appears from the time it first began "4. A copy of said scrip, the manner of locating the same, whether by the parties to whom it was issued, or by others; whether located upon lands ceded by said tribe, and all decisions of the Department of the Interior in relation to the issuance and location of said scrip." There appears to have been a report made in pursuance of this resolution on March 12, 1872, and on June 8, 1872, an act was passed in the following terms: "The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to permit the purchase, with cash or military bounty land warrants, of such lands as may have been located with claims arising under the 7th clause of the 2d article of the treaty of September 30, 1854, at such price per acre as he deems equitable and proper; but not at a less price than $1.25 per acre; and the owners and holders of such claims in good faith are also permitted to complete their entries, and to perfect their titles under such claims upon compliance with the terms above mentioned; but it must be shown to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Interior that such claims are held by innocent parties in good faith, and that the locations made under such claims have been made in good faith, and by innocent holders of the same." In pursuance of this act, Brown applied for and obtained, upon the payment of $2.50 per acre, a new patent for the lands, which had been located by Witter in Colorado. 609] *We think it was probably intended that the power to locate this scrip should be confined to the territory ceded to the United States by the 1st article, though perhaps not to the tracts named in the first six paragraphs of the 2d article of the treaty of September 30, 1854. By this 2d article the United States agreed to set apart and withhold from sale for the use of the Chippewes of Lake Superior certain tracts of land, all of which were within the states of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, and in the same article, paragraph 7, provided that each head of a family or single person over twenty-one years of age, of mixed blood, should be entitled to 80 acres of land, to be selected by them under the direction of the President. By article 3 the boundaries of the tracts were to be determined by actual survey, and the President was authorized to assign to each head of a family or single person over twenty-one years of age, 80 acres of land for his or their separate use, and as fast as the occupants became capable of transacting their own affairs, to issue patents therefor to such 162 U. S. U. 8., Воок 40. occupants, with such restrictions upon the power of alienation as he might see fit to Impose. There is some reason for saying that this article was intended to apply to Indians of pure, as distinguished from those of mixed, blood. By subsequent articles the United States agreed to pay for the land ceded an annuity, and also a certain sum in agricultural implements, household furniture, and cooking utensils, and also to furnish guns, rifles, beaver traps, ammunition, and ready-made clothing, to be distributed among the young men of the nation, as well as to furnish a blacksmith and assistant, with the usual amount of stock, during the continuance of the annuity payments. Article 7 provided against the manufacture, sale, or use of spirituous liquors on any of the lands therein set apart for the residence of the Indians, and the sale of the same was prohibited in the territory thereby ceded until otherwise ordered by the Presi dent. The whole scope and purpose of this treaty were evidently to induce the Chippewas to relinquish their claims to a large amount of territory theretofore owned by them, and to receive *in lieu thereof a certain annuity, and [610 also six tracts of land within the states above named, which were to be allotted, at the discretion of the President, in severalty, and in parcels of 80 acres each to heads of families and single persons over twenty-one years of age. If there were any doubt upon the question, arising from article 2, the subsequent articles indicate very clearly that the reserved tracts were intended to be for the actual residence of the Indians, and were to be within the states above named. Beyond this, however, Congress on December 19, 1854, passed an act (10 Stat. at