Knowledge of the shipper that the rate is based on value is to be presumed from the terms of the bill of lading and of the published schedules filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, and the effect of so filing the schedules makes the published rates binding upon shipper and carrier alike.

The limitation of liability of carriers for passengers' baggage is covered by the Interstate Commerce Act and the Carmack amendment to the Hepburn Act applies thereto as well as to liability for shipments of freight.

Under § 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act carriers must include in the schedules of rates filed regulations affecting passengers' baggage and the limitations of liability.

A provision in a tariff schedule that the passenger must declare the value of his baggage and pay stated excess charges for excess liability over the stated value to be carried free, is a regulation within the meaning of §§ 6 and 22 of the Interstate Commerce Act and as such is sufficient to give the shipper notice of the limitation.

In construing a statute, the practical interpretation given to it by the administrative body charged with its enforcement is entitled to weight.

The effect of permitting the carrier to file regulations as to pas

sengers' baggage which limit its liability except on payment of specified rates is not to change the common law rule that the carrier is an insurer against its own negligence but simply that the carrier shall obtain commensurate compensation for the responsibility assumed.

Where charges for full liability as specified in the published tariff are unreasonable, they can only be attacked before the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Congress is familar with the customs of travelers including that of checking baggage; and so held that a baggage check is sufficient compliance as to passengers' baggage with the provision in the Carmack amendment for issuing a receipt or bill of lading for the shipment.

If the subject needs regulation it is within the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission, under §§ 1 and 15 of the Act of June 18, 1910, to make requirements as to checks or receipts to be given for baggage by common carriers.

209 Massachusetts, 598, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the construction of the Car

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Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

mack Amendment to the Hepburn Act and the right of a common carrier which has filed schedules containing regulations as to passengers' baggage to limit its liability for loss of such baggage caused by its own negligence to the extent and in the manner specified in the schedules, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Frederick N. Wier, with whom Mr. Edgar J. Rich was on the brief, for plaintiff in error:

Congress has assumed exclusive jurisdiction of the subject-matter in issue thereby making the determination of the effect and validity of the baggage regulations of the plaintiff in error a Federal question.

Rates, parts of rates, and regulations affecting or determining rates, fares, and charges, or the value of the service rendered, have the force of law and therefore enter into and become a part of all contracts for interstate transportation.

The regulations contained in the schedules of the railroad company providing for carrying 150 pounds of personal baggage not exceeding $100 in value free for each passenger on presentation of a full ticket and specifying rates for excess value, have the force of law.

Such regulations are not void as being contrary to the common law or as against public policy or in violation of any Federal statute.

The reasonableness of the regulations is not in issue.

The regulations do not offend any principle of common law or public policy.

The regulations are not in violation of any Federal statute.

Such regulations are a part of the rates, and are regulations affecting or determining rates, fares, and charges, or the value of the service rendered, and when contained in

Argument for Defendant in Error.

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the schedules of the plaintiff in error had the force of law and entered into and became a part of the contract with defendant in error.

The regulations affected and determined rates, fares, and charges.

The regulations affected and determined the value of the service rendered.

Upon the ground of estoppel the limit of liability is $100 and would be even if the regulations of the railroad company were confined to the first paragraph.

In support of these contentions, see Adams Ex. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U. S. 14; Alair v. North Pacific R. R., 53 Minnesota, 160; Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U. S. 56; Bernard v. Adams Exp. Co., 205 Massachusetts, 254; Blumantle v. Fitchburg R. R., 127 Massachusetts, 322; Chicago & Alton Ry. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U. S. 155; Fourth Nat. Bank v. Olney, 63 Michigan, 58; Hammond v. Whittredge, 204 U. S. 538; Hart v. Penn. R. R. Co., 112 U. S. 331; Hoeger v. Chi., Mil. & St. P. Ry. Co., 63 Wisconsin, 100; Re Released Rates, 13 I. C. C. 550; Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U. S. 167; Kansas City Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639; Louis. & Nash. Ry. v. Motley, 219 U. S. 467; Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657; N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 531; N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. v. Int. Com. Comm., 200 U. S. 361; Polleys v. Black River Imp. Co., 113 U. S. 81; Squire v. N. Y. C. R. R. Co., 98 Massachusetts, 239; Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255; Tex., & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426; Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242; Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co., 227 U. S. 469; York Co. v. Central R. R., 3 Wall. 107.

