would seriously question that. But, I think that training missions. small operations on a temporary basis, that sort of thing, might be very possible.

Senator STONE. Mr. Chairman, may I ask the Senator to yield, even though his time is up on this regime of neutrality question for one question? I think it might clarify a question.

Senator CHURCH. You are asking the Senator to yield time that he no longer has? [General laughter.]

Senator STONE. That's right. [General laughter.]
Would the chairman please yield?

Senator CHURCH. All right, I will yield.

Senator STONE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

CONSTRUCTION OF REGIME OF NEUTRALITY

The question was raised on your construction of the regime of neutrality, that it was between Panama and the United States alone. But isn't it the case that the conditions outlined in the treaty of neutrality are reposed in the OAS-Organization of American States-for many nations to sign and that actually this is not a bilateral part of the regime of neutrality, but it is intended to take place with regard to all nations, whatever preferences we do get?

Senator SARBANES. I would think on that, as a legal matter, that the treaty is between the United States and Panama, and the maintenance of the regime is their responsibility; but to the extent other countries have subscribed to its purposes and objectives by signing the protocol and depositing it with the OAS, they, in effect, have indicated their approval or subscription to the terms contained within the regime, although I do not think that they, as a consequence, either have acquired any rights or assumed any obligations with respect to the regime of neutrality.

Senator STONE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator CHURCH. Our two witnesses at our end of the table have helped considerably in clarifying these particular provisions. [General laughter.]

I am left with only one question in my mind that I would like to ask the panel.

U.S. RIGHTS FOR EXPEDITIOUS USE OF CANAL

The regime of neutrality establishes and sets up our rights of expeditious use of the canal. Do those rights of expeditious use continue after the expiration of our treaty with Panama, that is, after December 31, 1999?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. They are contained in the treaty of neutrality, which takes effect at the same time as the basic canal treaty and runs on indefinitely.

CANAL TRAFFIC FIGURES

Senator CHURCH. I have been looking over some figures of the traffic. in the canal over the years. I notice that in recent years traffic is beginning to fall off, as is the tonnage. Is that be the very largest

vessels now being built for purposes of achieving the economy of size cannot use the canal?

General BROWN. I am not sure which figures you have before you, Mr. Chairman. The ones I have before me contain only U.S. Government vessels and cargo ships.

Senator CHURCH. These figures are worldwide.

Secretary BROWN. Then I suspect that the fact that the larger tankers, for example oil tankers, cannot go through the canal, has had a substantial effect. I am given to understand that that may well be worse as Alaskan oil becomes available, although it will have to be lightered through by smaller vessels.

PRESENT CANAL CANNOT ACCOMMODATE LARGE SHIPS

Senator CHURCH. This means that the present canal, with locks that are insufficiently large to accommodate the supertankers, or indeed our largest aircraft carriers, is already obsolescent and will become more so in the future since all indications are that the number of large ships will increase certainly the commercial will, and you will have to speak as to the warships. The commercial ships are getting larger. So, between now and the end of the century, a much bigger percentage of the ships using the oceans of the world might well be too large to use the present canal.

Isn't that correct?

Secretary BROWN. It is certainly true of the large tankers. Those will be an increasing fraction.

I think that the traffic may nevertheless go up as the world comes out of the present recession.

It is also true that a wider canal would be more useful, if it justifies the cost.

Senator CHURCH. For both military as well as commercial reasons; isn't that the case, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary BROWN. A wider sea level canal would be more useful.

Senator CHURCH. Since your newest and largest aircraft carriers cannot use the present canal

Secretary BROWN. That's right.

Senator CHURCH [continuing]. You would have a military benefit, as well as a commercial benefit, in a larger, wider, deeper, lock-free, sealevel canal.

Secretary BROWN. That's right.

BASIS FOR BUILDING NEW CANAL

Senator CHURCH. This treaty provides a basis for building a new canal that would accommodate the future military and commercial needs of the United States, does it not?

