department to act upon that assurance and to accept, as baving passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated, leaving the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution."

out interrupting legislative proceedings. The speaker of the house of representatives, in addition, stated that he was certain that the original *bill when it passed that body contained a[561 clause that it should go into effect on the 1st day of January, 1897. But what made him so certain of, or how he was able to recall, that fact, is not stated.

It is said that, although an enrolled act properly authenticated is sufficient, nothing to the contrary appearing on its face, to show that it Equally unsatisfactory, as proof of what ocwas passed by the territorial legislature, it can- curred in the territorial legislature, are the innot possibly be-that public policy forbids-dorsements made by the chief clerks of the that the judiciary should be required to accept council and the house upon the original bill. as a statute of the territory that which may be The indorsements made by the chief clerk of shown not to have been passed in the form in the house are as follows: "Introduced by Mr. which it was when authenticated by the signa- Fish January 28, 1895; read 1st time; rules tures of the presiding officers of the territorial suspended; read 2d time by title; 100 copies legislature and of the governor. This, it is ordered printed and referred to committee on contended, makes it possible for these officers judiciary. Reported printed, 2, 5, '95.—Reto impose upon the people, as a law, something ported by committee amended and recomthat never in fact received legislative sanction.mended that it do pass as amended. Referred Considering a similar contention in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 671 [36: 294 303], the court said: "But this possibility is too remote 560 to be seriously considered in the *present inquiry. It suggests a deliberate conspiracy to which the presiding officers, the committees on enrolled bills, and the clerks of the two houses must necessarily be parties, all acting with a common purpose to defeat an expression of the popular will in the mode prescribed by the Constitution. Judicial action based upon such a suggestion is forbidden by the respect due to a co-ordinate branch of the government. The evils that may result from the recognition of the principle that an enrolled act, in the custody of the secretary of the state, attested by the signatures of the presiding officers of the two houses of Congress, and the approval of the President, is conclusive evidence that it was passed by Congress according to the forms of the Constitution, would be far less than those that would certainly result from a rule making the validity of Congressional enact ments depend upon the manner in which the journals of the respective houses are kept by the subordinate officers charged with the duty of keeping them." These observations are entirely applicable to the present case.

But it may be added that, if the principle announced in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 671 [36: 294, 303], involves any element of danger to the public, it is competent for Congress to meet that danger by declaring under what circumstances or by what kind of evidence an enrolled act of Congress or of a ter ritorial legislature, authenticated as required by law, and in the hands of the officer or department to whose custody it is committed by statute, may be shown not to be in the form in which it was when passed by Congress or by the territorial legislature.

It is difficult to imagine a case that would more clearly demonstrate the soundness of the rule recognized in Field v. Clark, supra, than the case now under examination. The president of the council and the speaker of the house of representatives state that it was not "the custom," when an enrolled bill was presented for signature, to call the attention of their respective bodies to the fact that such bill was about to be signed; that the bill was simply handed up, when it would be signed and handed back, without formality and with 162 U. S. U. S., Book 40.

67

to committee of whole with report of committee and its amendments. 2, 7, '95.-Considered in committee of whole, amended, and reported back with recommendation that it do pass as amended. 2, 15, '95.-Amendments adopted and 100 copies ordered printed. 2, 21, '95.-Reported, printed, and ordered engrossed and to have third reading. 2, 28, '95.-Rep'd engrossed, read 3d time, placed on final passage, and passed-ayes, 17; noes, 6; absent, Brown, sick." The indorsements made by the chief clerk of the council were these: "Rec'd from house; read first time; rule suspended: read 2d time by title: referred to com, on ways and means, 2, 28, '95.-Rep't back that it be referred to a com. of the whole, rep'd adopted and made sp'c'l order for Tuesday, March the 12th, at 2 P. M., 3, 7, '95. Made sp'c'l order for 4 P. M. this day, 3, 16. '95. Considered in com, of whole; rep't back; progress. 3, 18, '95. Considered in committee of the whole; amend ment No. 1 and No. 2 offered and adopted. Ordered to have third reading. 3, 19. '95. Read third time; placed upon its final passage and passed council. Taken to house, 3, 20, '95." Again: "3, 20, '95, house. Rec'd by message; amended in council; amendments concurred by house; ordered enrolled. 3. 21, '95.-Rep't err'd and in hands of governor.' These indorsements, in themselves, throw no light upon the inquiry as to whether the particular clause alleged to have been omitted was, in fact, stricken out by the direction of the council and house. *They show, it is[562 true, that amendments of the original bill were made, but not what were the nature of those amendments. If it be said that certain amendments are attached to the original bill, and are attested by one of the clerks, the answer is, that other amendments may have been made that were not thus preserved. It was not required that each amendment should be entered at large on the journal.

