CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (continued).
varied to meet the necessities of a particular right. United States v. Reese et al., 214.
3. The Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution does not confer the right of suffrage; but it invests citizens of the United States with the right of exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of their race, color, or previous condition of servitude, and empowers Congress to enforce that right by "appropriate legislation." Id.
4. The power of Congress to legislate at all upon the subject of voting at State elections rests upon this amendment, and can be exercised by providing a punishment only when the wrongful refusal to receive the vote of a qualified elector at such elections is because of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Id.
5. The third and fourth sections of the act of May 31, 1870 (16 Stat 140), not being confined in their operation to unlawful discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, are beyond the limit of the Fifteenth Amendment, and unauthorized. Id.
6. As these sections are in general language broad enough to cover wrongful acts without as well as within the constitutional jurisdiction, and cannot be limited by judicial construction so as to make them operate only on that which Congress may rightfully prohibit and punish, Held, that Congress has not provided by "appropriate legislation" for the punishment of an inspector of a municipal election for refusing to receive and count at such election the vote of a citizen of the United States of African descent. Id.
7. The State of Louisiana passed an act entitled "An Act to regulate proceedings in contestations between persons claiming a judicial
Sect. 1 provides that "in any case in which a person may have been
appointed to the office of judge of any court of this State, and shall
have been confirmed by the senate, and commissioned thereto,..
such commission shall be prima facie proof of the right of such per-
son to immediately hold and exercise such office."
Sect. 2 provides "that if any person, being an incumbent of such
office, shall refuse to vacate the same, and turn the same over to the
person so commissioned, such person so commissioned shall have the
right to proceed by rule before the court of competent jurisdiction,
to have himself declared to be entitled to such office, and to be in-
ducted therein. Such rule shall be taken contradictorily with such
incumbent, and shall be made returnable within twenty-four hours,
and shall be tried immediately without jury, and by preference over
all matter or causes depending in such court; . . . and the judg-
ment thereon shall be signed the same day of rendition."
The next section provides that an appeal, if taken, shall be applied
for within one day after the rendition of the judgment, and be made
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (continued).
returnable to the Supreme Court within two days. The appeal has
preference over all other business in that court, and the judgment
thereon is final after the expiration of one day. Held, that the
State, by proceedings under this act, which resulted in a judgment
adverse to the title of the plaintiff in error to a certain judicial
office, did not, through her judiciary, violate that clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
which declares, "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." Kennard v.
Louisiana ex rel. Morgan, 480.
8. Citizens are the members of the political community to which they
belong. They are the people who compose the community, and who,
in their associated capacity, have established or submitted them-
selves to the dominion of a government for the promotion of their
general welfare and the protection of their individual as well as
their collective rights. The duty of a government to afford protec-
tion is limited always by the power it possesses for that purpose.
United States v. Cruikshank et al., 542.
9. There is in our political system a government of each of the several
States, and a government of the United States. Each is distinct
from the others, and has citizens of its own, who owe it allegiance,
and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The
same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States
and a citizen of a State; but his rights of citizenship under one of
these governments will be different from those he has under the
other. Id.
10. The government of the United States, although it is, within the scope
of its powers, supreme and beyond the States, can neither grant nor
secure to its citizens rights or privileges which are not expressly or
by implication placed under its jurisdiction. All that cannot be
so granted or secured are left to the exclusive protection of the
States. Id.
11. The right of the people peaceably to assemble for lawful purposes,
with the obligation on the part of the States to afford it protection,
existed long before the adoption of the Constitution. The first
amendment to the Constitution, prohibiting Congress from abridging
the right to assemble and petition, was not intended to limit the
action of the State governments in respect to their own citizens, but
to operate upon the national government alone. It left the authority
of the States unimpaired, added nothing to the already existing
powers of the United States, and guaranteed the continuance of the
right only against Congressional interference. The people, for
their protection in the enjoyment of it, must, therefore, look to the
States, where the power for that purpose was originally placed. Id.
12. The right of the people peaceably to assemble, for the purpose of
petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for any thing
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (continued).
else connected with the powers or duties of the national government.
is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the pro-
tection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of
a government republican in form implies that right, and an invasion
of it presents a case within the sovereignty of the United States. Id.
13. The right to bear arms is not granted by the Constitution; neither is
it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its existence.
The second amendment means no more than that it shall not be in-
fringed by Congress, and has no other effect than to restrict the
powers of the national government. Id.
14. Sovereignty, for the protection of the rights of life and personal
liberty within the respective States, rests alone with the States. Id.
15. The fourteenth amendment prohibits a State from depriving any per-
son of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, and
from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws; but it adds nothing to the rights of one citizen as
against another. It simply furnishes an additional guaranty against
any encroachment by the States upon the fundamental rights which
belong to every citizen as a member of society. The duty of pro-
tecting all its citizens in the enjoyment of an equality of rights was
originally assumed by the States, and it still remains there. The
only obligation resting upon the United States is to see that the
States do not deny the right. This the amendment guarantees, but
no more. The power of the national government is limited to the
enforcement of this guaranty. Id.
16. In Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 178, this court decided that the Con-
stitution of the United States has not conferred the right of suffrage
upon any one, and that the United States have no voters of their
own creation in the States. In United States v. Reese et al., supra,
p. 214, it held that the Fifteenth Amendment has invested the citizens
of the United States with a new constitutional right, which is, ex-
emption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise
on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The
right to vote in the States comes from the States; the right of ex-
emption from the prohibited discrimination comes from the United
States. The first has not been granted or secured by the Constitu
tion of the United States, but the last has been.
