when properly translated, means "the land, on the coast of Santa Cruz, known by the name of the Arroyo de la Laguna, according to the map, or diseño annexed" to the petition. Due reference of the petition was made to the proper authorities to report whether the land solicited was grantable to the applicant; and, an affirmative report having been made, the governor entered a decree ordaining that the petitioner is the dueño en propriedad del terreno conocido con el nombre del Arroyo de la Laguna, tomando por linderos desde el Arroyo de San Vicente hasta el de la Laguna, como se manifiesta en el diseño que corre agregado al espediente; which, properly translated, means that the petitioner is declared to be the owner in fee of the land known by the name of the Arroyo de la Laguna, taking for its boundaries, from the Arroyo de San Vicente, as far as that of the Laguna, as is shown in the diseño attached to the record of the proceedings. None of the documents constituting the espediente, except one embraced in what is called the informé, describe the land solicited by the word sitio, and that only in an incidental way. All the other documents constituting the original title papers describe the tract solicited as el terreno, the land known, &c. Nor would it change the original right of the claimants even if the word sitio had been used in all the documents, as the true meaning of the word sitio, as used in that connection, is "place,' and not league, as translated in the original petition of the claimants. Suppose that is so: still the error of translation was made by the claimants, and the decree of confirmation gave them all the land they claimed in their petition. Plainly the petitioners could have nothing more, as the commissioners were not authorized to adjudicate such claims, unless they were presented for confirmation. Complaint cannot be made that the District Court committed any error, as the transcript from the commissioners was never presented to the District Court. Three commissioners were appointed to adjudicate such claims; and the act authorizing their appointment provided that the commission should continue for three years from the date of the act, unless sooner discontinued by the President. 9 Stat. By a subsequent act, it was made the duty of the commissioners to have two certified transcripts prepared of their proceedings and decision, and of the papers and evidence on which the same are founded, one to be filed with the clerk of the proper District Court, and the other to be transmitted to the Attorney-General; and the provision was that the filing the transcript with the clerk of the District Court should ips facto operate as an appeal for the party against whom the decision was rendered, and either party might prosecute the appeal by filing within six months a notice with the clerk of the District Court that such was the intention of the party filing such notice. 10 Stat. 99. Prior to the expiration of the original act, the same was extended for one year longer from the date of its passage; and by a subsequent act the original act was continued another year from the 3d of March, 1855, and no longer. 10 id. 265, 603. Examined in the light of these acts of Congress, it is clear that the power of the board of commissioners appointed under the act to ascertain and settle such claims had expired and ceased to exist more than fifteen years before the petition under consideration was filed in the District Court. In the mean time, the petitioners never gave any notice of appeal from the decree of the commissioners to the District Court, and none was ever taken or perfected in their behalf. Instead of that, the notice given by the Attorney-General of his intention to prosecute an appeal in the case had been withdrawn, and the appeal abandoned; and it appears that all the parties, from the date of the decree to the 27th of May, 1872, acquiesced in the decision of the commissioners; and in that view the court here is of the opinion that it is too late to make the proposed correction in the petition to the commissioners, or to enlarge the bounda. ries of the land confirmed by the decree. Several reasons may be given for that conclusion: (1.) That the jurisdiction of the board of commissioners to adjudicate such claims ceased more than fifteen years before the petition in question was filed in the District Court. (2.) That the decree of the commissioners was never legally transferred to the District Court, so as to give that court any jurisdiction in the case. (3.) That the claimants, having acquiesced for fifteen years in the decree of confirmation, are without legal remedy. (4.) That they are not entitled to the redress claimed under Congress now in force. any act of Tested by these considerations, it is clear that there is no error. Decree affirmed. CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. UNITED STATES. The deed of conveyance executed to the United States on the twenty-fifth day of October, 1854, by the city of Carondelet, of a part of the commons of Carondelet upon which Jefferson Barracks are situate, having been based upon an equitable compromise of a long-pending and doubtful question of title, is valid. APPEAL from the Court of Claims. Mr. Montgomery Blair for the appellants. MR. JUSTICE MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. The subject of this controversy is the title to the land known as Jefferson Barracks, consisting of about seventeen