L. 598) which, though subsequent in date to the treaty, must, we think, be read in connection with it, and be held to operate as a ratification of it, by which the President was authorized to enter into negotiations with the Chippewa Indians for the extinguishment of their title to all the lands owned by them in Minnesota and Wisconsin, "which treaties shall contain the following provisions and such others as may be requisite and proper to carry the same into effect?" "First. Granting to each head of a family, in fee simple, a reservation of 80 acres of land, to be selected in the territory ceded, so soon as surveys shail be completed, by those entitled, which said reservations shall be patented by the President of the United States, and the patent therefor shall expressly declare that the said lands shall not be alienated or leased by the reservees," etc. If there were doubts latent in the language of the treaty itself, it is clear from this act that it was the intention of Congress to limit the reservations to the territory ceded, both as applied to Indians of pure and mixed blood. This was the distinct ruling of the supreme court of California in Parker v. Duff, 47 Cal. 566, in which an attempt had been made to lo cate certain of this scrip in California, and we see no escape from that conclusion. It is also entirely clear that this scrip was intended to be located by the half-breeds themselves; that the patents were to be issued to the persons 68 1089 named therein, and that the right to alienate | been misused by designing parties; had bethe lands was never intended to be given until come an ordinary subject of barter and sale; the patents had been issued. It follows from had been located with the assent of the land 611] this that the location *of these lands in department upon lands in other states, by unthe state of Colorado gave no title to Brown, learned men, who had acted themselves in and that the patent issued thereon was void and perfect good faith, supposing that they had a of no effect. legal right to do as they had done, and that to compel them to relinquish their holdings would be a great hardship to them and no advantage to the government, provided they were required to reimburse the government by payig for such holdings at the ordinary price at which public lands were sold. The words "located with claims arising under the 7th clause of the 2d article of the treaty" may doubtless be interpreted as referring to claims which could only arise within the ceded territory. But we are satisfied that it was not the intention of Congress to give it that narrow construction, and that it adopted a course which, partially at least, protected the holder of the land and at the same time insured to the government a proper compensation for them. It was doubtless contemplated that these lands might in the meantime have largely risen in value, or that persons obtaining knowl edge of the invalidity of the original location may have proceeded to pre-empt them, to locate them under the homestead laws, or otherwise with a design of obtaining for a nominal consideration the benefit of their rise in value. The validity of Brown's title must turn, then, upon the patent issued to him on June 8, 1872. The argument of the plaintiff in error in this connection is that, under the terms of this act, the Secretary of the Interior could only permit the purchase of such lands as may have been located "with claims arising under the 7th clause of the 2d article of the treaty;" that the facts show that Congress then knew of the existence of more than 450 claims arising under this clause of the treaty, which had been located within the ceded territory, presumably in good faith, by innocent holders thereof; that, as no claim could legally arise under this clause which would warrant the location of lands beyond the cession, the Secretary of the Interior acquired no jurisdiction from the act of 1872 to sell or issue a patent for lands lying outside that territory. We are not, however, disposed to put so narrow an interpretation upon this act. While it is true that Congress may have been ap prised of the fact that a large number of claims had been located within the ceded territory, it is also apparent from the resolution of December 20, 1871, that it had also been