CONTESTED CLAIMS, ADJUSTMENT OF. See National Banks,
1, 2.
CONTRABAND OF WAR. See International Law, 1-4.
Money, silver-plate, and bullion, when destined for hostile use or for
the purchase of hostile supplies, are contraband of war. Where a
foreign vessel entered New Orleans under the license of the Presi-
dent's proclamation of May 12, 1862, the determination of the ques-
tion whether such articles, part of her outward-bound cargo, were
CONTRABAND OF WAR (continued).
contraband, devolved upon the commanding general at that city.
Believing them to be so, he was authorized to order them to be
removed from her, and her clearance to be withheld until his order
should be complied with. United States v. Diekelman, 520.
CONTRACTS. See Bankruptcy, 2; Bills of Exchange and Promissory
Notes, Court of Claims, 1; Legal Representatives, 2; Municipal
Bonds, 5-7, 9; Pleading, 1; Rewards, 2; Warranty, 1, 2.
1. Where a party, knowing the pecuniary condition of a debtor, pur-
chased a claim against him of an ascertained amount, an opinion,
however erroneous, expressed by the seller as to the value of the
claim, does not affect the validity of the sale. Under such circum-
stances, each party is presumed to rely upon his own judgment.
Blease v. Garlington, 1.
2. Prior to the abolition of slavery in Mississippi, a contract there made
between a slave and his master neither imposed obligations nor con-
ferred rights upon either party. Hall v. United States, 27.
3. An action cannot be maintained against the government, in the Court
of Claims, upon a contract for secret services during the war, made
between the President and the claimant. Totten, Administrator, v.
United States, 105.
4. An agreement between the agent of an insurance company and an
applicant for insurance, whereby the former, without authority
from the company, accepted articles of personal property by way of
satisfaction of a premium payable in money, is a fraud upon the
company, and no valid contract against it arises therefrom. Hoff-
man v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 161.
5. While negotiations were still pending between an agent of the com
pany and the applicant, touching the precise terms of a contract of
insurance, the amount of premium, and the mode of payment, a
friend paid the premium, but concealed from the agent the condition
of the applicant, who was then in extremis, and died in a few hours.
The agent, in ignorance of the facts, delivered the policy. Held,
that no valid contract arose from the transaction. Piedmont and
Arlington Life Insurance Co. v. Ewing, Administrator, 377.
6. The following memorandum of a contract of sale signed by the agents
of the purchaser and the seller, to wit,
"NEW YORK, July 10, 1867.
"Sold for Messrs. Butler & Co., Boston, to Messrs. A. A. Thomson &
Co., New York, seven hundred and five (705) packs first quality
Russia sheet-iron, to arrive at New York, at twelve and three quar
ters (12) cents per pound, gold, cash, actual tare.
"Iron due about Sept. 1, '67.
"WHITE & HAZARD, Brokers."
-binds both parties thereto. Butler v. Thomson et al., 412.
7. A certain instrument of writing (inserted in the report of the case) —
Held, not to be a mere power of attorney revocable at the pleasure of
the maker; but a contract under which rights for a specified time
were acquired. Burdell et al. v. Denig et al., 716.
8. Where an inventor signed several different agreements with the same
party, on the same day, for the sale of his invention and for a
license to use it, they must all be construed together; and if it is
apparent that he intended to convey the right to use a new invention
in connection with former patents, under any renewal or extension
of the former, the grantee or assignee is protected, though the im
provement was never patented, and though the reissued patent was
extended afterwards. It is a question of intention to be gathered
from all the instruments of writing in the case. Hammond et al. v.
Mason and Hamlin Organ Co., 724.
CONTRACTS, OBLIGATIONS OF.
The constitution of a State cannot impair the obligation of a con
tract. County of Moultrie v. Rockingham Ten-Cent Savings-Bank, 631
CONTRIBUTION.
Where the legislature of Wyoming Territory organized two new
counties, and included within their limits a part of the territory of
an existing county, but made no provision for apportioning debts
or liabilities, Held, that the old county, being solely respon-
sible for the debts and liabilities it had previously incurred, has, on
discharging them, no claim upon the new counties for contribution.
Commissioners of Laramie Co. v. Commissioners of Albany Co. et al.,
1. The consolidation of two companies does not necessarily work a dis-
solution of both, and the creation of a new corporation. Whether
such be its effect, depends upon the legislative intent manifested in
the statute under which the consolidation takes place. Central
Railroad and Banking Company v. Georgia, 665.
2. An act of the legislature authorized two railroad companies (C. and
M.) to unite and consolidate their stocks, and all their rights, privi-
leges, immunities, property, and franchises, under the name and
charter of C., in such manner that each owner of shares of the stock
of M. should be entitled to receive an equal number of the shares of
the stock of the consolidated companies. The act also declared that
all contracts of both companies should be assumed by and be binding
upon C., that its capital should not exceed their aggregate capital,
and that all their benefits and rights should accrue to it. It was
further enacted, that, upon the union and consolidation, each stock-
holder of M. should be entitled to receive a certificate for a like
number of shares of the stock of C., upon his surrender of his cer-
tificate of stock in M. Held, that consolidation under this act was
not a surrender of the existing charters of the two companies, and
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