alongside of those from which quotations have been made it is reasonable to hold that the act applies not merely to transactions had before its date, but to any had before the time of final adjustment. In this case the several grants to the Southern Pacific have not yet been finally adjusted. Further, it must be borne in mind that this is a remedial statute, and is to be construed liberally, and so as to effectuate the purpose of Congress and secure the relief which was designed, and the mere date of the transaction between the purchaser and the railroad company is not of itself vital in determining whether there is or is not an equity in behalf of the purchaser."

Counsel for Davis rely upon Knepper v. Sands, 194 U. S. 476, as placing a different interpretation upon the adjustment act. But, although some broad language is found in the opinion, the real decision did not go as far as suggested. The case came here upon a certificate from a Circuit Court of Appeals, and the question presented for decision, considering the facts stated in the certificate, was, whether a purchase from the railroad company of land erroneously patented for its benefit under the grant of 1864 could be esteemed a purchase in good faith, within the meaning of § 4 of the act of 1887, where at the time of the purchase the land was occupied by a bona fide settler who was residing upon, improving and cultivating the same with a view to acquiring it under the homestead law. The question was answered in the negative, particular emphasis being laid upon the settler's occupancy at the time of the purchase and upon the well known policy of favoring actual settlers. The answer must have been the same whether the purchase was before or after the date of the act, and manifestly there was no purpose to overrule or qualify the decision in United States v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., supra, for it was not even mentioned. So, reading the opinion in Knepper v. Sands with appropriate regard for the facts of the case, we think it is not in point

or controlling here, for no one was occupying or claiming this tract under the settlement laws at the time it was purchased from the company.

The contention that Logan was charged with constructive notice of the defect in the company's title and so was not a purchaser in good faith, in the sense of the adjustment act, must be overruled, as was a like contention in United States v. Winona & St. Peter Railroad Co., 165 U. S. 463. It was there said, referring to the remedial provisions of § 4 (p. 480): "It will be observed that this protection is not granted to simply bona fide purchasers (using that term in the technical sense), but to those who have one of the elements declared to be essential to a bona fide purchaser, to wit, good faith. It matters not what constructive notice may be chargeable to such a purchaser if, in actual ignorance of any defect in the railroad company's title and in reliance upon the action of the Government in the apparent transfer of title by certification or patent, he has made an honest purchase of the lands. The plain intent of this section is to secure him the lands, and to reinforce his defective title by a direct patent from the United States, and to leave to the Government a simple claim for money against the railroad company." And, referring to the provisions of § 5, it was further said (p. 481): "It is true the term used here is 'bona fide purchaser,' but it is a bona fide purchaser from the company, and the description given of the lands, as not conveyed and 'for any reason excepted from the operation of the grant,' indicates that the fact of notice of defect of title was not to be considered fatal to the right. Congress attempted to protect an honest transaction between a purchaser and a railroad company, even in the absence of a certification or patent." This view of the purpose and meaning of the act was repeated and applied in Gertgens v. O'Connor, 191 U. S. 237, and United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 195 U. S. 524

As it thus appears that the decision of the Secretary of the Interior was right in point of law, and as it was conclusive upon all questions of fact (Gertgens v. O'Connor, supra), it follows that the state court erred in not sustaining Logan's title obtained under that decision.

Decree reversed.

SMITH v. STATE OF TEXAS.

ERROR TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF THE STATE OF TEXAS.

No. 268. Argued March 12, 1914.-Decided May 11, 1914.

Life, liberty, property and equal protection of the laws as grouped together in the Constitution are so related that the deprivation of any one may lessen or extinguish the value of the others.

In so far as a man is deprived of the right to labor, his liberty is restricted, his capacity to earn wages and acquire property is lessened, and he is denied the protection which the law affords those who are permitted to work.