informed of the location of half-breed scrip upon lands which had not been ceded by the Chippewas, and that there had been certain decisions of the land department to the effect that this might lawfully be done. The evil to be remedied was the one relating to these illegal locations, and, if consistent with its language, the act ought to receive a construction broad enough to effectuate this remedy. While Congress was not disposed to validate these locations as if they had been lawfully made, it did recognize them as giving to the locator a primary right of purchase, at a price not less than the minimum price of public lands, namely, $1.25 per acre. Upon the theory of the plaintiff in error, that the act applied only to such locations as had been made in pursuance of the treaty within the lands ceded, it is difficult to see any substantial reason for this legislation, since, if 612] the lands had been already properly located, why compel the settlers to pay for them again, or why speak of them as holders of such claims in good faith, who should be permitted to complete their entries and perfect their titles? Or why provide that it should be shown that such claims were held by innocent parties in good faith, and that the locations made under such claims had been made in good faith by innocent holders? Strictly speaking, no person who had located this scrip, except the half-breeds themselves, could be said to be purchasers in good faith, since they were apprised by the treaty and the act of De cember 19, 1854, that the scrip could only be located within the ceded territory by the beneficiaries therein named, and that such scrip was incapable of alienation. Congress, however, was evidently moved to use these words by the fact that this scrip had 1. 2. 3. Possession, soon after a murder, of articles apparently taken from the murdered man at the time of his death, if not satisfactorily accounted for, may be the foundation of a presumption of guilt. Bloodstains on the bedclothes of a person al leged to have been murdered while camping out, if not satisfactorily explained, may be considered as raising a presumption that he was murdered. False statements by an accused person, or procured by him to be made, in explanation or deNOTE. As to confessions of accused, when evidence against him, see note to Hopf v. Utah, 28: 262. As to questions of law and fact for court or jury, see note to King v. Delaware Ins. Co. 3: 155. Defendants in criminal cases, as witnesses in their own behalf; weight to be given to their testimony; those jointly indicted; when witnesses for each other; credibility a question for jury; parties to civil actions as witnesses for themselves. At common law a prisoner on trial for a crimina offense is not a competent witness in his own behalf. Harwell v. State, 10 Lea, 544; Hoagland v. State, 17 Ind. 488; Whelchell v. State, 23 Ind. 89. 4. A picture of a person who was killed is admissible on a trial for homicide for the purpose of showing identity. Statements by an accused not under oath, volintarily made in answer to questions of a commissioner, not as a confession of guilt, but as explanations to avert suspicion from himself, are not inadmissible because the commissioner failed to inform him that he could have the aid of counsel, or to warn him that his statements might be used against him, or to advise him that be need not answer. ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Arkansas to review a judgment convicting Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller: Wilson was convicted of the murder of one Thatch, both being white men and not Indians, on May 15, 1895, at the Creek Nation in the Indian country, and sentenced to *be [614 hanged. There was evidence tending to show that Thatch's body was found in a creek near where Wilson and Thatch had camped to6. The testimony of a defendant in a criminal case gether two weeks before, in a state of decomis to be considered and weighed by the jury, tak-position, indicating that deceased had been ing all the evidence into consideration, and giv- dead for that length of time. Wilson was aring such weight to the testimony as in their judg-rested the day the body was discovered, and ment it ought to have. [No. 884.] 