ment by the legislature reversed it in regard to causes submitted to the court to be heard without a jury under which circumstances 'any error made by the court in giving final judgment in the cause shall be subject to change, modification or reversal without the grounds of objection having been specifically submitted to the court."

7

Another innovation brought about by the act under consideration is that of suing defendants in the alternative. A question has been raised as to whether a defendant could be sued alternatively as an individual or as an executor. But in another case the practice seems to have worked well. In the latter case a carpenter having done certain work in the interior of a building sued both the company that rented and occupied the building and the manager of the company who also held an option for the purchase of the building. It was this manager who had hired the carpenter and the capacity in which he had acted was in dispute. The jury held the company and released the manager which verdict was upheld on appeal. The court's observations on the question of appeal in such a case illustrate the working of the practice.

There is another reason, founded on the bringing of the suit in the alternative, that should lead to a discharge of the present rule. On any reasonable theory of the case, a verdict against one defendant required a discharge of the other, and so the jury found. Now, if that verdict is brought in question, the other defendant should be heard as well as the plaintiff; for the natural inference in a case of this kind is that if the verdict against one defendant is wrong, the other defendant should have been held; and this the other defendant must be heard to controvert. Again, if the verdict be set aside as to the company, there ought to be a new trial as to both defendants, for if Steuerwald's verdict stands, peradventure a second jury will find the company not liable, and the plaintiff, though plainly entitled to be paid by one or the other, gets nothing from either. In such a case the rule should require both the plaintiff and the alternative defendant to show cause, and include both verdicts.

Difficulties of the kind that give rise to alternative pleading may sometimes be met, in jurisdictions where such pleading is not allowed, by alleging that the defendants are jointly liable and subsequently amending when the facts are discovered. The evils of such methods are obvious. Moreover where two suits are neces'L. 1916, p. 109.

• Pfeiffer v. Badenhop, 86 N. J. L., 492.

'Crouse v. Perth Amboy Publishing Co., 85 N. J. L., 476.

sary there is always the danger of losing both although the liability of one of the two defendants is certain. The New Jersey procedure is perhaps liable to abuse but such has not come to the knowledge of the writer, who believes that provision to be beneficial.

Much of the simplification introduced by the act is a simplification of nomenclature rather than of procedure. The substitution of motions for demurrers and pleas, and of appeals for writs of error is of this character. The preliminary reference or "omnibus motion" introduced by the rules does not seem to have been frequently used by the bar and little, therefore, can be said of its practical usefulness.

A simple and expeditious method of examining adverse parties before trial before a commissioner without first securing an order for the purpose has been added by the legislature.8

The liberal rules as to joinder of parties plaintiff form a valuable part of the new system. As an example, a case in the litigation of which the writer is now engaged, was brought in which father and son were both joined as plaintiffs in a complaint for personal injuries to the boy. The difference between this single suit and two separate suits may not be in itself very considerable, but each instance of the kind constitutes a saving in efficiency which in the aggregate may be quite appreciable. Much more striking instances of this advantage may undoubtedly be found such as might occur in case of a railroad collision injuring many people.

In the domain of pleading the advance toward simplicity attained under the Practice Act has been noticeable. It is here that as an improvement of the practice of the state the reform has been most successful. At first there was a widespread impression among the bar that a complaint henceforward was to consist of a kind of newspaper report of the occurrences including all the circumstances and evidence. This false impression corrected, everything has worked well, Lawyers have had the benefit of the precedents of the English practice, and judges have repeatedly recommended a study of the forms of Bullen and Leake. The result has been a clear, simple method of pleading which must in every way have fulfilled the hopes of the reformers.

It may be too much to claim for the act that it solves the problem of procedure in courts of law, a problem that has engaged the L. 1914, p. 151.

attention of the best legal minds for centuries. Whether the brevity and simplicity of the system which constitute its great merit will prove permanently successful cannot be determined until after a considerable period of years, during which the system has manifested its ability to meet new demands and new conditions as they arise, but certainly thus far the results amply justify the expectations of its framers that the simplification of procedure by a concise and flexible body of rules formulated and applied by an able judiciary will be a great aid to the proper administration of justice.

PROGRESS OF THE PROPOSAL TO SUBSTITUTE RULES OF COURT FOR COMMON LAW PRACTICE

BY THOMAS W. SHELTON,

Chairman, Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure of the American Bar Association, Norfolk, Va.

Governmental improvement in republics, or a departure from long standing policies or customs, is so correlated with a popular understanding of its merit and need as to render the latter a condition precedent to achievement. Inasmuch as that condition is a true reflex of representative democracy it is not to be criticized, but should be recognized, preserved and wisely used in the interest of the general welfare. It is visualized in the processes of garnering intelligence by an intellectual free people. So it is that time profitably lapses while the conscientious legislator seeks his constituents' views on proposed new legislation. Preparing these constituents by imparting and popularizing the necessary knowledge thereby becomes the key to the door of success of any proposal, as it is the measure of the strength of a democratic government. Obviously then, this duty rests with those citizens best prepared and possessing the confidence of the people, the performance of which is evidence of the most supreme public spirit.

THE THREE NECESSARY STAGES

It is the fate of every new measure proposed to a democracy to pass through the three distinct ordeals of investigation, education and legislation. Once approved by the accepted leaders of national and state thought, specially circumstanced to pass judgment upon it, and whatever its origin, the idea is properly credentialed for presentation to the masses, whereupon, the serious, highly responsible and patient work of education begins. The thoroughness and earnestness with which this is done, in the absence of some catastrophe impelling immediate legislative action, will measure the chance of successful, or speedy enactment into law. There is one exception to this rule, the cause of which is obvious to every lawyerthe reform of the procedure of the courts—the American history of

which we shall now outline, intermingled with a little philosophy and preceded by a short introduction. In this matter the people must trust their trained lawyers instead of politicians, just as in medicine they follow their experienced doctors.

SIMPLICITY ITS FEATURAL MERIT

There are few functions more highly technical and scientific than judicial procedure and which, when improperly applied, can become more wicked in results. There are few agencies that demand less simplicity in form and use or are worse impaired by mystery or technicality. Illustrated in nature, there is no element more useful and at the same time more deadly than electricity, and none requiring simpler methods of application. The vision of the unthoughtful never reaches or measures the research, concentration and highly perfected program of the philosophers and engineers who came so to understand the science of this necessary danger to mankind as to make it safely its servitor. But, once the scientific hand is removed from control, and the influential novitiate occupies the seat of experience and wisdom, it would revert to destructive methods, for it is axiomatic that ignorance meddling with science always brings its own punishment. Here is visualized investigation followed by education, resulting in economic utility.

DANIEL WEBSTER'S APPRECIATION

There is no human consideration of more importance than an acceptable administration of justice and few that are less appreciated and understood. Said Daniel Webster,

Justice is the greatest interest of man on earth. It is the ligature which holds civilized beings and civilized nations together. Wherever its temple stands, and so long as it is honored, there is a foundation for social security, general happiness and the improvement and progress of our race. And whoever labors upon this edifice with usefulness and distinction, whoever clears its foundations, strengthens its pillars, adorns its entablatures, or contributes to raise its august dome still higher to the skies, links himself in name, fame and character with that which is, and must be, as durable as the frame of human society.

SOCIAL HISTORY RECORDED IN THE COURTS

The world history of ethnogenic sociology may be traced through the courts, for there evolution leaves its trail in the last resort of all serious disputes and the interpretation of statutory