As will be soon more fully seen, the venue must in all cases correspond with the jurisdiction of the court.n Divided county. Where an offence is committed within the county of A., and after the commission of the offence, the county is divided, and the part of the county in which the offence was committed is erected a new county called B., the latter county has jurisdiction over the offence. In such case, however, the indictment may charge the perpetration in the former county while the trial is in the latter.p § 278. Extra-territorial offences. - Where an offence is committed within a state by means of an agent, the employer is guilty as a principal, though he did not act in that state, and was, at the time the offence was committed, in another state. In such case the forum delicti commissi has jurisdiction of the offence, and if the offender comes within the limits of the state, has also jurisdiction of his person, and he may be arrested and brought to trial. When an offence is committed within the state, whether the offender be at the time in the state, or be without the state, and perpetrates the crime by means of an agent, it is no answer to an indictment that the offender owes allegiance to another state or sovereignty.q As a general rule, however, an indictment does not hold good for an offence committed out of the jurisdiction.r § 279. Several jurisdictions in county. Where there are distinct judicial districts in the county, it is not sufficient that the caption names the county. Therefore, where the offence in a district court in North Carolina was laid to have been committed in Beaufort County, without adding in the district of Newbern, judgment was arrested. 8 So, also, when several counties are in the town, it is not enough to allege the town.t And so in all cases where the jurisdiction , is less than the county.u C. 3 Denio, 190; and see also Com. v. Gillespie, 7 S. & R. 469; R. v. Garrett, ut supra. See ante, § 154. r Manley v. People, 3 Selden (N. Y.), 295; Wh. Con. of Laws, § 855. s State v. Adams, 2 Battle's Dig. 729. t Com. v. Springfield, 7 Mass. 9. u McBride v. State, 10 Humph. 615; Taylor v. Com. 2 Va. Cas. 94. When state may be presumed. A complaint, made "in behalf of the Commonwealth," alleging an offence in a particular city and county (corresponding in name to a city and county of the commonwealth), against a statute the title and date of which are stated, and rightly describing a statute passed by the legislature of the commonwealth, sufficiently shows that the offence was committed within the commonwealth, without any caption, or venue in the margin. v § 280. Local description. In the city of New York, the practice is to charge the ward as part of the venue: thus, "in the first ward of the city of New York;" in New Orleans to name the parish. The same practice obtains elsewhere. If, however, the offence is shown to be within the jurisdiction of the court, the special place averred, if unnecessary, need not be proved. w § 281. But where the case is stated by way of local description and not a venue merely, a variance is fatal; thus where, in an indictment for arson, the tenement was averred to be in the sixth ward, whereas it was in the fifth, the indictment was held bad. y The same particularity is required in cases of stealing in a dwelling-house, of burglary, and of forcible entry and detainer, and in all cases where a statute makes a special locality essential. In such cases, where the situation of the premises is specially laid, the description must be strictly proved. z -- § 282. “ County aforesaid" generally enough. It is sufficient if the place be averred simply as "the county aforesaid," a county being named in the commencement, for which the grand jurors were sworn. a It is otherwise when two counties are named. b v Commonwealth v. Quin, 5 Gray Moore v. State, 12 Ohio St. 387. Post, (Mass.), 478. w 2 Hale, 179, 244, 245; 4 Bla. Com. 306; 2 Hawk. c. 25, sect. 84, c. 46, sect. 181, 182; 1 East P. C. 125; Holt, 534; Com. v. Gillon, 2 Allen, 502; Carlisle v. State, 32 Ind. 55; Heikes v. Com. 2 Casey, 513. Post, $ 602. x State v. Cotton, 4 Foster (N. H.), 143; State v. Crogan, 8 Iowa, 523; § 602. y People v. Slater, 5 Hill N. Y. R. 401. z R. v. Redley, Rus. & R. 515; Archbold's C. P. 38; Grimme v. Com. 5 B. Mon. 263; State v. Cotton, 4 Foster, 143. a State v. Ames, 10 Mo. 743; Com. v. Edwards, 4 Gray (Mass.), 1; State v. Simon, 50 Mo. 370; State v. Shull, b State v. McCracken, 20 Mo. (5 Bennett) 411. Even "county" may be left out in the statement of pleas, when it can be presumed from prior averments. Thus it is enough, in an indictment against A. B., of the town of C.. county of D., to aver that the offence was committed at C.e But it has been held that "county" or "town" must somewhere appear; and that it is not enough to aver the offence to have been committed in C. The indictment must say, either directly or inferentially, that C. is a town or county.d An indictment for burning a barn situate at a certain place, which was within the jurisdiction of the court, and alleged to be "within the curtilage of the dwelling-house of A.," need not also aver that the dwelling-house was at that place. e In an indictment for wounding, the time and place of the assault and stroke were formally laid, but no venue was alleged as to the wounding, the result of the stroke. It was held that the venue was sufficiently laid.