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Opinion of the Court.

petual upon the corporation; in the latter, the delinquency charged is personal, and involves no charge against the Government, against which a proceeding would not lie.

United States v. Chandler, 122 U. S. 643, was the case of a writ of error in review of a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia refusing a mandamus against William E. Chandler, Secretary of the Navy, to require of him the performance of certain alleged official duties. When the case was called, it appeared that Mr. Chandler was no longer Secretary, and that the office was filled by his successor. Thereupon this court, upon the authority of United States v. Boutwell, held that the suit had abated, and dismissed the writ of error.

A similar view prevailed in United States v. Lochren, 164 U. S. 701.

In Warner Valley Stock Company v. Smith, 165 U. S. 28, the subject was considered at some length. There a bill had been filed against Hoke Smith, as Secretary of the Interior, to compel him to cause patents to be issued to the plaintiff for certain tracts of land. The Supreme Court of the District sustained a demurrer to the bill and dismissed the suit. While an appeal to this court was pending, Hoke Smith resigned his office, and it was held that the bill could not be amended by making his successor a defendant, because he was not in office before the bill was filed and had no part in the doings complained of, and accordingly the cause was remanded with directions to dismiss the bill. In discussing the case Mr. Justice Gray cited the cases just mentioned and several others to the same effect, and again pointed out the difference between the case of a public officer of the United States and that of a municipal board, which is a continuing corporation, although its individual members may be changed, to which in its corporate capacity a writ of mandamus may be directed; and in respect to which the language of Chief Justice Waite, in Commissioners v. Sellew, 99 U. S. 624, was quoted: "One of the objects in creating such corporations, capable of suing and being sued, and having perpetual succession, is that the very inconvenience which manifested itself in Boutwell's case may be avoided."

Opinion of the Court.

In the absence, therefore, of statutory authority, we cannot, after a cause of this character has abated, bring a new party into the case. Nor is the want of such authority supplied by the consent of a person not a party in the cause.

It is, however, contended that an act of the State of Maryland enacted in 1785, chapter 80, section 1, and which, it is claimed, became the law of the District of Columbia when the territory thereof was ceded to the United States, is applicable. The terms of said section are as follows:

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No action, brought or to be brought, in any court of this State shall abate by the death of either of the parties to such action, but upon the death of any defendant, in a case where the action by such death would have abated before this act, the action shall be continued, and the heir, devisee, executor or administrator of the defendant, as the case may require, or other person interested on the part of the defendant, may appear to such action."

It is suggested that the attention of this court was not called to this statute in the previous cases. However that may have been, we are unable to perceive that this statute, either in its terms or its spirit, is applicable to cases like the present one. Neither the heir, devisee, executor or administrator of a deceased official would have any legal interest in such a controversy. Nor, in the case of a resignation, could the successor be said to be "a person interested on the part of the defendant."

In view of the inconvenience, of which the present case is a striking instance, occasioned by this state of the law, it would seem desirable that Congress should provide for the difficulty by enacting that, in the case of suits against the heads of departments abating by death or resignation, it should be lawful for the successor in office to be brought into the case by petition, or some other appropriate method.

The motion is refused, and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, the costs in this court to be paid by the plaintiff in error, and the cause remanded to that court with directions to reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia and remand

Statement of the Case.

the cause to that court with directions to dismiss the petition for the writ of mandamus because of the death of the defendant Butterworth.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, MR. JUSTICE BREWER and MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM dissented.

MCCORMICK HARVESTING MACHINE CO. v.
AULTMAN.

SAME v. AULTMAN-MILLER COMPANY.

CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.

Nos. 130, 131. Argued December 1, 2, 1897. -Decided March 21, 1898.

If the owner of a patent applies to the Patent Office for a reissue of it and includes, among the claims in the application, the same claims as those which were included in the old patent, and the primary examiner rejects some of such claims for want of patentable novelty, by reference to prior patents, and allows others, both old and new, the owner of the patent does not, by taking no appeal and by abandoning his application for reissue, hold the original patent (the return of which he procures from the Patent Office) invalidated as to those of its claims which were disallowed for want of patentable novelty by the primary examiner in the proceeding for reissue; as the Patent Office, by the issue of the original patent, had lost jurisdiction over it, and did not regain it by the application for a reissue.

THIS was a question certified to this court by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, involving the authority of a primary examiner of the Patent Office to reject as invalid claims of an original patent which were incorporated in an application for a reissue.

It appears that the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company filed a bill in equity in the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of Ohio against C. Aultman et al., and also one against the Aultman-Miller Company, in each of

Statement of the Case.

which it was sought to restrain the defendant from the future infringement of two patents covering automatic twine binders for harvesting machines. As the interests of the several defendants were closely identified the two cases were heard· together.

The question certified involves only patent No. 159,506, issued to Marquis L. Gorham, February 9, 1875, and the other patent sued upon will therefore not be considered. The record shows that there was filed in the Patent Office by the executrix of Gorham an application for a reissue of this patent, in which were included several claims of the original patent, as well as many new claims. Upon consideration, the assistant or primary examiner decided that claims 3, 10, 11, 25 and 26 of the original patent should be rejected for want of patentable novelty, and reference was made to prior patented devices. No appeal was taken from this decision, and subsequently, in compliance with a request, the original patent was returned to the plaintiff corporation, which had become the owner thereof. Thereafter these suits were brought against the defendants upon the original patent.

In the Circuit Court it was decided, that as the original claims 3, 10, 11, 25 and 26 had been determined by the examiner to be invalid, and no appeal had been taken from that decision, but the same had apparently been acquiesced in, the adverse action must be regarded as fatal to the claims in question, and to the same extent as if the rejection had been incident to the original application for the patent. 58 Fed. Rep. 778.

Upon appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals decided that there was no infringement by the defendants as to claims 25 and 26, but that there was infringement of claims 3, 10 and 11 of the original patent, unless it should be determined that they were invalidated by their being rejected by the examiner upon an application for a reissue of the same; and, desiring instruction upon this point, it certified to this court the following question: "If the owner of a patent applies to the Patent Office for a reissue of it, and includes among the claims in the application the same claims as those which were included in

Opinion of the Court.

the old patent, and the primary examiner rejects some of such claims for want of patentable novelty, by reference to prior patents, and allows others, both old and new, does the owner of the patent, by taking no appeal and by abandoning his application for reissue, hold the original patent, the return of which he procures from the Patent Office, invalidated as to those of its claims which were disallowed for want of patentable novelty by the primary examiner in the proceeding for reissue?"

Mr. Robert H. Parkinson for appellant.

Mr. Thomas A. Banning, (with whom was Mr. Ephraim Banning on the brief,) and Mr. Edmund Wetmore for appellees.

MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The validity of the claims in question depends upon the view taken of the action of the examiner in rejecting them when incorporated in an application for a reissue of the patent, upon the ground that the claims were wanting in patentable novelty, as evidenced by prior patents cited by him. No appeal was taken from this decision, and the matter lay in abeyance for nearly two years before the plaintiff corporation, which had in the meantime become the owner of the patent, abandoned the application for a reissue and requested and obtained from the Patent Office the return of the original patent.

It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court that when a patent has received the signature of the Secretary of the Interior, countersigned by the Commissioner of Patents, and has had affixed to it the seal of the Patent Office, it has passed beyond the control and jurisdiction of that office, and is not subject to be revoked or cancelled by the President, or any other officer of the Government. United States v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 378; United States v. Am. Bell Telephone Co., 128

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