1896. had in his possession five horses and a colt, a wagon, gun, bedclothing, and other property Submitted April 13, 1896. Decided April 27, that had belonged to Thatch. When Thatch left home he had no money except some $30 (6: 700); United States v. Wilson, 1 Baldw. 78; United States v. Gilbert, 2 Sumn. 20; Com. v. Manson, 2 Ashm. 32; State v. Soper, 16 Me. 293, 33 Am. Dec. 665; State v. Wise, 7 Rich. L. 412; State v. Smith, 2 Ired. L. 402; Bixbe v. State, 6 Ohio, 86; People v. Vermilyea, 7 Cow. 108; Rex v. Noble, 15 How. St. Tr. 731, 9 Harg. St. Tr. 1. Neither are persons jointly indicted and jointly | tried for the same offense competent witnesses for each other, or for the prosecution. Reg. v. Payne, L. R. 1 C. C. 349, 12 Cox, C. C. 118; Henderson v. State, 70 Ala. 23, 45 Am. Rep. 72; Lemaster v. State, 10 Ind. 391; State v. Blennerhassett, Walk. (Miss.) 7. Many cases hold that accomplices jointly indicted with the prisoner at the bar, but not put upon trial with him, are competent witnesses either for or against him. Reg. v. Lyons, 9 Car. & P. 555; Winsor v. Reg. L.R. 1 Q. B. 290; Reg. v. Bradlaugh, 15 Cox, C. C. 217; Marler v. State, 67 Ala. 55, 42 Am. Rep. 95; State v. Brien, 32 N. J. L. 414; Noyes v. State, 41 N. J. L. 418; Carroll v. State, 5 Neb. 35; George v. State, 39 Miss. 570; Allen v. State, 10 Ohio St. 287; Brown v. State, 18 Ohio St. 496; Everett v. State, 6 Ind. 495; Marshall v. State, 8 Ind. 498; Sloan v. State, 9 Ind. 565; Hunt v. State, 10 Ind. 69; State v. Spencer, 15 Ind. 249; People v. Labra, 5 Cal. 183; People v. Newberry, 20 Cal. 439; Jones v. State, 1 Ga. 610; Poteete v. State, 9 Baxt. 261; Lazier v. Com. 10 Gratt. 708; State v. Stewart, 51 Iowa, 312: State v. Nash, 10 Iowa, 81. Where it is proposed to call an accomplice, Jointly indicted with the prisoner, as a witness for the prosecution, it is the better practice to dispose of the indictment as to him by nolle prosequi, a verdict of acquittal at the request of the prosecution, or by judgment of conviction if he bas pleaded guilty. Winsor v. Reg. L. R. 1 Q. B. 312. But it is not necessary to do so. Reg. v. Payne, L. R. 1 C. C. 849; Reg. v. Bradlaugh, 15 Cox. C. C. 217. On the other hand it is held that where persons are jointly charged with the commission of a crime, one of them is not a competent witness upon the trial of another, so long as they stand jointly indicted for that offense. Moss v. State, 17 Ark. 327, 65 Am. Dec. 433; Brown v. State, 24 Ark. 620; Foster v. Street, 45 Ark. 328; Collier v. State, 20 Ark. 37; Adwell v. Com. 17 B. Mon. 310; People v. Bill, 10 Johns. 95; People v. Williams, 19 Wend. 377; Com. v. Marsh, 10 Pick. 57; State v. Mills, 2 Dev. L. 420; State v. Dunlop, 65 N. C. 288; Latshaw v. Territory, 1 Or. 141; Baker v. United States, 1 Minn. 207; State v. Dumphey, 4 Minn. 438; Shay v. Com. 36 Pa. 305; Staup v. Com. 74 Pa. 458; Kehoe v. Com. 85 Pa. 127; McMillen v. State, 13 Mo. 34; State v. Roberts, 15 Mo. 28; State v. Edwards, 19 Mo. 674; State v. Martin, 74 Mo. 547; United States v. Reid, 53 U. S. 12 How. 361 (13: 1023); Rutter v. State, 4 Tex. App. 57: Crutchfield v. State, 7 Tex. App. 65; Warfield v. State, 35 Tex. 736. An order for a separate trial is not a matter of right. It rests within the sound discretion of the court whether the trial shall be joint, or separate. United States v. Marchant, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 480 If a material witness for the prosecution is joined in the indictment, he may be rendered competent as a witness by the entry of a nolle prosequi as to him, or by his acquittal upon motion of counsel for the prosecution before the opening of the case. Rex v. Rowland, Ryan & M. 401; Winsor v. Reg. L. R. 1 Q. B. 312; Reg. v. Owen, 9 Car. & P. 83; Rex v. Sherman, Cas. t. Hardw. 303; State v. Clump, 16 Mo. 385. A nolle prosequi restores the competency of one jointly indicted with the prisoner, although he has, since the entry of the nolle prosequi, been separately indicted for the same offense. McKenzie v. State, 24 Ark. 636. And if, at the conclusion of the case for the prosecution, there is a defendant against whom there is no evidence, it is the usual practice for the court, on motion of counsel for the other defendants, to direct his acquittal, in order that he may be a competent witness for the defense. Hawk. P. C. chap. 46, 898; 1 Hale, P. C. 306; Rex v. Mutineers of the Bounty, cited in Rex v. Suddis, 1 East, 306; Rex v. Bedder, 1 Sid. 237; Rex v. Davis, 3 Keb. 136; Fraser's Case, 1 M'Nally, 56; State v. Shaw, 1 Root, 134; Fitzerald v. State, 14 Mo. 413; State v. Roberts, 15 Mo. 61; People v. Bill, 10 Johns. 