ƒ Federal courts. In these, the averment of county is clearly insufficient, as the jurisdictions may include several counties, as well as the high seas. g § 283. Change of local title. This, when enacted by the legislature, must be followed by the pleader. Thus in North Carolina, by an act of assembly, passed in 1842, a part of the county of Burke and a part of the county of Rutherford were constituted a new county, by the name of M'Dowell; and by a supplemental act, jurisdiction of all criminal offences committed in that part of M'Dowell taken from Burke was given to the superior court of Burke. It was held, that an indictment for a criminal offence, alleging it to have been committed in Burke County, could not be supported by evidence showing the offence to have been committed in M'Dowell, after the establishment of the latter county. b By the same rule, it is not error to describe a county within which the offence was committed, by the name belonging to it at the 3 Head (Tenn.), 42; Noe v. People, 39 Ill. 96. See also State v. Baker, 50 Me. 45; State v. Conley, 39 Me. (4 Heath) 78; State v. Roberts, 26 Me. 263; Haskins v. People, 16 N. Y. 344; State v. Lamon, 3 Hawks, 175; Wingard v. State, 13 Ga. 396; State v. Goode, 24 Mo. 361. c Com. v. Cummings, 6 Gray, 487. d Com. v. Barnard, 6 Gray, 488. e Commonwealth v. Barney, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 480. f State v. Freeman, 21 Mo. (6 Bennett) 481; State v. Bailey, 21 Mo. (6 Bennett) 484. g See Whar. Prec. vol. i. p. 26. time of trial, even though it went by another name at the time when the act was committed. c § 284. Where fine, &c., is payable, or penalty is special, to a subdivision of county. In such case it is natural to require that the pleading should aver such subdivision, so as to guide the court in the application of the fine or penalty. And so it has sometimes been ruled. c1 But it has been held in Pennsylvania that in an indictment for adultery, it is not necessary to mention the township in which the defendant resided, though of moment in the sentence, because the court may ascertain the place of the defendant's residence otherwise than by the verdict of the jury. d Larceny. Here the venue may be laid in any county in which the thief was possessed of the stolen goods. e Omission of venue. Where an indictment omits to lay a venue of the offence charged, it is a fatal defect, on motion to quash, or in arrest of judment. el Evidence. The subject of evidence as to venue is considered in a subsequent chapter. f Then and there. discussed. f1 The effect of these terms has been already VI. STATEMENT OF THE OFFENCE. 1. OFFENCE MUST BE MADE JUDICIALLY 8. ALTERNATE OR DISJUNCTIVE STATETO APPEAR, § 285. 2. STATEMENT MUST BE TECHNICALLY EXACT, § 287. 3. NOT ENOUGH TO CHARGE A CONCLUSION OF LAW, § 288. 4. COMMON BARRATOR AND COMMON SCOLD, &c. § 289. 5. MATTERS UNKNOWN, § 290. 6. BILL OF PARTICULARS, § 291. 7. SURPLUSAGE NEED NOT BE STATED, § 291. MENTS, $294. 9. KNOWLEDGE AND INTENT, § 297. 10. INDUCEMENT AND AGGRAVATION, § 298. 11. OBJECTS FOR WHICH PARTICULARITY IS REQUIRED, § 299. (a.) Identification, § 300. (d.) Preparation, § 303. 1. Offence must be made judicially to appear. § 285. It is general rule that the special matter of the whole fact should be set forth in the indictment with such certainty, c McElroy v. State, 8 Eng. (13 Ark.) 708; and see Jordan v. State, 22 Ga. 545. Ante, § 277. cl Botto v. State, 26 Miss. 108. d Duncan v. Com. 4 Ser. & Raw. 449. e Post, § 1812-7. el Searcy v. State, 4 Texas, 450. f Post, § 601-5. f1 Ante, § 272. "There situate" is a sufficient averment of location. State v. Reid, 20 Iowa, 413. Ante, § 272. that the offence may judicially appear to the court. g Thus, in indictments for murder or manslaughter, it is indispensably nec g The doctrine of this branch of pleading is thus stated by Judge Kane: "The law secures to every man who is brought to trial on a charge of crime, that the acts which constitute his alleged guilt shall be set forth with reasonable certainty in the indictment which he is called upon to plead to. This is his personal right, — indispensable, to enable him to traverse the facts, if he believes them to be untruly charged; to deny their asserted legal bearing, if in his judgment they do not establish the crime imputed to him; or to admit at once the facts and the conclusion from them, if he be conscious of guilt. It is important to his protection also, in case he should be a second time charged for the same of fence, that there should be no uncertainty as to that for which he was tried before. And besides all this, which may be supposed to regard the accused alone, it is necessary for the proper action and justification of the court, that it should clearly appear from facts patent on the record, that a specific, legally defined crime has been committed, for which sentence is to be awarded according to the laws that apply to it. "There are exceptions, or rather limits, to the application of this principle; but they all refer themselves to the peculiar character of the offence charged. Thus, an indictment against a' common barrator,' or for keeping a common gaming house,' or a ' house of ill-fame,' is good without a specification of acts; for the essence of the offence in these cases is habitual character. So, also, where the charge is not the absolute perpetration of an offence, but its primary characteristic lies in the intent, instigation, or motion of the party towards its perpetration; the acts of the accused, important only as developing the mala mens, and not constituting of themselves the crime, need not be spread upon the record. Such are certain cases of conspiracy, and those of attempt or solicitation to commit a known crime; where the mental purpose may not have matured into effective action, or has had reference to criminal action by a third party, — a class of exceptions this last, which vindicates much of the judicial action under this statute. "But these are only exceptions; the principle is as broad as the common law. It is not enough, and never has been, to charge against the party a mere legal conclusion, as justly inferential from facts that are not themselves disclosed on the record. You may not charge treason, murder, or piracy, in round general phrases. You must set out the act which constitutes it in the particular case. 66 "Following out the principle, it has always been held that where various acts have been enumerated in the statute as included in the same category of crime, and to be punished alike, it is not enough to charge the violation of such a statute in disjunctive or alternative terms. That is to say, you may not charge its violation to have been in this or that or another particular, leaving the defendant uncertain which or how many of the enumerated particulars he is to answer to. He is entitled to precise notice of the accusation against him. "All these are long recognized rules of the criminal law, framed for the protection of innocence, and not unfrequently essential to its safety. The court has no right to disregard them, if it would; on the contrary, it is called upon by the highest duty that man can |