Insertions for the record-Continued U.S. intercoastal trade and exports and imports-- Petroleum and petroleum products trade routes_ Prepared statement of Hon. Brock Adams and attachments-- Page 342 343 352 382 Letter to Senator Charles H. Percy from Richard N. Cooper, Under 384 402 434 435 Increase in transit cost for food and feed grains___ 440 Percentage of international trade transiting the Panama Canal, by country, 1973 447 Transporting costs of corn, wheat and soy beans from Des Moines, 451 Senator Percy's additional questions of Secretary Adams_ 452 454 Cable to Secretary of State, Washington, D.C. from American Em- "Treaties Foes Emerge in Panama with Rare Freedom of Expression," Letter to Hon. John J. Sparkman, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Letter to Hon. John J. Sparkman from Douglas J. Bennett, Jr., Assist- 456 478 487 488 488 495 Letter to President Carter from the Atlantic-Pacific Interocean Canal Appendix: Text of treaties relating to the Panama Canal and documents asociated with the treaties__ 497 A Collection of Major Statements on the Question of U.S. Sovereignty in the Panama Canal Zone, compiled by the Congressional Reference Service of the Library of Congress_ 571 PANAMA CANAL TREATIES MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1977 UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D.C. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, the Honorable John Sparkman (chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Senators Sparkman, Church, Pell, McGovern, Clark, Biden, Glenn, Stone, Sarbanes, Case, Javits, Griffin, and Baker. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order, please. OPENING STATEMENT The committee meets this morning to begin the hearing process on the Panama Canal agreements signed by President Carter on September 7, 1977, and submitted to the Senate on September 16, 1977. By the rules of the Senate and longstanding tradition, these agreements have been referred to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, which has exclusive jurisdiction over treaty matters. Given this responsibility, the committee will endeavor to compile a full and complete hearing record. As I stated on September 12, when these hearings were announced, "The committee will pursue one clear course of action, to review fully the issues involved in a new Panama Canal Pact, to inform ourselves and the citizens of the United States about these issues and in the final analysis to give the Senate its best judgment on the proposed agreement." To begin the process this week will be devoted to hearing executive branch witnesses. The following week, on October 4 and 5, the committee will receive testimony from congressional witnesses, Members of Congress who wish to express their views on these very important and highly controversial agreements. During the week of October 10, the committee has rearranged its schedule so that throughout that week we shall be able to hear from an array of public witnesses and outside experts. As I have said before, "the committee will make a genuine effort to listen to all interested parties in an effort to compile as full and complete a record as it can in order to guarantee to the Senate, the Congress, and the American people that every effort has been made to obtain all points of view." As a personal note, I want to say I have not made up my mind about the proposed agreements. To do so at this stage would be premature. Rather, I intend to listen carefully to all of the testimony and to make (1) a judgment only after everyone has been heard. I think there is no other sound course for the chairman of this committee to take. We welcome here this morning Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. With Mr. Vance are Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and Mr. Sol Linowitz, the two gentlemen who headed up the U.S. negotiating team for the Carter administration. We welcome all of you here this morning. Before we proceed, I will call on Senator Case for his remarks. Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. REMARKS BY SENATOR CASE The treaties that President Carter has signed with Panama cannot come into force until two-thirds of the Senate votes to consent to ratification. The final outcome of the debate may be something for sociologists as well as historians and political scientists to study. Unusually strong emotions have been stirred up by the issues ever since it was tossed into the 1976 Presidential campaign. A flood of letters and post cards, many of them, of course, preprinted as part of an organized campaign, began rolling in to Senate and House offices, and to the White House even before the text of the treaties was made public, in fact, even before the negotiations were complete, I think. To help the Senate fulfill its constitutional advise and consent role, it is essential that those of us on the Foreign Relations Committee get all the facts and examine all the evidence in an unemotional way, and evaluate all of the factors before providing a recommendation to the Senate as a whole. So, as Chairman Sparkman has said, we have worked out a schedule so that the various views and all of the facts upon which they are based will be laid out in public. The underlying matter to be resolved, of course, is what are our real interests in the Panama Canal? Is it primarily the form of sovereignty and whose flag flies over it? Or, is it keeping the canal in operation, assuring to the maximum extent possible the protection of the extremely vulnerable system of dams and locks and maintaining our strategic interest in the canal? If it should be the former, and I recognize the emotional attachment involved in the slogan: "We bought it, we paid for it, it's ours," how do we keep it ours in any meaningful way if the treaties are rejected? Can we assume that the relationships reflected in the treaty, the one that was signed in 1903 and resented by Panamanians ever since, can be maintained in the 1970's, when the concepts of nationalization, nationalism, and fair play are much more to the fore than at the beginning of the century; and if it is the latter, how can we best deal in a pragmatic way rather than in a nostalgic fashion with the problems of keeping it in operation for all shipping. More specifically, are the arrangements, not only during the 23-year transition period, but in perpetuity, satisfactory to assured continued efficient operation of the canal? CANAL'S VULNERABILITY A basic fact which has to be dealt with is the Panama Canal's vulnerability to sabotage or even a conventional attack in the face of a hostile Panamanian reaction to rejection of the treaties. The Canal Zone is only 5 miles wide on each side of the canal. Our military experts have said it would take up to 100,000 men to defend it, and even then there is no way to guarantee against the possibility that someone might sneak in with explosives or lob artillery shells over the heads of American troops to hit the slide-prone narrow sections of the canal. Is this a valid estimate, or are there other additional points of vulnerability if the Panamanians do not feel it is in their interest to keep the canal open? These days, when all sorts of arms are obtained by all sorts of terrorist groups, it is only prudent to take into account these practical concerns in the situation where nationalism and emotionalism can turn from a psychological factor into a fact of life. OTHER MATTERS TO BE EXAMINED I raise these questions because the Senate ultimately will have to deal with practical considerations as well as gut reactions here and in Panama and Latin America generally, and there are other matters, too, to be examined, not only the financial arrangements, but the interpretation of the treaties under which the United States and Panama agree to observe and respect the regime of permanent neutrality. Does this mean that we have the right to intervene? Does this mean we have to do so? These are only a few of the issues that must be thoroughly aired. On the basis of my initial reading of the briefings I have received, the treaties do appear prima facie to provide additional protection of our interests, and protection that may not be available if the treaties are rejected. It may be that the hearings will uncover defects in the treaties, and reservations may be needed either to clarify the interpretations that we give it or to add additional safeguards. Perhaps the treaties, like products of most negotiations, are a compromise which on balance deserve to be supported. That is why we have got to keep our doors and minds open to all possible additional information and insight, and that is what these hearings are for. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Javits has asked to be heard, too. Then I will call on any and all other members of the committee. Senator JAVITS. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, but perhaps one of my colleagues on the other side would rather go now. The CHAIRMAN. Anyone? Senator Church? Senator CHURCH. Mr. Chairman, I have no statement to make at this time. I look forward to hearing the witnesses, so I will be glad to defer to Senator Javits. STATEMENT BY SENATOR JAVITS Pro Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, I asked for a few minutes only because I think there are a few things that have to be emphasized before we start in order to alert the witnesses, and also to alert those who would be considering this matter in the Senate and in the country. First, my own attitude is definitely favorable but that is not a commitment. If it appears from the full record of inquiry that we should |