Mr. Samuel Williston for defendant in error:

The carrier and its agents, having received possession of the goods, were charged with the duty of delivering them

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Argument for Defendant in Error.

or explaining why that had not been done. Galveston Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U. S. 481, 492..

There is no question involved of the limits of Federal and state laws.

By the rule of the common law a limitation of liability was invalid unless a special contract was made by which the shipper agreed thereto, or unless the shipper was estopped by misrepresentation. Brown v. Eastern R. R., 11 Cush. 97; Malone v. Boston & Worcester R. R., 12 Gray, 388; Graves v. Adams Exp. Co., 176 Massachusetts, 280; John Hood Co. v. Am. Pneumatic Co., 191 Massachusetts, 27; The Majestic, 166 U. S. 375; Henderson v. Stevenson, L. R. 2 H. L. (Sc.) 470, 481.

There can be no limitation of liability without the assent of the shipper. Cau v. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., 194 U. S. 427, 431; N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 How. 344.

The law in the absence of special contract fixes the degree of care and diligence due from the railroad company to persons carried on its trains. York Co. v. Central Railroad, 3 Wall. 107; Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357; Hart v. Pennsylvania R. R., 112 U. S. 331, 343; Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phænix Ins. Co., 129 U. S. 397, 441, 442; Saunders v. Southern Railway, 128 Fed. Rep. 15.

Similar decisions have been made in recent years in precisely the same manner as before the passage of the Interstate Commerce Acts. Williams v. Central R. R. Co., 183 N. Y. 518; S. C., 93 N. Y. App. Div. 582; Martin v. Central R. R. Co., 121 N. Y. App. Div. 552; Homer v. Oregon Short Line, 128 Pac. Rep. 522; Black v. Atlantic Coast Line, 82 So. Car. 478; Elliott on Railroads (4th ed.), § 1510; Hutchinson on Carriers (3d ed.), §§ 401, 405; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477; Adams Express Co. v. Green, 112 Virginia, 527.

A few States have upheld to its full extent a contract of valuation or limiting liability, but have also held that

Argument for Defendant in Error.

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no merely formal assent can be inferred from accepting a bill of lading or a receipt without actual knowledge of its contents, and without the shipper's attention being called by the carrier to the limitation, though an agreement made with full knowledge of the situation would bind the shipper. See Hutchinson, Carriers (3d ed.), § 410; Plaff v. Pacific Exp. Co., 251 Illinois, 243; Hill v. Adams Exp. Co., 82 N. J. L. 373; Wichern v. U. S. Exp. Co., 83 N. J. L. 241.

The ground upon which the validity of a limitation upon a recovery for loss or damage due to negligence depends is that of estoppel. Wells, Fargo & Co. v. NeimanMarcus Co., 227 U. S. 469, 476; Kansas City So. Ry. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 651. Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, distinguished.

While in Massachusetts it has been the law that the acceptance of a document binds one who receives it, though he may not choose to read it, as held in Grace v. Adams, 100 Massachusetts, 505; Grinnell v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 113 Massachusetts, 299; Hoadley v. Nor. Transp. Co., 115 Massachusetts, 304; Clement v. West. Un. Tel. Co., 137 Massachusetts, 463; Graves v. Adams Exp. Co., 176 Massachusetts, 280, and see Cau v. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 194 U. S. 427, 431, it has also been the law both of this court and of the Massachusetts court that a public notice of an asserted limitation by the carrier, even though the shipper was aware of it (which was not the fact in the case at bar), does not have the effect of an agreement or representation. Some actual assent is necessary. N. J. Steam Nav. Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 6 Howard, 344, 382; Railroad Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 16 Wall. 318, 328; Judson v. West. R. R. Corp., 6 Allen, 486, 491; Buckland v. Adams Exp. Co., 97 Massachusetts, 124, 131. See also 1 Hutchinson on Carriers, 3d ed., § 406; Henderson v. Stevenson, L. R. 2 H. L. (Sc.) 470; Richardson v. Rowntree (1894), A. C. 217; Parker v. Southeastern Ry. Co., 2 C. P. D. 416.