ing by its mining operations. They had disclosed the existence of an extensive bed of valuable coal dipping to the west under the valley, and in that way had supplemented the evidence afforded by the outcrop and its surroundings. Without any doubt these considerations induced the company to believe, and rightly so, that the lands in controversy possessed a value for coal mining greatly in excess of their value for any other purpose. This explains the expenditure and the persistency of the company's efforts to acquire them; and the fact that the earlier effort was obviously fraudulent and unlawful, independently of the character of the lands, serves in no small degree to explain the kindred practices employed in the later effort. In short, the company, without care as to the means, sought and acquired the lands because it regarded them as valuable for coal. Its view and purpose were also reflected by its maps and tax returns. Of course, it was not a bona fide purchaser from Sneddon and Harrison, for they were mere agents representing it as an undisclosed principal.

An exposure to the eye of coal upon the particular lands was not essential to give them a then present value for coal mining. They were all adjacent to the outcrop and above the plane of the coal-bearing strata dipping under the valley. In alternate even-numbered sections they substantially paralleled the outcrop for seven miles, and in two places were separated from it by only a few rods. Those to the north were opposite the company's developed mine (No. 4), and those to the south were opposite the tract acquired through Lees, upon which good coal was disclosed. The outcrop, the disclosures in the vicinity, and the geological formation pointed with convincing force to a workable bed of merchantable coal extending under the valley and penetrating these lands. These conditions were open to common observation, and were such as would appeal to practical men and be relied upon by

them in making investments for coal mining. They did so appeal to the Cumberland people, as well as this company, both large concerns represented by men of experience, understanding the uncertainties and hazards of the business as well as its rewards. No doubt it has its uncertainties and hazards, but the evidence shows that they are not so pronounced as indicated by the company's experts. There is no fixed rule that lands become valuable for coal only through its actual discovery within their boundaries. On the contrary, they may, and often do, become so through adjacent disclosures and other surrounding or external conditions; and when that question arises in cases such as this, any evidence logically relevant to the issue is admissible, due regard being had to the time to which it must relate.

The case of Colorado Coal & Iron Co. v. United States, 123 U. S. 307, relied upon by the coal company, is essentially different from this in that there the court was dealing with a statute excepting from entry lands on which there were "mines" at the time, a matter particularly noticed in the opinion (p. 328), while here the exception is of "mineral lands" and "lands valuable for minerals." Rev. Stat., §§ 2302, 2318.

It will be perceived that we are not here concerned with a mere outcropping of coal with nothing pointing persuasively to its quality, extent or value; neither are we considering other minerals whose mode of deposition and situation in the earth are so irregular or otherwise unlike coal as to require that they be dealt with along other lines. Decree affirmed.

EL PASO BRICK COMPANY, APPELLANT, v. JOHN

H. MCKNIGHT.

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF NEW MEXICO.

No. 185. Argued January 22, 23, 1914.-Decided April 6, 1914.

Locators of mining claims have the exclusive right of possession of all the surface so long as they make the improvements or do the annual assessment work required by Rev. Stat., § 2324. To convert this defeasible possessory right into a fee simple the locator must comply with the provisions of Rev. Stat., §§ 2325, 2333.

The entry by the local land officer issuing the final receipt to a locator is in the nature of a judgment in rem and determines the validity of locations, completion of assessment work and absence of adverse claims.

The holder of a final receipt is in possession under an equitable title, and until it is lawfully canceled is to be treated as though the patent had been delivered to him. Dahl v. Raunheim, 132 U. S. 260. While the General Land Office has power of supervision over acts of local officers and can annul entries obtained by fraud or made without authority of law, it may not arbitrarily exercise this power; and if a cancellation is made on mistake of law it is subject to judicial review when properly drawn in question in judicial proceedings. Under the policy of the land laws the United States is not an ordinary proprietor selling land and seeking the highest price, but offers liberal terms to encourage the citizen and develop the country. Where there has been compliance with the substantial requirements of the land laws, irregularities are waived or permission given to cure them; and so held that, under the circumstances of this case, as there had been proper posting under Rev. Stat., §§ 2325 and 2333, the fact that the original affidavit of posting was made before an officer residing outside the district and not within the district as required by § 2335, did not render the entry void. The defect was curable and cancellation of entry for that defect alone was improper. The yielding of a locator holding a final receipt to an erroneous ruling does not destroy the rights with which he has become vested by full compliance with the requirements of Rev. Stat., § 2325.

Quare, whether § 2135, Comp. Laws New Mexico, imposing upon a

locator of mineral lands the burden of proving that he has performed the annual assessment work, is void as in conflict with the Federal statutes. See Hammer v. Garfield, 130 U. S. 29.

Quare, whether an affidavit of work offered for one purpose by an adverse claimant can be used for another purpose by the locator as substantive evidence in the case.

A locator acquires no rights by locating on property that had previously been, and then was, segregated from the public domain. 16 New Mex. 721, reversed.

In proceedings brought by McKnight to try the right of possession to conflicting mining locations, it appeared that the defendant, the El Paso Brick Company, was in possession of the Aluminum International and Hortense claims, constituting what was known as the Aluminum group of placer mines. It held under locations made prior to January, 1903. In 1905 the company decided to apply for a patent to the land which embraced about 411 acres. Accordingly, on August 2, 1905, it filed with the Register of the land office at Las Cruces, Dona Ana County, New Mexico, an application for a patent together with an affidavit (executed before an officer residing outside of the mining district) that notice of the application had been posted on the land. These papers were filed with the Register who gave the further notice required by statute. No protest or adverse claim was filed by any person. The Brick Company paid $1027.50, being the purchase price fixed by Rev. Stat., § 2333, and on October 23, 1905, the land officers allowed an entry on which the Receiver issued a final receipt-the material portions of which were as follows:

"United States Land Office at Las Cruces, N. Mexico, "October 23, 1905.

"Received from The El Paso Brick Company, El Paso, Texas, the sum of Ten hundred and twenty-seven and 50-100 dollars, the same being payment in full for the area embraced in that Mining Claim known as the 'Alum

410.90 acres in the Brickland Mining District, in the County of Dona Ana and Territory of New Mexico, as shown by the survey thereof.

"$1027.50.

Henry D. Bowman, Receiver." The entry and this final receipt prima facie entitled the Company to a patent, which however was not issued because various parties filed protests with the Land Commissioner in which it was asserted that the Brick Company's locations were originally void, or if valid, had been forfeited. It was also contended that the Company was not entitled to a patent because the affidavit showing the posting of the notice on the land had not been signed before an officer residing within the land district as provided in Rev. Stat., § 2335, which declares that "all affidavits required to be made under this chapter [mining laws] may be verified before any officer authorized to administer oaths within the land district where the claims may be situated."

Notice of these protests was given to the Brick Company which was allowed 60 days within which to show cause why the entry should not be cancelled. "In response numerous affidavits and exhibits designed to overcome the objections were filed on behalf of the Company," among which was a "supplementary affidavit with reference to such posting and such claim which was in compliance with the laws of the United States and was verified before a proper officer."

On September 4, 1906, the Commissioner ruled that the entry was fatally defective because the original affidavit as to posting had not been executed before an officer residing in the land district. From that ruling the Brick Company appealed.

There was a hearing before the Assistant Secretary of the Interior, who, on September 9, 1908, rendered a decision, 37 L. D. 155, in which, after discussing the pro