fendants from further prosecuting the action in the Iowa court. After
certain other pleadings and amendments thereto had been made the
case in the District Court of Pottawattamie County, Iowa, came on
for hearing, and upon the testimony that court entered a decree quiet-
ing Phelan's title to the land as against any and all other parties to
the suit, subject, however, to certain mortgage interests which were
recognized and protected, but which are not in any way pertinent to
this controversy between Dull and wife and the defendants in error.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State such decree was, on
January 21, 1896, affirmed. Held, that the decree of the Supreme
Court of Iowa was right, and that it should be affirmed. Dull v.
Blackman, 243.

2. In August, 1880, Sackett brought suit in the Supreme Court of the
State of New York, on behalf of himself and all other holders and
owners of bonds of certain railroad companies against Root, the Har-
lem Extension Railroad South Coal Transportation Company, the
New York, Boston and Montreal Railway Company and David But-
terfield, receiver of said company, praying for the appointment of a
receiver and for a sale of the railroad and franchises for the benefit of
the bondholders. On October 11, 1880, a receiver was appointed and
qualified. On April 2, 1881, on petition of the receiver, and after a
report by an expert disclosing the necessity for expenditure to make
the road safe and to enable trains to be run, an order was made by
the court authorizing the receiver to issue and negotiate $350,000 in
certificates, the same to be a first lien. The certificates were sold,
and the proceeds expended under the approval of the court. On
June 12, 1885, sale was made of the road and deed delivered to Foster
and Hazard for $155,000, subject to the payment of the unpaid portion
of the principal and interest of the certificates. On April 9, 1886, the
Central National Bank of Boston brought suit in the Supreme Court
of New York, on its own behalf and that of others as owners of the
certificates, against Foster, Hazard, the New York, Rutland and
Montreal Railway Company and the American Loan and Trust Com-
pany. On March 24, 1887, the suit having been transferred on the
petition of the defendants to the Circuit Court of the United States,
after full hearing and argument the latter court rendered a final decree,
establishing the rights of the Central National Bank of Boston and of
others as owners of said certificates, declaring the latter to be a first
lien, decreeing that Foster and Hazard were liable for any deficiency
if the sale should fail to realize enough to pay certificates. On
March 23, 1892, sale under said decree to Foster for $7500, and on
April 25, 1892, deed of conveyance by referee to Foster were made.
On December 8, 1890, Stevens and others brought their suit in the
Supreme Court of New York against the Central National Bank of
Boston, the other holders of certificates, Foster, Hazard and others, to
set aside the decree in Sackett's case and to enjoin proceedings in the

Circuit Court of the United States. November 11, 1891, judgment
setting aside the sale in Sackett's case and finally enjoining the Cen-
tral National Bank and others, plaintiffs in the Circuit Court of the
United States, from selling under the decree of the Federal court. On
May 16, 1892, sale and conveyance were made by referee under the
decree in the present suit to Foster. On May 9, 1893, judgment of
the general term was rendered, and November 27, 1894, judgment of
the Court of Appeals, each affirming the judgment of the Supreme
Court, Held that the judgment of the Supreme Court of New York and
of the Court of Appeals affirming the same are erroneous in so far as
they command the Central National Bank of Boston, the Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance Company and other holders of the receiver's
certificates whose rights, as such holders, were adjudged by the Cir-
cuit Court of the United States, to appear before the referee appointed
by the Supreme Court in the present case, and which enjoin the Cen-
tral National Bank of Boston and others, whose rights have been
adjudged by the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern
District of New York, from proceeding with the sale under the decree
of that court. Central National Bank v. Stevens, 432.

LACHES.

1. In this case the court arrives at the conclusion, on the evidence, that if
the false representations as to the earned fees were made by Baker as
alleged, there was entire knowledge thereof by Cummings more than
three years before the filing of his bill, which is the time in which an
action at law for such a cause is barred in the District of Columbia,
and that the conduct of Cummings, in permitting Baker to go on and
prosecute the claims as if they were his own, debars him from proceed-
ing in a court of equity; but in so holding the court must not be con-
sidered as intimating that it concludes that there was either clear and
convincing proof, or even a preponderance of proof, that the sale was
as claimed by Cummings. Baker v. Cummings, 189.

2. The decree of the Circuit Court, affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals, dismissing the bill in this case on the ground of laches, was
correct, and that decree is affirmed. Wetzel v. Minnesota Railway
Transfer Co., 237.

1

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1.

LIFE INSURANCE.

This was an action on six policies of insurance, all alike (except as to the
amount of insurance), and in the following form: "In consideration
of the application for this policy, which is hereby made a part of this

