as well as the personal representatives of the deceased, and provides that the jury may give such damages, pecuniary or exemplary, as under all the circumstances of the case may to them seem just. These provisions worked a repeal of section 656 of the act of 1873, but we are unable to discover any intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate any other portion of the existing law upon this subject. A parent, at common law, could maintain an action for damages for loss of services of his minor child from the time of the injury until death, where death did not immediately follow the injury; and the object of the statute is to create a new and independent right of action for the loss of services subsequent to the decease of the child, which did not exist at common law. And this right is separate and distinct from that of the heirs or personal representatives. Two actions may thus spring from the same wrongful act, because two distinct injuries are thereby inflicted. But the actions are prosecuted in different rights, and the damages are given upon different principles. The damages recovered by a parent for loss of services of a child belong to the parent in his own right, and are not distributable among the heirs, and do not become a part of the estate of the deceased. The measure of damages in such cases is the value of the child's services from the time of the injury until he would have attained the age of majority, taken in connection with his prospects in life, less the cost of his support and maintenance. To this may be added in proper cases the expense of nursing and medical treatment, and in some jurisdictions even funeral expenses. See Mayhew". Burns, 103 Ind. 328; Railroad Co. v. Goodykoontz, 119 Ind. 111, 42 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 40; Rains v. Railway Co., 71 Mo. 164, 5 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 610, 2 Thomp. Neg. 1292. Under the California statutes, which are almost identical with ours, the father, and, under certain contingencies, the mother, may maintain an action for the injury or death of a minor child. See Durkee v. Railroad Co., 56 Cal. 388, 8 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 321. And in Iowa and Indiana, under statutes but slighty variant from our own, the same rule obtains. See Walters v. Railroad Co., 36 Iowa, 458; Mayhew v. Burns, supra; Railroad Co. v. Goodykoontz, supra. In the latter case it is held that no one but a parent can claim to be damaged by the death of a minor, " because the injury is to the person entitled to the child's services, and not to the minor's estate;' and we think this construction of the statute is eminently a reasonable one, and equally applicable to our statute. The same rule is laid down in Walters v. Railroad Co., supra, and it is there held that damages for the death of an infant are recoverable by the administrator only for injury accruing to the estate of the infant after he would have attained majority. We conclude, therefore, that the judgment in the action brought by the plaintiff, as administrator, is no bar to this action. The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to overrule the demurrer. STILES and DUNBAR, JJ., concur. CANADIAN PAC. R. Co. . v. ROBINSON. (19 Canada Supreme Court, 292.) Action for Death-Limitation-Cause of Action Barrea at Death of Injured Person.-Under a statute providing that a person who would have been liable to one injured through his wrongful act shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, the right of action of a widow for the death of her husband is barred where the cause of action of the injured person was barred by the statute of limitations at his death. APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side)-(1) which confirmed the judgment of the Court of Review (2), dismissing three motions of the appellants, (1st) for judgment non obstante veredicto; (2d) in arrest of judgment; and (3) for a new trial; and granting the respondent's motion for judgment upon the findings of the jury upon a second trial in this cause. The action was instituted on the 17th day of May, 1884, by the respondent, acting as well for herself as in her capacity of tutrix to her minor daughter, then a child about eight years of age, to recover damages consequent on the death of Patrick Flynn, the husband of the respondent, and father of her minor child, which death had been caused by the fault and negligence of the appellants. The facts and pleadings are fully given in the report of the case (in review), M. L. R. 5 S. C. 225. See also 14 Can. S. C. R. 105. A. Lacoste, Q. C., and H. Abbott, Q.C., for appellants. Sir W. J. RITCHIE, C.J.-I am of opinion that this appeal should be allowed. I rely upon the judgment of Mr. Justice TASCHEREAU, and concur in his reasons for my decision. 54 A. & E. R. Cas.-4 Statute-Lord act. STRONG, J.-When this cause was before this court on a former occasion on an appeal from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench dismissing the appeal from the judgment refusing a new trial, I expressed the opinion that the action founded on article 1056 of the Civil Code of Quebec was the same action as that authorized by chapter 78, of the Consolidated Statutes of Canada, which was itself a re-enactment of the Imperial statute known as Lord Campbell's act. I adhere to that opinion, and I must therefore hold that the present action is subject to the same conditions as a similar action would be under the Imperial statute referred to, except in so far as express provision to the contrary may have been made by the Code. Right to main tions. It has been determined in England that the action under Lord Campbell's act is not the same action as that which the deceased person would have himself had at comtain action for mon law if he had survived, but a new action given death-Condi- by the statute. Seward v. Vera Cruz, 10 App. Cas. 59; Pym v. Great Northern R. Co., 4 B. & S. 396. It has, however, been decided, as the language of the statute plainly requires, that the right to maintain an action under the statute is subject to the condition that the deceased person himself should have been at the time of his death entitled to maintain an action for the injury. This principle is clearly established by many authorities, and it applies as well to cases in which, there having been originally a good cause of action, it has been extinguished by release, acceptance of satisfaction, or in any other manner, as to cases in which there was originally no cause of action. The application of this principle is shown by the following cases: In Haigh v. Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., 52 L. J., Q. B. 640, a ticket was sold by the defendants to a passenger subject to a condition that the company would not be responsible for injury arising from perils of the sea, though the negligence of the defendants' servants might have contributed to it. The passenger having been drowned in consequence of a collision caused by neglect of the officers and crew of the ship, it was held that as the company would not have been liable to the passenger himself, they were consequently not liable in an action in Lord Campbell's act brought by his executors. In Senior v. Ward, 1 E. & E. 385, it was held that contributory negligence by the deceased was a defence to an action under the statute brought by his widow. In Griffiths v. Earl of Dudley, 9 Q.B. D. 357, the deceased was a workman in the employ of the defendant, who had expressly contracted that the defendant should not be liable in the case of an injury such as that which caused his death, and it was held that no action could be maintained under the statute. In Read v. Great Eastern R. Co., 9 B. & S. 714, BLACKBURN, J., treats a bar of the right of action by the deceased by the operation of the statute of limitations, six years having elapsed in the interval between the injury and the death without any action having been brought, as equivalent to a bar by satisfaction or release, saying "Mr. Codd was driven to argue that the present right of action did not arise till the death of the deceased, and that although six years elapsed before the party died from the effects of the wrongful act, neglect, or default, and although he in his lifetime received compensation, his executors might bring another action after his death, but that would be straining the words of the statute." It is to be remarked that this case of Read v. Great Eastern R. Co. is also reported in Law Reports, 3 Q. B. 555, but that the passage just quoted is not to be found in that report. Best and Smith, however, appear to have been the authorized reporters to the Court of Q. B. at the time of the decision, and their report is therefore to be regarded as the more authentic. Now, the question we have to determine in the present case, which in this aspect of it comes before us on an appeal from the judgment of the court below on the motion in Deceased right arrest of judgment, or for judgment non obstante of action exmade by the defendants in the court of review, is tinguished by whether the deceased husband and father of the prescription. plaintiffs retained up to the time of his death a good right of action against the defendants in respect of the injury he had received, or whether the right to maintain such an action had not been extinguished by the prescription of the article 2262. The procedure on a motion for judgment non obstante is provided for by article 433, of the Code of Procedure, and article 431 regulates the proceedings on a motion in arrest of judgment. As I understood the argument it was not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondents that it did appear upon the record both from the pleadings and the evidence (all of which are open for consideration on motions of this kind), that more than a year had elapsed in the interval between the injury received by the deceased and the time of his death, and that any objection founded on this was open on these motions. It was, however, strenuously contended on the part of the respondents that the action of the present plaintiffs was in no way dependent on the subsistence of a right of action in the deceased up to the date of his death (inasmuch as their action was an entirely new and independent one); and further, that even if it were, the respondents (plaintiffs) had notwithstanding, under the express provision of article 1056, the right to maintain an action begun at any time within a year after the death of the deceased; and, lastly, that at all events the defence that the action of the deceased had been extinguished by prescription could not be set up, inasmuch as it had not been pleaded. As I have before said, I am of opinion that the action being of the same nature, and indeed the same action in all respects, as that conferred by Lord Campbell's act, it must, as an action on that statute is considered in England, be deemed to be a new action, but still a new action dependent. on the condition that the action of the deceased had not at the time of his death been barred or extinguished. It therefore only remains to consider the other propositions advanced by the respondents. That the provisions of article 1056 do not entitle the consort and relations mentioned in the article to sue in a case where the original action of the party deceased was extinguished before his death by satisfaction or release is, I think, abundantly clear from the English authorities decided under Lord Campbell's act. No case appears to have arisen in England in which the right of action of the deceased had been barred by the statute of limitations, but in the passage which I have before quoted from Mr. Justice BLACKBURN'S judgment in Read v. Great Eastern Railway Co., 9 B. & S. p. 714, he puts the case of the action having been barred by the statute as one in which it would be "straining the words of the statute" to admit the action. Then it is to be observed that whilst the English statute of limitations only bars the remedy, leaving the right still subsisting, here the article 2262 is not merely a bar to the remedy, but an actual extinguishment of the obligation arising from the delict, for the article 2267 expressly provides that in "all the cases mentioned in articles 2250, 2260, 2261, and 2262 the debt is absolutely extinguished, and no action can be maintained after the delay for prescription has expired." If, therefore, the bar of the remedy by the statute of limitations would constitute a defence in England a fortiori must be the prescription of the article 2262, which not merely bars the remedy, but is extinctive of the obligation, so operate in the province of Quebec. There is, however, contained in the article 2262 a saving of the special provision contained in article 1056. This unquestionably refers to the proviso in article 1056 that the consort or designated relations of the deceased shall have "but only within a year after his death a right to bring an action. These words are, in my opinion, quite immaterial in the present case. It could not be pretended that they would apply so as to give a right to sue in a case in which the deceased had accepted satisfaction or released the action; and if so, there is no more reason why they should apply in a case where his |