as it has been construed by the highest court of that State, a direct
burden on interstate commerce; but, as so construed, it is a valid
exercise of the police power of the State. Erie R. R. Co. v. Wil-
liams, 685.
See ATTACHMENT AND GARNISHMENT, 4;
EVIDENCE, 3;
JURISDICTION, A 13, 14.
Eminent domain.-See EMINENT DOMAIN, 2.
19. Equal protection of the law; reasonableness of classification for regu-
lation.
A state statute imposing double damages and otherwise valid, is not
unconstitutional as denying the equal protection of the laws be-
cause it applies only to railroad companies and not to litigants in
general. The classification is not arbitrary. (Seaboard Air Line
v. Seegers, 207 U. S. 73.) Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Ander-
325.
20. Equal protection of the law; reasonableness of classification of sellers
of sewing machines.
The classification of merchants selling sewing machines at regular
places of business as distinguished from a manufacturer selling
them by traveling salesmen is not so unreasonable and arbitrary as
to render it a denial of equal protection of the law under the Four-
teenth Amendment. Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Brickell, 304.
21. Equal protection of the law; classification for taxation; discretion of
State.
The State has a wide range of discretion in establishing classes for
revenue taxes, and its laws will not be set aside as discriminatory
if there is any rational basis for the classification. Ib.
22. Equal protection of the law; reasonableness of classification by State;
oleomargarine.
So long as it does not interfere with interstate commerce, a State may
restrict the manufacture of oleomargarine in a way that does not
hamper that of butter. The classification is reasonable and does
not offend the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. (Capital City Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U. S. 238.) Hammond
Packing Co. v. Montana, 331.
23. Equal protection of the laws; reasonableness of classification for regu
lation of insurance concerns.
A discrimination is not invalid under the equal protection provision
of the Fourteenth Amendment if not so arbitrary as to be beyond
the wide discretion that a legislature may exercise; and so held as
to a classification exempting farmers' mutual insurance companies
doing only a farm business from the operation of an act regulating
rates of insurance. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 389.
24. Equal protection of the laws; reasonableness of classification.
A legislative classification may rest on narrow distinctions. Legislation
is addressed to evils as they appear and even degrees of evil may de-
termine its exercise. (Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union National Bank,
207 U. S. 251.) Ib.
25. Equal protection of the law; validity of Alabama railway double dam-
age statute.
A State may impose double damages and an attorney's fee on railway
companies for failure to pay the owner of stock killed within a
reasonable period after demand and award of the jury of the
amount claimed before action commenced; and so held that the
double damage statute of Arkansas is constitutional as applied to
cases of this character. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co. v. Anderson,
325.
St. Louis, Iron Mtn. & Southern Ry. Co. v. Wynne, 224 U. S. 354,
distinguished, as in that case this statute was declared unconstitu-
tional only as applied to claims where the jury awarded less than
the amount demanded. Ib.
27. Equal protection of the laws; corelation of life, liberty and property.
Life, liberty, property and equal protection of the laws as grouped to-
gether in the Constitution are so related that the deprivation of any
one may lessen or extinguish the value of the others.
Smith v.
Texas, 630.
28. Equal protection of the laws; effect to deny, of deprivation of right to
labor.
In so far as a man is deprived of the right to labor, his liberty is re-
stricted, his capacity to earn wages and acquire property is les-
sened, and he is denied the protection which the law affords those
who are permitted to work. Ib.
29. Equal protection of the laws; effect to deny, of Texas statute prescribing
qualifications of railroad conductors.
The statute of Texas of 1909 prohibiting any person from acting as a
conductor on a railroad train without having for two years prior
thereto worked as a brakeman or conductor of a freight train and
prescribing no other qualifications, excludes the whole body of the
public from the right to secure employment as conductors and
amounts, as to persons competent to fill the position but who have
not the specified qualification, to a denial of the equal protection of
the law. Ib.
30. Equal protection of the law; validity of state statute allowing attorneys'
fees to successful plaintiffs.
If the classification is otherwise reasonable, a state statute does not
deny equal protection of the law because attorney's fees are allowed
to successful plaintiffs only and not to successful defendants. The
classification is reasonable. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Cade, 642.
