CORTEZ RETURNS TO TEZCOCO AND IS REINFORCED. 61 Accordingly, he did not delay a day in that city, but, gathering his soldiers as soon as they were refreshed, he departed for Tezcoco by the northern journey around the lakes. His way was again beset with difficulties. The season of rain and storm in those lofty regions had just set in. The road was flooded, and the soldiers were forced to plough through mud in drenched garments. But as they approached their destination, Sandoval came forth to meet them, with companions who had freshly arrived from the West Indies; and, besides, he bore the cheering news that the brigantines were ready to be launched for the last blow at the heart of the empire. CHAPTER VIII. 1521. CORTEZ RETURNS CONSPIRACY AMONG HIS MEN DETECTED. TO ATTACK THE CITY.-SIEGE AND ASSAULTS ON THE CITY. CONTEST RENEWED STARVA THE return of Cortéz to his camp, after all the toils of his arduous expedition, was not hailed with unanimous delight by those who had hitherto shared his dangers and successes, since the loss of the capital. There were persons in the small band of Spaniards, especially among those who had been added from the troops of Narvaez,- who still brooded over the disaffection and mutinous feelings which had been manifested at Tlascala before the march to Tezcoco. They were men who eagerly flocked to the standard of the conqueror for plunder; whose hearts were incapable of appreciating the true spirit of glorious adventure in the subjugation of an empire, and who despised victories that were productive of nothing but fame. These discontented men conspired, about this period, under the lead of Antonio Villafaña, a common soldier; and it was the design. of the recreant band to assassinate Sandoval, Olid and Alvarado, together with Cortéz, and other important men who were known to be deepest in the General's councils or interests. After the death of these leaders, - with whose fall the enterprise would ⚫ doubtless have perished, a brother-in-law of Velasquez, by name Francisco Verdugo, who was altogether ignorant of the designs of the conspirators, was to be placed in command of the panicstricken troop, which, it was supposed, would instantly unite under the new general. It was the project of these wretched dastards to assault and despatch the conqueror and his officers whilst engaged in opening EXECUTION OF VILLAFAÑA BRIGANTINES LAUNCHED. 63 despatches, which were to be suddenly presented, as if just arrived from Castile. But, a day before the consummation of the treachery, one of the party threw himself at the feet of Cortéz and betrayed the project, together with the fact, that, in the possession of Villafaña, would be found a paper containing the names of his associates in infamy. Cortéz immediately summoned the leaders whose lives were threatened, and, after a brief consultation, the party hastened to the quarters of Villafaña accompanied by four officers. The arch conspirator was arrested, and the paper wrested from him as he attempted to swallow it. He was instantaneously tried by a military court, and, after brief time for confession and shrift, was swung by the neck from the casement of his quarters. The prompt and striking sentence was executed before the army knew of the crime; and the scroll of names being destroyed by Cortéz, the memory of the meditated treachery was forever buried in oblivion. The commander, however, knew and marked the men whose participation had been so unexpectedly revealed to him; but he stifled all discontent by letting it be understood that the only persons who suffered for the shameful crime had made no confession! He could not spare men from his thin ranks even at the demand of justice; for even the felons who sought his life were wanted in the toils and battles of his great and final enterprise. It was on the 28th of April, 1521, amid the solemn services of religion, and in the presence of the combined army of Spaniards and Indians, that the long cherished project of launching the brigantines was finally accomplished. They reached the lake safely through the canal which had been dug for them from the town of Tezcoco. The Spanish forces, designed to operate in this last attack, consisted of eighty-seven horse and eight hundred and eighteen infantry, of which one hundred and eighteen were arquebusiers and crossbowmen. Three large iron field pieces and fifteen brazen falconets formed the ordnance. A plentiful supply of shot and balls, together with fifty thousand copper-headed arrows, composed the ammunition. Three hundred men were sent on board the twelve vessels which were used in the enterprise, for unfortunately, one of the thirteen that were originally ordered to be built, proved useless upon trial. The navigation of these brigantines, each one of which carried a piece of heavy cannon, was, of course, not difficult, for 64 XICOTENCATL'S TREASON AND EXECUTION. although the waters of the lake have evidently shrunken since the days of the conquest, it is not probable that it was more than three or four feet deeper than at present. The distance