icance is not to be gathered simply from the words and a dictionary
but by considering their origin and the line of their growth.
Gompers v. United States, 604.
8. Appropriations; special and temporary; effect to express intent as to
future appropriations.
A provision making a special and temporary appropriation will not be
construed as expressing the intent of Congress to have a general
and permanent application to all future appropriations. (Minis v.
United States, 15 Pet. 423.) United States v. Vulte, 509.
A proviso in a statute will not be so construed as to have little or noth-
ing to act upon and to have no reason for its insertion. Thaddeus
Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 461.
10. Repeals; effect on statute fixing salary of public officer of subsequent
appropriations of a less amount.
A statute which fixes the annual salary of a public officer at a designated
sum without limitation as to time is not abrogated or suspended by
subsequent enactments which merely appropriate a less amount for
that officer for particular years and which contain no words ex-
pressly, or by clear implication, modifying or repealing the pre-
vious law. (United States v. Langston, 118 U. S. 389.) United
States v. Vulte, 509.
11. Effect on constitutionality of state court's construction as to application
of state statute.
A statute is not necessarily void for all purposes because it has been
declared by this court to be unconstitutional as applied to a par-
ticular state of facts; it may be sustained as to another state of
facts where the state court has expressly decided that it should not
be construed as applicable to such conditions as would render it
unconstitutional if applied thereto. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co.
v. Anderson, 325.
12. Limitations as part of right conferred.
Limitations specified in the statute creating a new liability are a part
of the right conferred and compliance therewith is essential to
the assertion of the right conferred by the statute. Texas Port-
land Cement Co. v. McCord, 157.
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 5, 8-16, 19.
B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.
See ACTS OF CONGRESS.
C. STATUTES OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES.
See LOCAL LAW.
1. Constitutionality of state statute; presumption as to intention of
In determining whether a state tax statute is constitutional, there is
presumption that the legislature intended to tax only that which
it had the constitutional power to tax, and the statute will be
sustained if full and fair effect can be given to its provisions as
confined wholly to intrastate business. Singer Sewing Machine
Co. v. Brickell, 304.
2. License tax; who within scope of Alabama law imposing license on
vendors of sewing machines.
The court below rightly held that a foreign corporation having an
agency in each county of the State and selling sewing machines
by traveling salesmen as well as at the agencies was subject to
the license intended to be imposed on itinerant sales by the statute
of Alabama, and that it fell without the excepted class of merchants
although the latter made deliveries of machines by wagon. Ib.
3. Estoppel by payment of tax.
In this case held that payments of taxes made under an attempted com-
promise agreement did not operate to estop the taxpayer from
contesting the legality of the action of the taxing authorities in
increasing the assessments on the property. Arizona v. Copper
Queen Mining Co., 87.
4. Separate assessment of mining claims theretofore assessed en masse;
law of Arizona.
In this case this court affirms the judgment of the Supreme Court of
the Territory of Arizona that the Board of Equalization had no
power under the statute of the Territory to raise the separate
assessed valuation of certain mining claims of groups which had
originally been assessed en masse. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 14, 17, 21;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 1, 2, 22.
To chattel incorporated in structure; when lost.
An owner of a chattel may lose title thereto without his consent by
its incorporation into a structure in such manner that its removal
would destroy the structure. Detroit Steel Cooperage Co. v.
Sistersville Brewing Co., 712.
See INDIANS, 5;
PUBLIC LANDS, 10;
RIPARIAN RIGHTS, 1.
TRADE-MARKS.
1. What appropriable as; surnames.
A trade-mark consisting of an ordinary surname is not the subject of
exclusive appropriation as a common-law trade-mark, but may,
under the fourth proviso of § 5 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905,
be validly registered if in use for ten years next preceding the
passage of that act in the manner specified therein. Thaddeus
Davids Co. v. Davids Mfg. Co., 461.
2. Personal and geographical names; effect of fourth proviso of § 5 of
act of 1905.
The fourth proviso of § 5 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 modifies the
general limitations contained in the second proviso of the same
section against the use of personal and geographical names and
terms descriptive of character and quality. Ib.
3. Proper names; registration; infringement.
While a trade-mark consisting of a proper name may be registered
under the fourth proviso of § 5 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905,
another who uses that name will not be regarded as infringing the
trade-mark unless the name is so reproduced, copied or imitated
as to mislead the public with respect to the origin or ownership
of the goods. Ib.
4. Infringement of proper-name trade-mark; jurisdiction of Federal
Improperly using a proper-name trade-mark registered under the
fourth proviso of § 5 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 in such
manner as to mislead the public and thereby constitute infringe-
ment is not merely unfair competition at common law, which
would not give the Federal court jurisdiction unless diverse
citizenship existed, but is a violation of a Federal right and a
Federal court has jurisdiction of an action based thereon. Ib.
5. Infringement; sufficiency of showing as to intent.
While in a case for unfair competition it may be necessary to show
intent to deceive the public, in a case for violation of a properly
registered trade-mark it is not necessary to show wrongful intent
or facts justifying an inference of such intent. Ib.
6. Infringement of proper-name trade-mark; when name properly
registered.
Complainant having, for the period and in the manner specified in
the proviso of § 5 of the Trade-Mark Act of 1905, used the name
"Davids"" in connection with ink manufactured and sold by it
in a particular manner, that name was properly registered as a
trade-mark and the defendants by using the same word in such
a similar style on the ink manufactured by them as to mislead the
public infringed complainant's rights under the statute and
should be enjoined. Ib.
7. Rights conferred by § 5 of act of 1905.
In enacting the Trade-Mark Act of 1905 and inserting the provisos in
§ 5 thereof, Congress did not intend to provide for a barren notice
of an ineffectual claim, but to confer definite rights, and an appli-
cant properly registering under the act becomes the owner of the
trade-mark and entitled to be protected in its use as such. Ib.
TRANSFER TAX.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17.
TRANSITORY ACTIONS.
See ACTIONS, 5.
1. What constitutes; dredging gravel from bed of stream as; remedy of
To constantly dredge gravel from the bed of a stream is a continuing
trespass and wrong that entitles the owner to injunctive relief in
equity and for which he has no adequate remedy at law. Archer
v. Greenville Sand & Gravel Co., 60.
2. On bed of navigable stream; pleading in suit to prevent; presumption
as to permit from Secretary of War.
One sued for removing gravel from the bed of a navigable stream by
the owner of the upland cannot demur on the ground that the
complaint fails to show that he has not obtained a permit from
the Secretary of War. It will not be presumed that the Secre-
tary of War will authorize such removal, and the existence of
such a permit must be pleaded. Ib.
3. Equity jurisdiction to enjoin; timeliness of invocation.
Equity has jurisdiction of an action to enjoin a continuing trespass
even if the injunctive remedy is only asked after final adjudication
and although the trespass may have been discontinued before
that time.
4. Equity jurisdiction to enjoin; timeliness of invocation.
There is no loss of rights or remedies because a plaintiff does not ask
for immediate relief but endures the wrong pending the litigation
and until final adjudication. Ib.
See APPEAL AND ERROR, 1;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 30.
UNFAIR COMPETITION.
See TRADE-MARKS, 4, 5.
Authority; impairment of; consent to; necessity for.
The authority of the United States to enforce a restraint lawfully
created by it cannot be impaired by any action without its
consent. Bowling v. United States, 528.
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