95; State v. Blennerhassett, Walk. (Miss.) 7. One of a number of persons jointly charged with the commission of a crime, who has been separately tried and convicted, or has pleaded guilty, is, after judgment is pronounced in his case, a competent witness for or against his codefendants, unless he is rendered infamous by the judgment of the court. Reg. v. Lyons, 9 Car. & P. 555; Rex v. Fletcher, 1 Strange, 633, 4 Car. & P. 250; State v. Stotts, 26 Mo. 307; State v. Jones, 51 Me. 125; Strawhern v. State, 37 Miss. 422. The wife of a defendant who has been convicted is a competent witness against her husband's codefendant. Reg. v. Williams, 8 Car. & P. 283. A convict under sentence of death, is incapable of being a witness. Reg. v. Webb, 11 Cox, C. C. 133. And, according to the weight of authority, such a defendant is a competent witness upon the trial of his codefendants before he receives his sentence, since after conviction or a plea of guilty, he is no longer a party to the issue. Reg. v. George, 1 Car. & M. 111; Reg. v. Hinks, 2 Car. & K. 462, 1 Den. C. C. 84; Reg. v. Drury, 3 Car. & K. 190; Reg. v. Arundel, in cash and a certificate of deposit for $140, issued by the bank of Springdale, Arkansas. Wilson, when taken, had about $28, and the certificate of deposit was found among Thatch's things in a trunk claimed by Wilson. All of Thatch's clothing was in the possession of Wilson, except a pair of overalls, and the body had on a pair of overalls similar to Thatch's. The bedclothing was bloody and the blood had passed through the bed, the bloody parts being a foot or more in diameter; a pillow case belonging to Thatch was sewed over the blood spots on one side of the bed tick and a flour sack sewed over those on the other; charred pieces of cloth and some buttons were found at the camping place, and some blood in the ground under where there had been fire. that Thatch had never known Wilson before he was brought to his camp by a boy who had started with Thatch from Springdale, Arkansas, but concluded to return, and was requested to find some one else to go in his place. On the day before that on which he was alleged to have been killed, Thach and Wilson were seen camping at dark near the creek, and that night about 10 o'clock two gun shots were heard in that direction, but the body was so badly decomposed that it could not be told whether any bullets had entered it. The head was crushed with some blunt instrument, and there was testimony that an axe found in Wilson's possession had blood on it. Wilson was seen at the camp the next morning at sunrise, but Thatch was not there. *Wilson said[615 Wilson claimed that Thatch was his uncle, that Thatch had left about two weeks before the but Thatch's relatives knew of no such rela- discovery of the body, and that he had heard tionship; also, that he had known Thatch for nothing from him since; told contradictory several years, but the evidence tended to show stories as to where Thatch had gone; asserted 4 Cox, C. C. 260; Com. v. Smith, 12 Met. 238: Lee v. be considered in weighing his evidence and deterState, 51 Miss. 566; State v. Jones, 51 Me. 125; De-mining his credibility, is not erroneous. Reagan lozier v. State, 1 Head, 45. v. United States, 157 U. S. 301 (39: 709). The force of a witness's testimony is a matter strictly within the jury's province. VanTassel v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co. 1 Misc. 299; Virginia | Nat. Bank v. Mills, 99 N. Y. 656; People v. O'Brien, 68 Mich. 468; Howell Lumber Co. v. Campbell, 38 Neb. 567; Harrison v. Brock, 1 Munf. 22; Lyles v. Com. 88 Va. 396; State v. Patrick, 107 Mo. 147; Haynes v. Trenton, 123 Mo. 326; Mechelke v. Bramer, 59 Wis. 57; United States v. Hughes, 34 Fed. Rep. 732. The common-law incompetency of parties being removed by statute, the interest which they have in the result of the trial is a matter to be considered by the jury in weighing their testimony and determining what force it shall have. Goldsmith v. Coverly, 75 Hun, 48: Van Mater v. Burns, 76 Hun, 3; Meeteer