Opinion of the Court.

assign his right and title to another, and the rights under such assignment were not affected by the fact that the defendant in error did not purchase his title until many years after the final determination by this court that no formal, actual or valid grant had ever been made by the Mexican government to the Romeros.

IV. We are also of opinion that the rejection by the Secretary of the Interior of the first application made by the defendant in error for a patent, and the subsequent granting of a rehearing and the issuing of a patent thereafter by the Secretary, were all acts within the jurisdiction of that officer. The fact that a decision refusing the patent was made by one Secretary of the Interior, and, upon a rehearing, a decision granting the patent was made by another Secretary of the Interior, is not material in a case like this. It is not a personal but an official hearing and decision, and it is made by the Secretary of the Interior as such Secretary, and not by an individual who happens at the time to fill that office, and the application for a rehearing may be made to the successor in office of the person who made the original decision, provided it could have been made to the latter had he remained in office. The Secretary who made the first decision herein, could have granted a rehearing and reversed his former ruling.

The case of United States v. Stone, 2 Wall. 525, has no bearing adverse to this proposition. In that case it was stated that a patent is but evidence of a grant, and the officer who issues it acts ministerially and not judicially; that if he issues a patent for land reserved from sale by law, such patent is void for want of authority, but that one officer of the land office is not competent to cancel or annul the act of his predecessor; that is a judicial act and requires the judgment of a court. The power to cancel or annul in that case meant the power to annul a patent issued by a predecessor, and this court held no such power existed. The officer originally issuing it would have had no greater power to annul the patent than had his suc

cessor.

Neither does Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad, 147

Opinion of the Court.

U. S. 165, touch the case. The principle therein decided was in substance the same as in the Stone case, supra. The control of the department necessarily ceased the moment the title passed from the Government. It was not a question whether a successor was able to do the act which the original officer might have done, but it was the announcement of the principle that no officer, after the title had actually passed, had any power over the matter whatever. After the Secretary of the Interior had approved the map as provided for in the act of Congress under which the proceedings were taken by the company, the first section of that act vested the right of way in the company. This was equivalent to a patent, and no revocation could thereafter be permitted. See also Michigan Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U. S. 589, at 592.

We have considered the other questions raised herein but do not think any error was committed in their disposition by the courts below. The judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals must be

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissented.

Affirmed.

SMITH V. NAPHTALY. Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. No. 181. Submitted with No. 180. MR. JUSTIGE PECKHAM delivered the opinion of the court. In this case, counsel for the appellant concedes that if the court should hold that the sale of the land mentioned in the patent involved in the foregoing case were a valid sale, then the judgment in this case should be affirmed. As we do so hold, the judgment herein is, therefore,

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN dissented.

Same counsel and same briefs as in No. 180.

Affirmed.

Statement of the Case.

HOLDEN v. HARDY (No. 1).

HOLDEN v. HARDY (No. 2).

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH.

Nos. 261, 264. Argued October 21, 1897. Decided February 28, 1898.

The provisions in the act of March 30, 1896, c. 72, of Utah, providing that "The period of employment of workingmen in all underground mines or workings shall be eight hours per day, except in cases of emergency where life or property is in imminent danger;" that "The period of employment of workingmen in smelters and all other institutions for the reduction or refining of ores or metals shall be eight hours per day, except in cases of emergency where life or property is in imminent danger;" and that "Any person, body corporate, agent, manager or employer who shall violate any of the provisions of sections one and two of this act shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor," are a valid exercise of the police power of the State, and do not violate the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States by abridging the privileges or immunities of its citizens, or by depriving them of their property, or by denying to them the equal protection of the laws. The cases arising under the Fourteenth Amendment are examined in detail, and are held to demonstrate that, in passing upon the validity of state legislation under it, this court has not failed to recognize the fact that the law is, to a certain extent, a progressive science; that in some States methods of procedure which, at the time the Constitution was adopted, were deemed essential to the protection and safety of the people, or to the liberty of the citizen, have been found to be no longer necessary; that restrictions which had formerly been laid upon the conduct of individuals or classes had proved detrimental to their interests; and other classes of persons, particularly those engaged in dangerous or unhealthy employments, have been found to be in need of additional protection: but this power of change is limited by the fundamental principles laid down in the Constitution, to which each member of the Tnion is bound to accede as a condition of its admission as a State.

THESE were writs of error to review two judgments of the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, denying applications of the plaintiff in error, Holden, for his discharge upon two writs of habeas corpus, and remanding him to the custody of the sheriff of Salt Lake County.

The facts in case No. 261 were substantially as follows: On June 20, 1896, complaint was made to a justice of the peace of

Statement of the Case.

Salt Lake City that the petitioner Holden had unlawfully employed "one John Anderson to work and labor as a miner in the underground workings of the Old Jordan mine in Bingham cañon, in the county aforesaid, for the period of ten hours each day; and said defendant, on the date aforesaid and continuously since said time, has unlawfully required said John Anderson, under and by virtue of said employment, to work and labor in the underground workings of the mine aforesaid, for the period of ten hours each day, and that said employment was not in case of an emergency or where life or property was in imminent danger, contrary," etc.

Defendant Holden, having been arrested upon a warrant issued upon said complaint, admitted the facts set forth therein, but said he was not guilty because he is a native-born citizen of the United States, residing in the State of Utah; that the said John Anderson voluntarily engaged his services for the hours per day alleged, and that the facts charged did not constitute a crime, because the act of the State of Utah which creates and defines the supposed offence is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States in these respects:

"It deprives the defendant and all employers and employés of the right to make contracts in a lawful way and for lawful purposes;

"It is class legislation, and not equal or uniform in its provisions;

"It deprives the defendant, and employers and employés of the equal protection of the laws; abridges the privileges and immunities of the defendant as a citizen of the United States, and deprives him of his property and liberty without due process of law."

The court, having heard the evidence, found the defendant guilty as charged in the complaint, imposed a fine of fifty dollars and costs, and ordered that the defendant be imprisoned in the county jail for a term of fifty-seven days, or until such fine and costs be paid.

Thereupon petitioner sued out a writ of habeas corpus from the Supreme Court of the State, annexing a copy of the proceedings before the justice of the peace, and praying his dis

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

charge. The Supreme Court denied his application, and remanded him to the custody of the sheriff, whereupon he sued out this writ of error, assigning the unconstitutionality of the law.

In the second case the complaint alleged the unlawful employment by Holden of one William Hooley to work and labor in a certain concentrating mill, the same being an institution for the reduction of ores, for the period of twelve hours per day, The proceedings in this case were precisely the same as in the prior case, and it was admitted that there was no distinction in principle between the two cases.

Mr. Jeremiah M. Wilson for plaintiff in error. Mr. C. W. Bennett, Mr. R. Ilarkness, Mr. A. Howat and Mr. W. M. Bradley were on his brief.

In both of these cases is involved the constitutionality of the same statute of Utah, the only difference being that in the first the defendant Holden was convicted of a violation of section one of said act, while in the latter he was prosecuted and convicted under the second section. We will, therefore, consider them together, referring in the following statement to the record in the first case.

I. The statute of Utah involved herein is in conflict with the Constitution of the United States, and is not a valid exercise of the police power of the State.

Before presenting our views in detail concerning the repugnance of this statute to the Constitution of the United States, and to the various clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment which we think applicable to the matter in controversy, we deem it appropriate to ask the attention of the court, at the outset, to some of the most conspicuous of the authorities bearing upon the general question as to the scope of this police. power, and as to the subjects relating to which it may properly be invoked.

(a.) We have not found in any of the text-books or cases an authoritative statement defining and limiting the exact