hundred acres, five miles below the city of St. Louis. It lies within the lines of a survey of the commons of Carondelet, containing a much larger quantity, nearly ten thousand acres. The present suit was instituted in the Court of Claims, in 1859, by the city of Carondelet. As the jurisdiction of that court was doubted, Congress, by the act of 1873 (17 U. S. Stat. 621), specially authorized it to entertain jurisdiction of the controversy. The city of Carondelet having become merged in the city of St. Louis by an act of the legislature of Missouri, the latter city was substituted as plaintiff. A deed conveying the land in controversy to the United States was made by the city of Carondelet on the twenty-fifth day of October, 1854; and it is not controverted that the authority under which this was done was sufficient. If this deed be held to be otherwise valid, it decides the controversy in favor of the United States. Its validity is denied, however, on the part of plaintiff, on the ground that it was without consideration, and that it was improperly coerced from the authorities of Carondelet by the officers of the government who had charge of the department of public lands by an unjust and illegal exercise of authority in refusing to confirm and threatening to set aside the survey, which we have already mentioned, of the Carondelet commons, and exacting this deed as the condition of their acquiescence in that survey. On the other side, the deed is supported as a just and equitable compromise of a long-existing controversy, both as to the correctness of that survey and the right of the government to the ground known as Jefferson Barracks. ana. The origin of the claim of Carondelet was a concession of six thousand arpents of land adjoining the village, made in 1796 by Zenon Trudeau, lieutenant-governor of Upper LouisiAn attempt to give locality to this concession was made by Soulard (who describes himself as a surveyor commissioned by the government) in December, 1797; but the first actual survey was made in 1818 by Elias Rector, who was deputy under his father, William Rector, surveyor of public lands for the Territories of Illinois and Missouri. The Court of Claims finds, that, though the field-notes of this survey were filed in the surveyor's office, it was never approved by him. But, in the year 1834, Elias T. Langham, surveyor-general at St. Louis, caused J. C. Brown, one of his deputies, to retrace and re-establish the lines of Rector's survey; and, when the result of the work was returned to his office, he approved the survey, and the same was duly filed in the office of recorder of land-titles in Missouri, who thereupon certifies that the title was by him duly confirmed of the village to their claim as commons of six thousand arpents of land, as shown by that survey. Six thousand arpents are equivalent to five thousand one hundred and four acres. The survey contained nine thou sand nine hundred and five acres; and the Court of Claims finds, that, after deducting from that quantity the JeffersonBarracks claim and all private claims, there still remained nearly one thousand acres more than the six thousand arpents. There is no evidence that this survey was ever brought to the attention of the Land Department in Washington until June, 1839. In that year, the surveyor-general at St. Louis seems to have called the attention of the district-attorney of the United States for Missouri to the survey in connection with the location of Jefferson Barracks; and, the letter having been transmitted to the Secretary of War, an investigation of the whole matter was instituted by the commissioner of public lands. This resulted in an order, made in 1841 by Commissioner Whitcomb to Surveyor-General Milburn, directing a new survey of these commons, on the principle of reserving one thousand seven hundred and two acres for military purposes at Jefferson Barracks, allowing six thousand arpents to Carondelet for her commons, and restoring the balance, not covered by private claims, to sale as public lands. It may as well be here stated that this order was never carried out. In the year 1826, the military authorities of the United States, desiring to establish at that point a military post, procured from twelve inhabitants of the village of Carondelet a deed conveying to the United States a described portion of the land which they claimed as part of the commons of the village, with a reversion to the village whenever the United States should cease to use it for military purposes. From that time the government has been in continued possession of the property. It appears by the findings of the court that certain persons who had purchased lots of the city of Carondelet, not conflicting with the barracks claim, and other citizens of Carondelet, becoming uneasy about the condition in which the title to all the commons was left by the order of Commissioner Whitcomb, employed agents to procure a confirmation of the Brown-Rector survey. They appeared at Washington, and a negotiation, remonstrance, and correspondence was carried on for several years; and divers opinions and decisions were had from Com. missioners of the Land-Office, and Secretaries of the Treas ury and Interior, none of which confirmed the survey as valid. Finally, without any suggestions shown to come from the United States or its officers, the parties interested in the settlement of the title of Carondelet to the remainder of the com |