to be traversed from Tezcoco to the capital was about twelve miles, and the subsequent service was to be rendered in the neighborhood of the causeways, and under the protection of the walls of the city. The Indian allies from Tlascala came up in force at the appointed time. These fifty thousand well equipped men were led by Xicotencatl, who, as the expedition was about to set forth by land and water for the final attack, seems to have been seized with a sudden panic, and deserted his standard with a number of followers. There was no hope for conquest without the alliance and loyal support of the Tlascalans. The decision of Cortéz upon the occurrence of this dastardly act of a man in whose faith he had religiously confided, although he knew he was not very friendly to the Spaniards, was prompt and terribly severe. A chosen band was directed to follow the fugitive even to the walls of Tlascala. There, the deserter was arrested, brought back to Tezcoco, and hanged on a lofty gallows in the great square of that city. This man, says Prescott, "was the only Tlascalan who swerved from his loyalty to the Spaniards." All being now prepared, Cortéz planned his attack. It will be recollected that the city of Mexico rose, like Venice, from the bosom of the placid waters, and that its communication with the main land was kept up by the great causeways which were described in the earlier portion of this narrative. The object of the conqueror, therefore, was to shut up the capital, and cut off all access. to the country by an efficient blockade of the lake, with his brigantines, and of the land with his infantry and cavalry. Accordingly he distributed his forces into three bodies or separate camps. The first of these, under Pedro de Alvarado, consisting of thirty horse, one hundred and sixty-eight Spanish infantry, and twenty-five thousand Tlascalans, was to command the causeway of Tacuba. The second division, of equal magnitude, under Olid, was to be posted at Cojohuacan, so as to command the causeways that led eastwardly into the city. The third equal corps of the Spanish army was entrusted to Sandoval, but its Indian force was to be drawn from native allies at Chalco. Alvarado and Olid were to proceed 'The writer sounded the lake in the channel from Mexico to Tezcoco in 1842, and did not find more than 2 feet in the deepest path. The Indians, at present, wade over all parts of the lake. DISPOSITION OF FORCES TO ATTACK THE CITY. 65 around the northern head of the lake of Tezcoco, whilst Sandoval, supported by Cortéz with the brigantines, passed around the southern portion of it, to complete the destruction of the town of Iztapalapan, which was deemed by the conqueror altogether too important a point to be left in the rear. In the latter part of May, 1521, all these cavaliers got into their assigned military positions, and it is from this period that the commencement of the siege of Mexico is dated, although Alvarado had previously had some conflicts with the people on the causeway that led to his head quarters in Tacuba, and had already destroyed the pipes that fed the watertanks and fountains of the capital. At length Cortéz set sail with his flotilla in order to sustain Sandoval's march to Iztapalapan. As he passed across the lake and under the shadow of the "rock of the Marquis," he descried from his brigantines several hundred canoes of the Mexicans filled with soldiers and advancing rapidly over the calm lake. There was no wind to swell his sails or give him command of his vessels' motion, and the conqueror was obliged to await the arrival of the canoes without making such disposition for action as was needful in the emergency. But as the Indian squadron approached, a breeze suddenly sprang up, and Cortéz, widening his line of battle, bore down upon the frail skiffs, overturning, crushing and sinking them by the first blow of his formidable prows, whilst he fired to the right and left amid the discomfitted flotilla. But few of these Indian boats returned to the canals of the city, and this signal victory made Cortéz, forever after, the undisputed master of the lake. The conqueror took up his head quarters at Xoloc, where the causeway of Cojohuacan met the great causeway of the south. The chief avenues to Mexico had been occupied for some time, as has been already related, but either through ignorance or singular neglect, there was the third great causeway, of Tepejacac, on the north, which still afforded the means of communication with the people of the surrounding country. This had been altogether neglected. Alvarado was immediately ordered to close this outlet, and Sandoval took up his position on the dyke. Thus far the efforts of the Spaniards and auxiliaries had been confined to precautionary movements rather than to decisive assaults upon the capital. But it soon became evident that a city like Mexico might hold out long against a blockade alone. Accordingly an attack was ordered by Cortéz to be made by the two commanders at the other military points nearest their quarters. The brigantines sailed |