contract, the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York promises
to pay at its home office in the city of New York, unto William M.
Runk, of Philadelphia, in the county of Philadelphia, State of Penn-
sylvania, his executors, administrators or assigns, twenty thousand
dollars, upon acceptance of satisfactory proofs at its home office of the
death of the said William M. Runk during the continuance of this
policy, upon the following condition, and subject to the provisions,
requirements and benefits stated on the back of this policy, which are
hereby referred to and made part thereof. The annual premium of
seven hundred and eighty-two dollars shall be paid in advance on the
delivery of this policy, and thereafter to the company, at its home
office in the city of New York, on the tenth day of November in every
year during the continuance of this contract. In witness whereof,"
etc. The principal defence was that the assured, when in sound
mind, deliberately and intentionally took his own life, whereby the
event insured against his death -was precipitated. One of the
issues was the sanity or insanity of the assured when he committed
self-destruction. Held, (1) If the assured understood what he was
doing, and the consequences of his act or acts, to himself as well as to
others in other words, if he understood, as a man of sound mind
would, the consequences to follow from his contemplated suicide, to
himself, his character, his family and others, and was able to compre-
hend the wrongfulness of what he was about to do, as a sane man
would, then he is to be regarded as sane; (2) In the case of fire insur-
ance it is well settled that although a policy, in the usual form, indem-
nifying against loss by fire, may cover a loss attributable merely to the
negligence or carelessness of the insured, unaffected by fraud or
design, it will not cover a destruction of the property by the wilful act
of the assured himself in setting fire to it, not for the purpose of avoid-
ing a peril of a worse kind but with the intention of simply effecting
its destruction; (3) Much more should it be held that it is not con-
templated by a policy taken out by the person whose life is insured
and stipulating for the payment of a named sum to himself, his exec-
utors, administrators or assigus, that the company should be liable,
if his death was intentionally caused by himself when in sound mind.
When the policy is silent as to suicide, it is to be taken that the
subject of the insurance, that is, the life of the assured, shall not be
intentionally and directly, with whatever motive, destroyed by him
when in sound mind. To hold otherwise is to say that the occurrence
of the event upon the happening of which the company undertook to
pay, was intended to be left to his option. That view is against the
very essence of the contract; (4) A contract, the tendency of which is
to endanger the public interests or injuriously affect the public good,
or which is subversive of sound morality, ought never to receive the
sanction of a court of justice or be made the foundation of its judg-
ment; (5) If, therefore, a policy taken out by the person whose life

-

is insured, and in which the sum named is made payable to himself,
his executors, administrators or assigns-expressly provided for the
payment of the sum stipulated when or if the assured, in sound mind,
took his own life, the contract, even if not prohibited by statute,
would be held to be against public policy, in that it tempted or encour-
aged the assured to commit suicide in order to make provision for
those dependent upon him, or to whom he was indebted. The case is
not different in principle, if the policy be silent as to suicide, and the
event insured, the death of the assured, is brought about by his wilful,
deliberate act when in sound mind. Ritter v. N. Y. Life Insurance
Co., 139.

LIMITATION, STATUTES OF.

Metropolitan National Bank v. St. Louis Dispatch Co., 149 U. S. 436, affirmed
to the point that courts of equity, in cases of concurrent jurisdiction,
consider themselves bound by the statutes of limitation which govern
actions at law. Baker v. Cummings, 189.

MARRIED WOMAN.

1. Under the laws of Maryland, which were in force in the District of
Columbia in 1859, it was competent for a married woman, outside of
the District, to execute, with her husband, a power of attorney to con-
vey her lands therein, which, when acknowledged by her accord-
ing to the statute relating to the acknowledgment by married
women of deeds conveying their real property in the District, thereby
became a valid and sufficient instrument to authorize the conveyance
by attorney; and the first section of the act of March 3, 1865, c. 110,
13 Stat. 531, contains a clear legislative recognition of the right to
execute such power. Williams v. Paine, 55.

2. Such a power of attorney, executed in one of the Northern States before
the civil war by a married woman then residing there, was not re-
voked by the fact that when that war broke out she and her husband
removed to the Southern States, where he entered the Confederate
service, and where she resided to the close of the war.
Ib.
3. When the purchase money for land sold under such a power is received
by the principal, to permit her heirs after her death to repudiate the
transaction, on the ground that the power of attorney had been re-
voked by the war, would be in conflict with every principle of equity
and fair dealing. 1b.

4. A majority of the court think that the deed made under the power of
attorney which is in controversy in this suit, and which is printed at
length in the Statement of the Case, was in the nature of a convey-
ance of the legal title, though defectively executed, and that it came
within the provisions of the act of March 3, 1865, and its defective
execution was thereby cured. Ib.

5. By this disposition of the whole case upon the merits the court is not
to be considered as deciding that parties situated as the plaintiffs
were in this case, out of possession, can maintain an action for parti-
tion. Ib.

MEXICAN LAND GRANT.

See PUBLIC LAND, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6.

MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE.

See DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 1.

MOTION TO DISMISS.

On a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, this court being of opinion
that the ruling of the state court on the points upon which the case
turned there was obviously correct, does not feel constrained to retain
the case for further argument, and accordingly affirms the judgment.
Richardson v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 128.

NATIONAL BANK.

1. One who holds shares of national bank stock - the bank being at the
time insolvent cannot escape the individual liability imposed by
the statute by transferring his stock with intent to avoid that liability,
knowing or having reason to believe, at the time of the transfer on
the books of the bank, that it is insolvent or about to fail. Stuart v.
Hayden, 1.

2. A transfer with such intent and under such circumstances, is a fraud
upon the creditors of the bank, and may be treated by the receiver as
inoperative between the transferrer and himself, and the former held
liable as a shareholder without reference to the financial condition of
the transferee. Ib.

3. The right of creditors of a national bank to look to the individual
liability of shareholders, to the extent indicated by the statute, for its
contracts, debts and engagements, attaches when the bank becomes
insolvent; and the shareholder cannot, by transferring his stock, com-
pel creditors to surrender this security as to him, and force the receiver
and creditors to look to the person to whom his stock has been trans-
ferred. lb.

4. If the bank be solvent at the time of the transfer, that is, able to meet its
existing contracts, debts and engagements, the motive with which the
transfer is made is immaterial, as a transfer under such circumstances does
not impair the security given to creditors; but if the bank be insolvent,
the receiver may, without suing the transferee and litigating the ques-
tion of his liability, look to every shareholder who, knowing or having
reason to know, at the time, that the bank was insolvent, got rid of