v. Manhattan R. Co. 63 Hun, 535; Nicholson v. Conner, 8 Daly, 212; Klason v. Rieger, 22 Minn. 59: Lovell v. Davis, 52 Mo. App. 343; Stewart v. Kindel, 15 Colo. 539; Pridgen v. Walker, 40 Tex. 135; Cornelius v. Hambay, 150 Pa. 359. The jury are not bound to give credit to the statements of a party, though he is uncontradicted and unimpeached. Elwood v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 45 N. Y. 549, 6 Am. Rep. 140; Kavanagh v. Wilson, 70 N. Y. 177; Gildersleeve v. Landon, 73 N. Y. 609; Kearney v. New York, 92 N. Y. 621; Dean v. Van Nostrand, 23 N. Y. Week. Dig. 97; Wilson v. Wyandance Springs Improv. Co. 4 Misc. 605; Olson v. Ensign, 7 Misc. 682; Reid v. New York, 68 Hun, 110; Prowattain v. Tindall, 80 Pa. 295. On the other hand, it cannot be affirmed as a matter of law that the jury are bound to give more weight to the testimony of one witness than they accord to that of another, on the ground of interest in the one and a lack of it in the other. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Watson, 90 Ala. 68; Metropolitan R. Co. v. Jones, 1 App. D. C. 208; Reid v. New York, supra; Sullivan v. Collins, 18 Iowa, 228; Bonnell v. Smith, 53 Iowa, 281; Greer v. State, 58 Ind. 420. The testimony of a party in interest, as that of any other witness, must be submitted to the jury, for whom it is to say how far his interest shall affect his credibility. Prowattain v. Tindall, supra; Honegger v. Wettstein, 94 N. Y. 261. But it is error for the court to refuse to instruct the jury that they have a right to consider the interest of a party when weighing his testimony. Hill v. Sprinkle, 76 N. C. 853; Dean v. Metropolitan Elev. R. Co. 119 N. Y. 540. An instruction as to the interest of the respective witnesses in a criminal case, which states that the deep personal interest of the defendant should An instruction that, while the defendants are competent witnesses, the jury have a right to take their interest into consideration and all the circumstances surrounding them, and give to the testimony only such weight as it is entitled to, is not erroneous. Barmby v. Wolfe, 44 Neb. 77. An instruction that the jury are not required blindly to receive the testimony of the accused as true and made in good faith, but only for the purpose of avoiding conviction, is erroneous. State v. White, 10 Wash. 611. An instruction that the testimony of the accused in his own behalf is to be weighed by its own inherent truthfulness or proving power, unless corroborated, is not erroneous. Johnson v. United States, 157 U. S. 320 (39: 717). An instruction that the jury must remember that defendant's testimony is that of an accused man, and that while they are not to disbelieve bim solely on that account they must remember that he has a powerful motive to swear himself out of the charge, is erroneous. People v. Lang, 104 Cal. 363. The jury may be instructed that the testimony of the accused may be considered with reference to its probability, the manner in which it is given, its connection with other evidence in the case, and the situation, inducements, and temptations of the accused. State v. Hartley (Nev.) 28 L. R. A. 33. An instruction that the statement of defendant on trial for murder is evidence before the jury, to be allowed such weight, and “such only," as they see fit to give it, is not erroneous. Olive v. State, 34 Fla. 203. An instruction that the jury "sball," instead of "may," take into consideration the interest of an accused as affecting his credibility, is not erroneous. State v. Renfrow, 111 Mo. 589. A requested charge in a murder trial, as to the credibility of the accused in making the statement of bis defense, is properly refused as invading the province of the jury. Ballard v. State, 31 Fla. 266. Instructions as to the credibility of the defendants in a criminal case are not erroneous on the ground that they are thus singled out from the other witnesses for comment. Haines v. Territory, 3 Wyo. 167. In a criminal trial an instruction that the defendants, having become witnesses in their own behalf, are subject to the same rules as other witnesses, and that their interest and the contradiction of their testimony by other witnesses may be taken into consideration in determining their credibility.—is proper. Siebert v. People, 143 Ill. 571., |