404 DELIBERATIONS OF COMMISSIONERS. May it not then be justly said that it was a proper moment for a heroic general to pause in front of a national capital containing two hundred thousand people, and to allow the civil arm to assume, for a moment of trial, the place of the military? Like a truly brave man, he despised the eclat of entering the capital as Cortéz had done on nearly the same day of the same month, three hundred and twenty-six years before. Like a wise man, he considered the history and condition of the enemy, instead of his personal glory, and laid aside the false ambition of a soldier, to exhibit the forbearance of a christian statesman. 1 The American Commissioner unquestionably entered upon the negotiations in good faith, and it is probable that Santa Anna was personally quite as well disposed for peace. He, however, had a delicate game to play with the politicians of his own country, and was obliged to study carefully the posture of parties as well as the momentary strength of his friends and enemies. Well acquainted as he was with the value of men and the intrigues of the time, he would have been mad not to guard against the risk of ruin, and, accordingly, his first efforts were directed rather towards obtaining the ultimatum of the United States, than to pledging his own government in any project which might prove either presently unpopular or destroy his future influence. The instructions, therefore, that were given to General José J. de Herrera, Bernardo Couto, Ignacio Mora y Villamil and Miguel Atristain, the Mexican commissioners, were couched in such extreme terms, that much could be yielded before there was a likelihood of approaching the American demands. In the meanwhile, as negotiations progressed, Mexico obtained time to rally her soldiers, to appease those who were discontented with the proposed peace, and to abjure the project if it should be found either inadmissible or impossible of accomplishment without loss of popularity. For several days consultations took place between Mr. Trist and the commissioners, but it was soon found that the American pretensions in regard to the position of Texas, the boundary of the Rio Grande and the cession of New Mexico and Upper California, were 'It will be remembered that even Cortéz had paused in the precincts of the ancient capital of the Aztecs, in order to give them a chance of escape before striking the fatal blow. See Prescott, vol. 3, p. 199. It is a little remarkable also, that the dates of Scott's and Cortez's victories coincide so closely. Cortez's victory was on the 13th of August, 1521, Scott's on the 20th of August, 1847. The date of Cortéz's achievement is given according to the Old Style, but if we add ten days to bring it up to New Style, it will be corrected to the 23d of August! PARTIES AGAINST SANTA ANNA. 405 of such a character that the Mexicans would not yield to them at the present moment. The popular feeling, stimulated by the rivals of Santa Anna, his enemies, and the demagogues, was entirely opposed to the surrender of territory. Sensible as the President was, that the true national interests demanded instantaneous peace, he was dissuaded by his confidential advisers from presenting a counter projét, which would have resulted in a treaty. Congress, moreover, had virtually dissolved by the precipitate departure of most of its members after the battles of the 20th. All the party leaders labored diligently at this crisis, but none of them with cordiality for Santa Anna, in whose negotiations of a successful peace with the United States, they either foresaw or feared the permanent consolidation of his power. The puros, or democrats, still clung to their admiration of the constitution of our Union; to their opposition to the standing army; to their desire for modifying the power and position of the church and its ministers, and to their united hostility against the President. They were loud in their exhortations to continue the war, while Olaguibel, one of their ablest men and most devoted lovers of American institutions, issued a strong manifesto against the projected treaty. This was the party which, it is asserted, in fact desired the prolongation of the war until the destroyed nationality of Mexico took refuge from domestic intrigues, misgovernment and anarchy, in annexation to the United States. The monarquistas, who still adhered to the church and the army, proclaimed their belief in the total failure of the republican system. Revolutions and incessant turmoils, according to their opinions, could only be suppressed by the strong arm of power, and in their ranks had again appeared General Mariano Paredes y Arrellaga, who, returning from exile, landed in disguise at Vera Cruz, and passing secretly through the American lines, proceeded to Mexico to continue his machinations against Santa Anna, whom he cordially hated. The moderados formed a middle party equally opposed to the ultraisms of monarchy and democracy. They counted among their number, many of the purest and wisest men in the republic, and although they were not as inimical to the United States as the monarquistas, or as many of the puros pretended to be, yet they cordially desired or hoped to preserve the nationality and progressive republicanism of Mexico. In this junto Santa Anna found a few partizans who adhered to him more from policy than principle, for all classes had learned to distrust a person who played so many parts in 406 FAILURE OF THE NEGOTIATION. the national drama of intrigue, war, and government. As a party, they were doubtless unwilling to risk their strength and prospects upon a peace which might be made under his auspices. In this crisis the President had no elements of strength still firmly attached to him but the army, whose favor, amid all his reverses, he generally contrived to retain or to win. But that army was now much disorganized, and the national finances were so low that he was scarcely able to maintain it from day to day. The mob, composed of the lower classes, and the beastly leperos, knowing nothing of the principles of the war, and