order to have such an agreement equitable and efficient, it would

be necessary to have it reciprocal, Mayence and Landau must be dismantled as well as Strasburg and Metz; and this would be the most certain token that France and Prussia were both sincerely desirous of a durable peace. And although by reason of our late reverses, this special neutrality of the banks of the Rhine would remain for some time incomplete and unequal, still, its adoption in principle, and the strength that it would receive from the guarantee of the other Powers, would not fail to have great weight. No one assumes to render war impossible; what we can do is to make it more difficult, and, where it is unjust, to make its injustice more manifest; this is the maximum of human power and wisdom.

"The second idea - I ought rather to say the second pacific force to which I wish to call your attention, my dear Mr. Gladstone, is the idea of the European balance of power, and of the influence of congresses or conferences of the great Powers in defending or establishing this equilibrium. It is hard for reasonable and clear-sighted men to suppress a smile when they see with what disdain many people, even those of much intelligence, speak at the present day of the European balance of power, treating it as a vain chimera. Since when, then, has it been required that a principle should always keep its promises, and a thing be done perfectly, before any merit be acknowledged or any good results recognized? Since when have good and evil ceased to be intimately blended in this world, and the good often defeated on some given day, while yet, on the whole and in the end, the good has triumphed over the evil? It is certain that during the last four hundred years, that is to say, since the idea of a balance of power in Europe has entered into our history, European society, despite its errors and its crimes, its disturbances and its misfortunes, is by no means in a state of decadence; it has been and is, upon the whole, much

less a prey to violence and to chance, than it was during the previous centuries; it is better regulated, more prosperous, more firm in its advance towards justice for all, the well-being of all, towards that which we call, and rightly, general civilization. What has been the share in this progress of the principle of the European equilibrium, and the influence of European congresses gathered in its interest? I do not attempt to determine the question; I will only recall some historic facts, which may throw light upon it.

"After our religious wars of the sixteenth century, it was the concert between France and England, between Henry IV. and Queen Elizabeth, it was the great reign and the "Great Plan" of Henry IV. which saved Europe from falling under the gloomy tyranny of Philip II., which laid the foundations of religious liberty in France, and made the balance even between France and Austria. In the middle of the seventeenth century, it was the Congress of Westphalia which established in Germany the peace between Roman Catholics and Protestants, and crowned the success of Richelieu's labor for the security and grandeur of France. In 1712, the beginning of the eighteenth century, it was the renewed concert between France and England at the Conferences of Utrecht, that restored peace to Europe, repressing the ambition and pride of Louis XIV., without humiliating France. Lastly, in our own days, after our revolutionary shocks and the conquering despotism of Napoleon, it was the Congress of Vienna which restored to their places, so to speak, the principal members of the European body, and secured to the nations of Europe forty years of a repose which, notwithstanding its afflictive events, has not been without life and progress. Let it be admitted that all these Congresses, these reconstructions of the European equilibrium, have been full of omissions and of faults, that unworthy concessions and ignoble passions have had a large place in them; I am as

much aware of this as any man can be; but I am equally convinced that the European equilibrium is and remains in principle a just, rational, and liberal idea, and that, upon the whole, its results have been extremely salutary in regard to the progress as well as to the peace of European society.

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Undertake, my dear Mr. Gladstone, the cause of the European equilibrium and of European peace; defend it against the ambition and love of conquest now manifested. To do this has been in past ages the natural, historic, and illustrious rôle of England. For fifteen years you have had France for an adversary in this great strife; you will have her henceforward I ought indeed to say you have her now-for an ally. Modern France has passed through her fever of ambition and conquest. She has paid dear for it, and for her, destiny is yet severe; the pain returns though the fever is gone, and the error seems to recur for a moment, only to prove that France will no more of it. There are still, I confess, in this quick-tempered and impetuous nation traces of its former inclinations and its former errors; it still easily allows itself to be tempted by brilliant novelties, by military reputation and glory. And still, this is not its true bias nor its true aim; it is the movement still agitating the surface of the ocean after a storm. What France to-day seriously desires is peace, and a free and fruitful scope for her own domestic activities. It is a land of assiduous labor, agricultural, industrial, commercial, of a civilization at once scientific and practical, animated and tranquil. It eagerly desires to gather the fruits of the experiences through which it has passed, and of the institutions towards which, for three-quarters of a century, it has incessantly aspired without being really able to practise and preserve them. In this path England is its natural and most useful ally, and it is towards the English alliance, notwithstanding all memories of strife and rivalry, that the various governments which have

had any claim to durability in France since 1815, have always turned. This was to be expected from the Restoration; it owed much to you, and it remembered with dignity and independence its obligations. The government of 1830 owed you nothing; it made, nevertheless, the English alliance the habitual characteristic of its foreign policy; and when, in the affair of Egypt and in that of Spain, it deviated from this line of conduct, France did not design to abandon it definitively, and made haste to return to it at the earliest moment. Even the Second Empire, notwithstanding many causes were contradictory and many feeble attempts were made at diplomatic conspiracies, also desired England as an ally. In almost all the great questions which have arisen, and the great events which have occurred, during this period, the two nations have walked together and acted in concert; after having, in 1827, protected Greece against Turkey, in 1854 they protected Turkey against Russia, and their flags were united at Sebastopol as at Navaxino. From 1830 to 1833, they united in establishing the kingdom of Belgium; together they have maintained the independence of Switzerland and of Italy, and have assisted in the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Spain and Portugal.

"These facts have been by no means accidents, momentary impulses on the part of the different governments; they have been the natural and necessary result of the true interest and the deepest instincts of the two nations. They are not obliged to require great sacrifices from each other, and they are able to do each other great services. You see it yourself: France, it is true, has become a lover of peace, but her pride and valor have not been lessened; she manifests in defence the same ardor, the same heroic courage that she once showed in attack; painful as is her position at this moment, she is not a troublesome ally nor one difficult to sustain. Let the two nations be well agreed;

let them mutually feel the worth of their united strength, moral and material, and they will secure tranquillity to Europe and their own prosperity; they will acquire glory of a new kind, which will cost contemporary generations neither blood nor tears, and they will leave to future generations a heritage good to receive, for it will not be laden with violent national hatreds and desires for vengeance."

The effort was in vain. The English government did not understand the great work that M. Guizot pointed out to them, the great place that they might secure in Europe for their country. Vaguely, confusedly, without great national ardor, England caught a glimpse of that which her government refused through weakness and a patriotic egotism as inconsiderate as it was selfish. The English government allowed France to be dismembered. English generosity exerted itself vainly to relieve the material wants which keenly excited national sympathy. The hour for efficient and powerful action went by. European preponderance had been once more within the grasp of England. Holding herself apart in her island she suffered it to escape her. Prudence is sometimes blind, and courage has its moments of unexpected timidity. Mr. Gladstone unhesitatingly shook to its foundations and modified the constitution of Great Britain. Venturesome even to rashness at home, he remained powerless and inactive in presence of extreme crises in European policy. He left France alone against Prussia, struggling and suffering with resolution and courage, amid the most frightful interior and exterior perils. Slowly rising from her disasters, painfully and with difficulty defending herself from her domestic foes, France stands at last upon her feet, and still relies upon that recuperative power which God has bestowed upon hera power she has so often manifested amid the most afflicting

reverses.

Labor upon great domestic reforms was not, meanwhile,