If there be danger, under the principles announced in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 671 [36: 294, 303], that the governor and the presiding officers of the two houses of a territorial legislature may impose upon the people an act that was never passed in the form in which it is preserved by the secretary of the territory, and as it appears in the published statutes, how much greater is the danger of permitting the validity of a legislative enactment to be

1073

It remains to consider whether that act is repugnant to the act of Congress of July 30, 1886, 563]chap. 818, entitled "An Act to Prohibit the Passage of Local or Special Laws in the Territories of the United States to Limit Territorial Indebtedness, and for Other Purposes." 24 Stat. at L. 170.

questioned by evidence furnished by the gen- that does not make it a local or special law. eral indorsements made by clerks upon bills The act is general in its operation; it applies to previous to their final passage and enrolment,— all counties in the territory; it prescribes a rule indorsements usually so expressed as not to be for the stated compensation of certain public intelligible to any one except those who made officers; no officer of the classes named is exthem, and the scope and effect of which can- empted from its operation; and there is such a not in many cases be understood unless sup- relation between the salaries fixed for [564 plemented by the recollection of clerks as to each class of counties, and the equalized assessed what occurred in the hurry and confusion valuation of property in them, respectively, as often attendant upon legislative proceedings. to show that the act is not local and special in We see no reason to modify the principles any just sense, but is general in its application announced in Field v. Clark, supra, and there to the whole territory and designed to estabfore hold that, having been officially attested lish a system for compensating county officers by the presiding officers of the territorial that is not intrinsically unjust, nor capable of council and house of representatives, having being applied for purposes merely local or been approved by the governor, and having special. It is not always easy to fix a basis been committed to the custody of the secretary for the salaries of county officers, so as to comof the territory, as an act passed by the terri- pensate them fairly for their services, and yet torial legislature, the act of March 21, 1895, is be just to taxpayers. Certainly those named to be taken to have been enacted in the mode in the territorial act of 1895 ought not to rerequired by law, and to be unimpeachabie by ceive as much compensation for services in a the recitals or omission of recitals in the jour-county having a few people and in which a pals of legislative proceedings which are not small amount of taxes is collectible, as in required by the fundamental law of the terri-a populous county in which a large amount of tory to be so kept as to show everything done taxes is collectible. The services performed in both branches of the legislature while en by such officers in the latter class of counties gaged in the consideration of bills presented would necessarily be greater than those refor their action. quired in the former. The assessed valuation of property in a county furnishes a reasonable test of the character of the services required at the hands of county officers; at any rate, the adoption of such a test does not show that the act was designed to defeat the objects of Congress, nor that it is local or special legislation. If the territorial act is embraced by the act of Congress, and if the territory by legislation of that kind cannot fix the salaries of county of ficers, and thereby displace the system of fees, percentages, and allowances, it would follow that many county officers would receive compensation out of all proportion to the labor performed and the responsibility incurred by them. It seems to us that the act in question cannot be characterized as local or special any more than an act which did not create, increase, or diminish fees, percentages, or allowances of public officers during the term for which they were elected or appointed, but which, prospectively, fixed their compensation upon the basis of a named per cent of all the public moneys that passed through their hands. Could an act of the latter kind be regarded as local or special because, under its operation, officers in some counties would receive less than like officers would receive in other counties whose population was larger, and where business *was heavier and property of larger [565 value? We think not. And yet we should be obliged to hold otherwise, if we approved the suggestion that the territorial act of March 21, 1895, was local or special, simply because, under its operation, county treasurers, district attorneys, county recorders, assessors, and probate judges will receive larger salaries in some counties than like officers will receive in other counties.

That act declares that the legislatures of the territories of the United States shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following. among other, enumerated cases: "Regulating county and township affairs;" "for the assess ment and collection of taxes for territorial, county, township, or road purposes;" "cre ating, increasing, or decreasing fees. per centage, or allowances of public officers during the term for which said officers are elected."

The territorial act alleged to be repugnant to the act of Congress is declared to be "for the purpose of fixing the compensation of county officers" of the territory, and to that end all the counties of the territory are classified according to the equalized assessed valuation of property in each county. County treasurers, district attorneys, county recorders, assessors, and probate judges are to receive salaries of specified amounts, as the counties of which they are officers are in one or the other of the six classes established. In other words, the salaries of officers in each class are specified, the largest salary that each can re ceive being that named for a county of the first class having an equalized assessed valua tion of property of $3,000,000 or more, and the smallest that each can receive being that named for counties of the sixth class, having an equalized assessed valuation of property of less than $1,000,000. Arizona Laws 1895, p.68. We are of the opinion that the territorial act is not a local or special law within the meaning of the act of Congress. It is true that the practical effect of the former is to es tablish higher salaries for the particular offi cers named, in some counties, than for the same class of officers in other counties. But

In support of the appellant's contention numerous adjudged cases have been cited. We have examined them, but do not find that they are in conflict with the conclusions reached by us in this case.