heedless of its consequences, — plied moreover by the demagogues of all the parties, shouted loudly for its continuance, and thus the president was finally forced to yield to the external pressure, and to be governed by an impulse which he was either too timid or too weak to control. - The armistice provided that the Americans should receive supplies from the city, and that no additional fortifications should be undertaken during its continuance; nevertheless the American trains were assailed by the populace of the city, and, it is alleged, that Santa Anna disregarded the provision forbidding fortifications. When it became evident to the American commissioner and General Scott, that the Mexicans were merely trifling and temporizing, that the prolongation of the armistice would be advantageous to the enemy, without affording any correspondent benefits to us, and when their supplies had been increased so as to afford ample support for the army during the anticipated attack on the city, --it was promptly resolved to renew the appeal to arms. Accordingly, on the 6th of September, General Scott addressed Santa Anna, calling his attention to the infractions of the compact, and declaring that unless satisfaction was made for the breaches of faith before noon of the following day, he would consider the armistice terminated from that hour. Santa Anna returned an answer of false recriminations, and threw off the mask. He asserted his willingness to rely on arms; he issued a bombastic appeal to the people, in which he announced that the demands of the Americans would have converted the nation into a colony of our Union. He improved upon the pretended patriotic zeal of all the parties—puros, moderados, monarquistas and mob-who had proclaimed themselves in favor of the war. Instead of opposing or arguing the question, he caught the war strain of the hour, and sent it forth to the multitude in trumpet tones. He was determined not to be hedged or entrapped by those who intrigued to destroy him, and resolved that if he must fall, his opponents should share the political disaster. Nor was he alone in MEXICAN DESIRE TO DESTROY SANTA ANNA. 407 his electioneering gasconade, for General Herrera- a man who had been notoriously the advocate of peace, both before and since the rupture, addressed the clergy and the people, craving their aid by prayer, money, fire and sword, to exterminate the invaders! All classes were, thus, placed in a false and uncandid position. This is a sad picture of political hypocricy based upon the misnamed popular will of a country which had for twenty years been demoralized by the very chieftain who was about to reap the direful harvest he had sown in the hearts of his people. Every man, every party, acknowledged, privately, the impolicy of continued hostilities, yet all men and all parties were resolved that Santa Anna should not make the peace whilst an American army remained in the country to sustain it, or an American government dispensed millions to pay for the ceded territory. Distrusting his honesty and patriotism, they believed that the money would only be squandered among his parasites, or used for the prolonged corruption and disorganization of their country. With gold and an army they believed him omnipotent; but, stripped of these elements of power in Mexico, the great magician dwindled into a haggard and harmless witch. Combinations arose readily and bravely against the man whose sway was irresistible as long as he dealt with his countrymen alone or preserved a loyal army and dependant church, whose strength and wealth were mutual supports. The sky was dark and lowering around him, and he must have acknowledged secretly, that the political parties of his country, if not his countrymen universally, were more anxious to destroy him than the Americans. The army of the invaders, they hoped, might perform a task in this drama, which the Mexicans themselves could not achieve; and there are multitudes who would have been glad to see its end become tragic by the death of one whom they feared in prosperity, and despised in adversity. CHAPTER XVI. 1847. MILITARY POSITION OF THE AMERICANS AT THE END OF THE ARMISTICE MEXICAN DEFENCES PLAN OF ATTACK RECONNOISSANCES OF SCOTT AND MASON IMPORTANCE OF MEXICAN POSITION AT MOLINO DEL REY-SCOTT'S SCHEME OF CAPTURING THE CITY-BATTLE OF MOLINO DEL REY REFLECTIONS AND CRITICISM ON THIS BATTLE PREPARATIONS TO ATTACK CHA PULTEPEC- STORMING OF CHAPULTEPEC AND OF THE CITY GATES AMERICAN MEXICO. AT the termination of the armistice the position of the American forces was greatly changed from what it had been on the morning of the 20th of August. The occupation of San Agustin had been followed by that of Contreras, San Angel, Coyoacan and Churubusco in the course of that day, and on the next, Mixcoac and Tacubaya were taken possession of. Thus the whole southern and south-western portion of the valley, in front of Mexico, were now held by the Americans; and this disposition of their forces, commanding most of the principal approaches to the capital, enabled them, for the first time to select their point of attack. In reconnoitering the chief outworks of the Mexicans by which he was still opposed, General Scott found that there were several of great importance. Directly north of his headquarters at Tacubaya, and distant about a mile, arose the lofty, isolated hill of Chapultepec, surrounded by its massive edifice, half castle, half palace, crowned with cannon. This point, it was known, had been strongly fortified to maintain the road leading from Tacubaya to the garita of San Cosmé on the west of the city. Westwardly, beyond the hill of Chapultepec, whose southern side and feet are surrounded by a dense grove of cypresses, and on a rising ground within the military works designed to strengthen the castle, was the Molino del Rey, or King's Mill, which was represented to be a cannon foundry to which large quantities of church bells had been sent to be cast into guns. Still further west, but near the Molino or Mill, was the fortified Casa Mata, containing a large deposite of powder. |