EDWARD S. CORWIN Of the Department of History and Politics, Princeton University "The history of law must be a PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS PREFACE In the preparation of another volume, not yet published, I have encountered a number of questions involving controversies important to the student of American Constitutional History, an extended consideration of which however in those pages I felt to be out place. The following studies present my conclusions with regard to these questions, and the grounds of them. In the principal essay, I have endeavored to present judicial review as the outcome of a view of legislative power which arose in consequence of the astonishing abuse of their powers by the early State legislatures but which was first appreciated for its full worth by the Convention that framed the Constitution of the United States. Incidentally I have, I trust, laid to rest that most inconclusive "explanation" of judicial review which dwells on the idea that a legislative measure contrary to the constitution is not law and never was. The alleged explanation totally ignores the crucial question, which is, Why is it the judicial view of the constitution that legislative measures have to conform to? The article on the Dred Scott Decision treats of the most dramatic episode in the history of judicial review, though one that is by no means the best illustrative of the spirit of the institution. The study entitled "We, the People," approaches the time-honored controversy over Secession and Nullification from what is shown to be, I submit, |