Secretary BROWN. In essence, it provides the United States with the exclusive option to build such a canal, through the term of the treaty, and Panama with the right to be the exclusive place that we consider during that term.

Senator CHURCH. So, with the treaties, we have an exclusive option to build the canal that might service the future commercial and military needs of the country. Do we have that right without the treaties?

Secretary BROWN. I believe that we have a right under the present treaty as well, but I am not sure of the exact nature of that right. But I believe it exists at present.

Senator CHURCH. Would you supply the committee with whatever rights we now have with respect to the building of a new canal so that the committee can compare those rights with the rights that are conferred in this treaty?

Secretary BROWN. Yes, sir.

[The information referred to follows:]

UNITED STATES RIGHTS UNDER THE 1903 TREATY TO CONSTRUCT A SEA LEVEL CANAL OR ADD A THIRD LANE OF LOCKS WITHIN THE PRESENT CANAL ZONE

[Supplied by Department of Defense]

(As provided by the State Legal Advisor). The U.S. position is that the U.S. does possess the rights to construct a sea level canal or add a third lane of locks within the Canal Zone. Panama disputes these rights on the basis of the 1936 Treaty. The 1903 Treaty, however, provides the U.S. a monopoly for the construetion of any inter-oceanic canal in Panama, thereby giving the U.S. a veto with respect to a third country undertaking this project. We have no rights to use areas outside of the current Canal Zone for these projects. Note: Assuming the validity of the U.S. position, these rights are of marginal value. (1) Any sea level canal in Panama will have to be outside of the Canal Zone. (2) The water required under the proposed terminal lakes third locks plan, the one favored for such a project, would denude the watershed without providing sufficient water to operate the locks. The new Panama Canal Treaty provides clear and unambiguous rights for the addition of a third set of locks should this be deemed desirable. The Treaty commits the U.S. and Panama to study the feasibility of a sea level canal and if the two countries agree on its necessity, then to negotiate terms for its construetion. The Treaty precludes the construction of any new canal in Panama during the treaty's lifetime, without the consent of the U.S.

Senator CHURCH. We have another rollcall vote.

I just want to make one final comment.

UNDERSTANDING TO ACCOMPANY ARTICLES OF RATIFICATION SUGGESTION

Again and again the questions today of the different Senators have come back to the rights of the United States to protect the canal, to keep it open, during the period of the treaty and afterward. We have had various references to interpretations that the Panamanian spokesmen have made that may differ from our own.

I agree that this is a matter that needs to be cleared up. Furthermore, I think it is an appropriate matter for an understanding to accompany the Articles of Ratification so that there can be no question as to the Senate's interpretation of the meaning of these treaties in regard to the future security of the canal. Whether that must become a reservation I think depends to a large degree upon whether the Panamanians do, in fact, adopt a different interpretation. So far there is no evidence of this. The Chief of Government of Panama has indicated otherwise. I would hope that the Senate would not have to consider a reservation. But, in any case, I think an understanding on this score should be attached to the instrument of ratification, and I think our hearings thus far pretty well establish that need.

Senator CASE. Would the Senator yield on my time for a little further discussion about that point?

Senator CHURCH. Yes.

Senator CASE. I think one of the things that is most important is what the Panamanian leaders do between now and the time of their plebiscite or referendum in explaining this and its meaning to the Panamanian people. I think we ought to be very conscious of what they say because it will do us no good at all in respect of a climate of Panamanian opinion to have a difference between what we understand the treaties to do and what the Panamanians themselves think when they vote to ratify it.

For my own purpose, therefore, I am going to be very heavily affected by what goes on in Panama between now and the time of the referendum. I think our committee ought to be following that independently. You gentlemen, I am sure, don't disagree with this because we are all after the same objective, the best kind of attitude resulting in Panama in respect of the security and the future of the canal. Gentlemen, I think it is my turn for a couple of questions on the second round. So I would like to proceed this way.

