He paid for the land in land grant bonds. This purchase was made nearly one year after the institution of the suit by the United States to recover the title to the land, and Wilder, as trustee, was party defendant to that suit and knew all about it.

Under the facts and circumstances shown in this case, Wilder could not have purchased "in good faith" within the meaning of the act of March 3, 1887, or "in actual ignorance of any defect in the railroad company's title," or "in reliance upon the action of the government in the apparent transfer of title."

In United States v. Winona, etc., Railroad (165 U. S., 480), the court construed the words "bona fide" and "good faith" as applied to purchasers of said lands, and said:

It matters not what constructive notice may be chargeable to such a purchaser, if, in actual ignorance of any defect in the railroad company's title, and in reliance upon the action of the government in the apparent transfer of title by certification or patent, he had made an honest purchase of the land.

Mr. Wilder does not come within this modified definition of “bona fide" or "good faith" purchaser, and no rights can be successfully maintained under the act of March 3, 1887, predicated upon said purchase. The action of your office in denying the application for a confirmatory patent to the heirs of Wilder is therefore affirmed.

Gustafson was in possession of the tract he now claims and had been for six years residing there, cultivating and improving the same, and Egdorf was in possession of, residing on, and improving the tract claimed by him at the date of the application by Chalstrom, who had never settled upon or improved the land.

Your office decision, in so far as it sustained the homestead applications of Gustafson and Egdorf and rejected the homestead application of Chalstrom, is also affirmed.

MINING CLAIM-RIGHTS ACQUIRED BY LOCATION.

HUSTLER AND NEW YEAR LODE CLAIMS.

The location of a mining claim, as made upon the surface of the ground by the locator, determines the extent of his rights below the surface, and the end lines of the location, as established by him on the surface, place the limits beyond which he may not go in the appropriation of any vein or veins along their course or strike, except in a case where it is developed that the location has been placed, not along, but across the course or strike of the vein, in which event the side lines of the location become the end lines, and the end lines the side lines of the claim.

Directions given for the modification of Rules 7 and 8 of the Mining Regulations, in so far as they are in conflict with the conclusions herein reached.

Secretary Hitchcock to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, (W. V. D.) (A. B. P.)

April 18, 1900.

February 3, 1898, H. W. Davis made mineral entry No. 1618, for the Hustler and New Year lode mining claims, survey No. 10313, Pueblo,

Colorado, excluding therefrom certain conflicts with the Fort Wilcox ode claim, survey No. 10180, and the Sitting Bull lode claim, survey No. 11272.

As located and surveyed the southerly end line of the Hustler claim s laid upon the northerly side line of the New Year, thus forming the only point of junction between the two claims. The easterly side line. of the Hustler, in its southwesterly course, extends entirely across, and some distance beyond, the Fort Wilcox claim. The westerly side line of the Hustler extends into, but not entirely across the Fort Wilcox. There is thus embraced in the Hustler location, at its southeasterly corner, a small triangular piece of ground adjoining the southerly side line of the Fort Wilcox, and the northerly side line of the New Year (tract B on the accompanying diagram), and not embraced in any other claim.

July 1, 1898, your office required an amended survey to be made in order to more specifically describe the exclusions from the entry, and also for the purpose of establishing a new southerly end line of the Hustler claim at the point where the assumed lode line of that claim, in its southwesterly course, intersects the northerly side line of the Fort Wilcox claim (dotted line C and D on said diagram), whose location antedated that of the Hustler. The amended survey was accordingly made, and as one of the results thereof the Hustler and New Year claims were rendered non-contiguous. December 8, 1898, your office directed that the mineral entryman be allowed sixty days from notice within which to show cause why his entry should not be canceled as to the Hustler claim because of such non-contiguity, and held that in default of such showing the entry would be canceled to the extent indicated without further notice.

February 21, 1899, the entryman, presumably assuming the action of your office, whereby his claims were rendered non-contiguous, to be correct, filed his written consent to the cancellation of his entry as to the Hustler claim, and on March 15, 1899, the entry was accordingly cancelei as to that claim, and approved for patent as to the New Year claim. Patent for the New Year claim was thereupon issued April 4, 1899. Subsequently, however, resident counsel for the applicant for patent filed a petition asking that your office reconsider and review its action requiring the establishment of a new southerly end line for the Hustler claim, contending, in substance and effect, that such action was erroneous, and that the entry of the Hustler claim as originally allowed should be reinstated and passed to patent under the application and former proceedings bad thereon.

This petition was denied by your office, and the applicant for patent thereupon appealed to the Department.

In addition to rendering the Hustler and New Year claims noncontiguous, as stated, and therefore not subject to application and entry as adjoining claims held in common, the effect of the action of

your office is to deny the right of the applicant for patent, to two small triangular parcels of ground, represented on the accompanying diagram as tracts A and B, which were embraced in the Hustler claim as originally located, surveyed, and applied for. The appellant contends that both these tracts were lawfully included in the location of the Hustler claim, and that, having included them in his application for patent, proceedings thereon having in all respects been regular and without adverse claim, he is entitled to entry and patent embracing them as a part of the Hustler claim. As has been shown, they were embraced in the entry as originally allowed, and the question presented is, whether the action of your office requiring the establishment of a new southerly end line for the Hustler claim, at the point and in the manner stated, thus excluding from said claim the two small triangular tracts aforesaid, and thereby rendering the New Year and Hustler claims noncontiguous, and for that reason not subject to entry and patent as adjoining claims held in common, was legal and proper. That action is based upon paragraph 7 of the mining regulations, which is as follows:

The rights granted to locators under section 2322, Revised Statutes, are restricted to such locations on veins, lodes, or ledges as may be "situated on the public domain.” In applications for lode claims where the survey conflicts with the survey or location lines of a prior valid lode claim and the ground within the conflicting surveys is excluded, the applicant not only has no right to the excluded ground, but he has no right to that portion of any vein or lode the top or apex of which lies within such excluded ground, unless his location was prior to May 10, 1872. His right to the lode claimed terminates where the lode, in its onward course or strike, intersects the exterior boundary of such excluded ground and passes within it. The end line of his survey should not, therefore, be established beyond such intersection.

The case of Del Monte Mining Co. v. Last Chance Mining Co. (171 U. S., 55), was one where a number of questions were certified by the lower court to the supreme court for decision. One of the questions certified was

May any of the lines of a junior lode location be laid within, upon or across the surface of a valid senior location for the purpose of defining for or securing to such junior location under ground or extra-lateral rights not in conflict with any rights of the senior location?

The supreme court, after referring specifically to and quoting from the earlier cases of Belk r. Meagher (104 U. S., 279) and Gwillim v. Donnellan (115 U. S., 45), said:

The question presented in each of those cases was whether a second location is effectual to appropriate territory covered by a prior substituting and valid location, and it was held it is not. Of the correctness of those decisions there can be no doubt. A valid location appropriates the surface, and the rights given by such location cannot, so long as it remains in force, be disturbed by any acts of third parties. Whatever rights on or beneath the surface passed to the first locator can in no manner be diminished or affected by a subsequent location. But that is not the question here presented. Indeed, the form in which it is put excludes any impairment or disturbance of the substantial rights of the prior locator. The question is whether the lines of a junior lode location may be laid upon a valid senior location for the purpose of defin