The judgment of the supreme court of the territory is affirmed.

JOHN GIBSON, Plf. in Err.,

D.

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 565–592.)

Removal of criminal prosecution-organization of grand jury-statute as to jurors-error in summoning juror.

their race.

Sec

Isippi, which was adopted in the constitutional convention in November, 1890, it prescribes that the qualification for persons to serve as jurors in said state shall be that the ability of said citizens, qualified electors of the county and state, male, being citizens thereof, not having [been] convicted of specified crimes, shall be able to read and write; but the legis lature shall provide by law for procuring a list of persons so qualified to draw therefrom 1. The removal of a prosecution of a colored per- of grand and petit jurors for each term of son from a state court to a Federal court cannot the circuit court. Miss. Const. § 264. be had because jury commissioners or other sub-tion 2358 *of the Code of Mississippi for[568 ordinate officers had, without authority derived 1892, adopted 1st day of April, 1892, and in from the Constitution and laws of the state, ex- force at the time of the finding of the bill of cluded colored citizens from juries because of indictment filed herein against relator, pro2. The organization of a grand jury under a state vides that at the first meeting of each year, or statute which is not applicable to the case fur- as soon as practicable thereafter, the board of nishes no ground for removing the cause into a supervisors shall make a list of persons to Federal court, unless the statutes whose provi- serve as jurors in the circuit court for the sions were followed either expressly or by neces- next two terms to be held more than thirty sary operation denied the accused some Federal days afterwards, and as a guide in making right. the list they shall use the registration book of voters, and shall select and list the names of qualified persons of good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair character, and shall take them, as nearly as it can conveniently, from ber of the qualified persons in each, excluding the several districts in proportion to the num all who have served on the regular panel within two years, if there be not a deficiency of jurors. Relator states that under § 283 of the new Constitution of Mississippi the indict

8. A state statute requiring jurors to be persons of good intelligence, sound judgment, and fair character is not an ex post facto law, though made applicable to prosecutions for crimes committed before its passage.

4. Error in summoning jurors in a state court cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the

United States if no Federal right was invaded or denied.

[No. 711.]

Argued and Submitted December 13, 1895. De- ment returned against him should have been

cided April 13, 1896.

ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi te review a judgment of that court affirming the judgment of the Circuit Court of Washington County, Mississippi, convicting John Gibson of murder. Affirmed.

See same case below, 17 So. 892.

Statement by Mr. Justice Harlan : The plaintiff in error was indicted in the circuit court of Washington county, Mississippi, for the crime of having, in that county and on the 12th day of December, 1892, killed and murdered one Stinson.

When the case was called for trial the accused presented a petition for its removal to the circuit court of the United States for the western division of the southern district of Mississippi. The petition was verified by the oath of the accused to the effect that the facts set forth in it were true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief, and was as follows:

"This petition_respectfully shows unto this court that John Gibson, a citizen of said state and of the United States of America, is a negro of the African descent and color black. That under the Constitution of the state of Missis

by a jury of the grand inquest of the said County, under the laws of the Code of said state, adopted in 1880, because the crime for be returned is alleged to have been committed January, 1892, before the statute of 1892 took effect.

"Relator states that under the laws of said state, provided by the Code of 1880 thereof, the only qualifications required as shown by § 1661 of said Code, to wit, 'All male citizens of the United States and not being under the age of twenty one years nor over the age of sixty years, and not having been convicted of any infamous crime, shall be qualified to serve as jurors within the county of their residence.' Section 1664 of Code of 1880 also provides that the board of supervisors of each county shall, at least twenty days before every term of the circuit court, select twenty persons competent to serve as jurors in said county, to be taken, as nearly as conveniently may be, in equal numbers from each supervisor's district of the county, who shall serve as grand jurors for the next ensuing term of said court.

"Relator states that at the time the said grand jury of said county was elected, impaneled, and charged by this court at the December term, 1892, a great Federal [right] of his was *abridged, viz., the civil right guaran [569 teed to him under the 14th Amendment to the

As to removal of causes from state to Federal courts where United States Constitution, act of Congress, or treaty comes in question, see note to Little York Gold Wash. & W. Co. v. Keyes, 24: 656,

As to civil rights; removal of causes, when denied, -see note to Civil Rights Cases, 27: 835.

As to removal of actions against officers; U. S. Rev. Stat. § 643,-see note to Davis v. South Carolina, 27: 574

Constitution of the United States, particularly, a named day to serve as jurors in the cause. to wit, no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the protection of the laws.

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