31. Equal protection of the law; validity of state statute allowing attorneys'
fees to successful plaintiffs.
The statute of Texas of 1909 imposing an attorney's fee on the defeated
defendant in certain classes of cases, as the same has been construed
by the highest court of that State, is not unconstitutional under the
equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gulf,
Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, distinguished.
Ib.
See SUPRA, 14, 15, 16;
STATES, 2.
32. Full faith and credit; extent of obligation as to statute creating transi-
tory cause of action.
While the courts of a State are bound to give full faith and credit to all
substantial provisions of a statute of another State creating a
transitory cause of action which inhere in the cause of action or
which name conditions on which the right to sue depends, venue
is no part of a right, and whether jurisdiction exists is to be deter-
mined by the law of the State creating the court in which the case
is tried. Tennessee Coal, I. & R. R. Co. v. George, 354.
33. Full faith and credit; effect of taking jurisdiction of transitory action
limited by law creating it to courts of enacting State.
A state court does not deny full faith and credit to a statute of another
State by taking jurisdiction of a transitory cause of action created
thereby, although such statute provides that the action can only be
brought in the courts of the enacting State. (Atchison &c. Ry. v.
Sowers, 213 U. S. 55.) Ib.
Liberty means more than freedom from servitude; and the constitu-
tional guarantee is an assurance that the citizens shall be protected
in the right to use his powers of mind and body in any lawful call-
ing. Smith v. Texas, 630.
35. States; laws of; requirement of Fourteenth Amendment.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not require that state laws shall be
perfect. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Cade, 642.
Contempts are none the less offenses because trial by jury does not ex-
tend to them as a matter of constitutional right. Gompers v.
United States, 604.
2. Limitations; application of § 1044, Rev. Stat.
The provision in Rev. Stat., § 1044, that no person shall be prosecuted
for an offense not capital unless the indictment is found or informa-
tion instituted within three years after commission of the offense
applies to acts of contempt not committed in the presence of the
court. Ib.
3. Limitations; application of § 1044, Rev. Stat.
The substantive portion of § 1044, Rev. Stat., is that no person shall
be tried for any offense not capital except within the specified time,
and the reference to form of procedure by indictment or informa-
tion does not take contempts out of the statute because the pro-
cedure is by other methods than indictment or information. Ib.
4. Limitations; period of.
As the power to punish for contempt has some limit, this court regards
that limit to have been established as three years by the policy of
the law, if not by statute, by analogy. (Adams v. Wood, 2 Cranch,
336.) Ib.
5. Indictment for; quære as to.
Quare, whether an indictment will lie for a contempt of a court of the
1. Joint; notice to bind parties.
Notice to either of joint contractors is notice to both. Tevis v. Ryan,
273.
2. Inducement; admissibility of evidence as to fraud in.
In this case, the cause of action being not on the contract alone, but
also upon alleged fraudulent conduct, evidence as to oral declara-
tions of the defendant was admissible to show the misrepresenta-
tions alleged as basis for the claim of fraudulent inducement to
make the contract and fraudulent use of the property entrusted
to the defendant thereunder. Ib.
3. Liability under contract in regard to disposition of outstanding stock of
corporation.
Covenants in a contract between individuals who control a corporation,
in regard to disposition of its outstanding stock, construed in this
case to import a personal responsibility on the parties and not on
the corporation. Ib.
4. Construction; judicial power in.
In determining rights thereunder; this court must be governed by the
contract, and cannot first destroy it in part and then enforce that
which remains. Miller v. United States, 1.
5. Construction of contract providing for surrender and reinvestment of
control of corporation.
A contract, providing that in a specified contingency the interest
of the parties surrendering control to the other party shall revest
in them in the same proportion and ratio as they held on the mak-
ing of the contract, was properly construed as contemplating that
the surrendering parties be restored to the same proportionate in-
terest in the property as they held prior to the making of the agree-
ment. Tevis v. Ryan, 273.
6. Government; construction of.
A Government contract should be interpreted as are contracts between
individuals and with a view of ascertaining the intention of the
parties and to give it effect accordingly if that can be done con-
sistently with its terms. Hollerbach v. United States, 165.
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