Liberty means more than freedom from servitude; and the constitutional guarantee is an assurance that the citizen shall be protected in the right to use his powers of mind and body in any lawful calling. A State may prescribe qualifications and require an examination to test the fitness of any person to engage, or remain, in the public calling.

While the State may legislate in regard to the fitness of persons privately employed in a business in which public health and safety are concerned, the tests and prohibitions must be enacted with reference to such business, and not so as to unlawfully interfere with private business or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133.

Arbitrary tests by which competent persons are excluded from lawful employment must be avoided in state regulations of employment in private business affecting public health and safety. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465.

The statute of Texas of 1909 prohibiting any person from acting as a conductor on a railroad train without having for two years prior thereto worked as a brakeman or conductor of a freight train and prescribing no other qualifications, excludes the whole body of the

233 U.S.

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

public from the right to secure employment as conductors and amounts, as to persons competent to fill the position but who have not the specified qualification, to a denial of the equal protection of the law.

A State cannot, in permitting certain competent persons to accept a specified private employment, lay down a test which absolutely prohibits other competent persons from entering that employment. Quare, whether such a statute is not also unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause as applied to conductors employed on trains engaged in interstate commerce.

THE facts, which involve the constitutionality of the statute of Texas of 1909 prescribing qualifications for conductors on railroad trains, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Gardiner Lathrop, with whom Mr. Robert Dunlap was on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

7th

The Texas statute deprives defendant, without due process of law, of liberty to engage in a lawful occupation for which he was shown to be well fitted and denies to him the equal protection of the laws. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 369; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 31; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 559; Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 53; Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 173; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 124, 125; Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 508, 509; Cooley's Const. Lim., ed., pp. 889, 890; Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat., p. 244; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 176; Wyeth v. Thomas, 200 Massachusetts, 474; Josma v. Western Car Co., 249 Illinois, 508; Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wisconsin, 193; Chenoweth v. Examiners, 135 Pac. Rep. 771; Ruhstrat v. People, 185 Illinois, 133, 141, 142; People v. Schenck, 257 Illinois, 384; In re Opinion of Justices, 211 Massachusetts, 618; Morgan v. State, 101 N. E. Rep. 7; State v. Wagener, 69 Minnesota, 206; Commonwealth v. Snyder, 182 Pa. St. 630; State v. Kreutzberg, 114 Wisconsin, 530; People v. Hawkins, 157 N. Y. 7; Vicksburg v. Mullane, 63 So. Rep. 412.

As to what is an arbitrary classification, see G., C. &

Argument for Defendant in Error.

233 U. S.

S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150; Connolly v. Union Pipe Co., 184 U. S. 549; Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards, 183 U. S. 79; Smith v. Examiners, 88 Atl. Rep. 963; Little v. Tanner, 208 Fed. Rep. 605, 609.

An enactment cannot invade the rights of persons and property under the guise of a police regulation when it is not such in fact. Eden v. People, 161 Illinois, 296; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377; Ritchie v. People, 155 Illinois, 98; Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465; N. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96; Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79; Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173; C., B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 137; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 319; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78; Henderson v. New York, 92 U. S. 259, 268; Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U. S. 137; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 589; Butchers' Union v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S. 761.

The Texas statute is an unreasonable interference with the carrying on of interstate commerce. Adams Express Co. v. New York, 232 U. S. 14; Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 525; Yazoo & Miss. R. R. v. Greenwood Grocery Co., 227 U. S. 1, 3; Houston & Tex. Cent. R. R. v. Mayes, 201 U. S. 321; Central Ry. Co. v. Murphy, 196 U. S. 194, 203, 204.

Mr. B. F. Looney, Attorney General of the State of Texas, and Mr. Luther Nickels, for defendant in error, submitted: The general purpose of the act was within the police power of the State. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 53; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436; Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86; In re Converse, 137 U. S. 624.

A State may prohibit unqualified men from occupying responsible positions in train operation. Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465; N. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96.

The State has the power to prevent individuals from