PANAMANIAN TYRANNY, RELATIONS WITH COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

I wonder if you would clear up a point or comment on a statement that Senator Allen made a couple of days ago in the Congressional Record. This appears in the issue for September 22, 1977, page S15321. He comments on the visit of a Soviet delegation to Panama and its negotiations on July 19 of this year of an agreement with Panama, including the following points: The construction of a major heavy equipment repair facility in Panama for use by the Soviet Union; permission for the Soviet Union to take advantage of the tariff "free zone" at Colón for Soviet merchandise; and so on. He makes the comment against that background that he questioned

seriously the judgment of those who would urge Congress to support treaties which would prop up and perpetuate a military regime whose leader oppresses his own countrymen and seems bent on forging an alliance with the world's bloodiest and most tyrannical imperial power.

These treaties, he concludes

are clearly not in the best interest of the United States or the Free World. Since they will tend to darken and prolong the night of tyranny and oppression in Panama, neither are they in the best interest of the Panamanian people.

I wish you would comment on any aspects of that statement and on that conclusion for the benefit of the record and for the benefit of the American people.

Secretary BROWN. Senator Case, the Panamanian regime is neither the least authoritarian Latin American regime, nor is it the most authoritarian.

Its relations with Communist governments, political and economic, are probably considerably less than our own.

There was recently a trade mission, I believe, from the Soviet Union that visited Panama, but there was no particular outcome. I suspect there may be future trade relations between Panama and the Soviet Union, but if such relations disqualify a country, we are disqualified ourselves.

I think that the concerns expressed in the statement which you have quoted are not really borne out.

SIGNIFICANCE OF RUSSIAN INSTALLATION IN PANAMA

Senator CASE. I wonder if you and your professional colleagues would comment specifically on the question of the Russian installations and how significant they are.

General BROWN. Our information is that there was discussion of the Soviets capitalizing or investing in a plant to overhaul and maintain heavy sugar cane production equipment. However, this was not consummated.

The rumors that the Soviet trade mission was really a disguise to negotiate the use of a naval port in Panama we found no evidence to support.

We may see some activity by the Soviet Union in trade, as the Secretary has said, and in banking in Panama. There is a small "Tass" office there for press representation. But the total extent of the Soviet presence in Panama is very minimal and, as the Secretary said, it is certainly not as extensive as it is in the United States.

Senator CASE. Thank you, General. If there is any further comment that any of you want to make on that point, I would be glad to have it included in the record of these hearings.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to reserve the balance of my time on this round because I have to get over to vote, or I will miss the vote. I yield my time temporarily, if I may.

DEFENSIBILITY OF CANAL

Senator CLARK [presiding]. General Brown, I wanted to ask further about the defensibility of the canal. It is a little hard to define, I am sure, but at one point it seemed to me that you were saying that the canal is defensible. At another point it seemed to me that a string of saboteurs could continually interrupt canal operations.

My question is this. Given the vulnerability of this rather narrow artery which traverses very difficult terrain, how could you effectively defend the canal against all possible attacks? For example, wouldn't it be easy for an enemy to simply blow up his own ship on the way through? Or, I am sure what your air defenses are, but how would you prevent an aircraft from dropping a bomb?

General BROWN. Our air defenses are nil for all practical purposes. The only active heavy radar is the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration] radar that handles commercial as well as military traffic, principally commercial traffic.

The aircraft that are deployed in Panama are not optimum interceptors. They are really attack aircraft.

The threat to Panama is not from air attack today. If we are worrying about the canal being destroyed by a missile or air attack, it can be destroyed. But it seems to me that at that point the game changes. Senator CLARK. Let's forget that exception and think of the others, then.

General BROWN. On the sabotage, then, the way we could handle it is with a very heavy investment of troops and with an acceptance of some rather extensive offensive operations to track these people down. Now my statement was that this still would not guarantee that