Kessel, 128 U. S. 456, 461; Parsons v. Venzke, 164 U. S. 89.

3. So that the case involves a determination of the single question as to whether the patent was properly refused by the Land Department because of the objection that the Brick Company had failed to comply with the terms of the law relating to Mineral Land. Rev. Stat., § 2325. That can be determined by an inspection of the record, in which the order appears. It shows that the cancellation of the entry was not based on the Brick Company's failure to do the annual assessment work, or to give the proper notice, or to pay the statutory price, but solely for the reason that the affidavit of posting was executed before an officer who resided outside of the land district.

That decision (37 L. D. 155), though supported by some Departmental rulings of comparatively recent date, was in conflict with the established practice of the Land Department, and was expressly and by name overruled, on July 29, 1911, in Ex parte Stock Oil Company, 40 L. D. 198, which reaffirmed prior decisions to the effect that irregularities in proof, including the execution of affidavits before other than the designated officers, might be supplied, even on appeal.

These and similar rulings, previously followed in the Department, are manifestly correct. They accord with. the policy of the land laws, under which the United States does not act as an ordinary proprietor seeking to sell real estate at the highest possible price, but offers it on liberal terms to encourage the citizen and to develop the country. The Government does not deal at arm's length with the settler or locator and whenever it appears that there has been a compliance with the substantial requirements of the law, irregularities are waived or permission is given, even on appeal, to cure them by supplemental proofs. United States v. Marshall Mining Co., 129 U. S. 579, 587. In

the present case such proof by supplemental affidavits, properly executed, showed that the land had been properly posted. But that fact was not allowed to have any effect because of the mistaken view that, as the original affidavit of posting had been signed before an officer residing outside of the land district, the patent proceedings were absolutely void. This confused service by proper postingwhich was jurisdictional, with defective proof of such service which-like the defective return of an officer,could be corrected. Under the law, jurisdiction depended upon giving notice by publication in a newspaper, by posting in the land office, and by posting on the land itself, -the statute directing how the giving of such notice should be proved. But irregularities in complying with such directory provision could be cured, and when cured, as it was here, the patent should have been issued. The cancellation of the entry was based on a plain error of law, and though there was no appeal in fact, and no right of appeal to the courts, the ruling did not operate to deprive the Brick Company of its property in the mines. The fact that the Brick Company, perforce, yielded to the erroneous ruling, and instituted new proceedings in order to secure a patent, as evidence of its title, did not destroy the rights with which the Company had become invested by full compliance with the requirements of Rev. Stat., § 2325. When, therefore, in the suit to try the right of possession the plaintiff asked that proper effect be given to the final receipt and the entry on which it was based as a judgment in rem, it was not making, as is contended, a collateral attack on the order of the Land Department, but was merely relying on the valid entry and asking the court to decline to give effect to the erroneous cancellation. 4. This conclusion makes it unnecessary to decide the question as to whether the territorial statute, imposing upon the locator the burden of proving that he has performed the annual assessment work, is void as being in

conflict with the Federal statutes, which require no such annual proof, raise no presumption of abandonment and as construed in Hammer v. Garfield, 130 U. S. 291, demand clear and convincing proof that work has not been done before a forfeiture can be declared. It also makes it unnecessary to determine whether the affidavit of work being offered for one purpose by McKnight could be used for another purpose by the Brick Company as substantive evidence in the case.

Many pages of the briefs are devoted to a discussion of these questions, but if any of them were decided in favor of the Brick Company it could not increase its rights. If the legal propositions involved could be decided in favor of McKnight that could not overcome the fact that the issuance of the final receipt to the Brick Company on October 23, 1905, was an adjudication not only that the Brick Company was entitled to a patent, but that McKnight then had no adverse claim to the land. Of course he acquired none in May, 1906, by locating on property that had previously been and then was segregated from the public domain.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico is reversed and the case is remanded to the Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed.

AMERICAN IRON AND STEEL MANUFACTURING CO. v. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAILWAY.

CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.

No. 233. Argued March 6, 1914.-Decided April 6, 1914.

Whatever may have been the English and early American rule, the present tendency in this country is to allow interest on contracts to pay money from the date the debt becomes due; and so held as to goods sold in Virginia on a credit of thirty days.

The acceptance of goods sold on a credit of a specified number of days is equivalent to a promise to pay the money on that day, Atlantic Phosphate Co. v. Grafflin, 114 U. S. 492, and interest accrues as an incident of the debt and not merely as damages.

The general rule that interest is not allowed after property of the insolvent is in custodia legis, is not based on loss of interest-bearing quality, but is a necessary and enforced rule incident to equality of distribution between creditors of assets which, in most cases, are insufficient to pay all debts in full.

On the facts certified in this case, held that interest was recoverable on a debt for goods sold on a thirty day credit at the legal rate of interest from the expiration of the credit until payment, including the period that the assets of the debtor were in the hands of a receiver in a suit to foreclose a mortgage.

UNDER the provisions of § 6 of the act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, 26 Stat. 826, 828, the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit certified to this court a question on which it desired instruction, and in that connection made the following Statement of Facts:

"Upon a bill filed by a railway company alleging its insolvency and consequent inability to maintain itself as a going concern, except through the medium of a receivership, receivers were appointed. The bill alleged that a receivership would enable the property of the Railway Company to be preserved and maintained as a whole,

and the sums due and to become due to the bondholders and creditors to be secured and ultimately paid in full.

"The trustee in the first mortgage answered the bill admitting its allegations, and afterwards filed a cross bill again admitting the allegations of the bill in regard to the insolvency of the company. The suit was not a creditors' suit. The trustee subsequently filed a bill in the same court to foreclose the mortgage, seeking a sale of the equity of redemption, and the two suits were consolidated. No prior encumbrancers were made parties to either suit. Prior to the receivership the claimant furnished supplies to the railway company, for which, shortly after the receivers were appointed, a lien was duly perfected under the statute of Virginia known as the Labor and Supply Lien Statute, Code of Va., § 2485. The supplies were sold on a credit of '30 days, one per cent. discount allowed for payment in 10 days.' Claimant filed its claim before the Special Master in the receivership proceedings, relying upon a statutory lien under the statute above mentioned. The Special Master reported against the allowance of interest on the claim, to which report in that particular claimant excepted.

"Subsequently, on the petition of the railway company, a decree was entered approving 'a plan of adjustment' of the finances of the company, and providing for turning back to the company its property, and for ending the receivership at a certain time. From time to time during the receivership and at the ratification of the plan of adjustment, and as a part thereof, all interest due at the time of the appointment of the receivers and accruing during the receivership on all the funded and many of the floating obligations of the Railway Company were paid in full. The amount so paid for interest aggregated some millions of dollars.

"The decree approving the plan of adjustment provided that the company should pay in due course of business all