advanced age, and would probably be dead, before relief could be had in chancery.'

Courts will not exercise their extraordinary power by writ of mandamus to effect purposes, as well effected by the ordinary remedies; and accordingly to obtain relief by this process, the applicant must not only show a specific legal right, but there must be no other specific remedy, adequate to enforce that right. Upon this ground a mandamus has been refused to compel a bank to permit a transfer of stock on the books of the company, since complete satisfaction, equivalent to a specific relief, may be obtained in an action of the case; and to compel a railway company to carry goods, there being nothing in the act, rendering it compulsory on the company to carry, and they being liable in an action, as common carriers.* It has been refused also to compel a bank, or to compel a

5

3

1 Ex parte Rugby Charity Trustees, 9 D. & R. 214.

* Middleton's Case, 1 Sid. 169; Rex v. Ward, Fitzgib. 124; Rex v. Owen, Comb. 399; Rex v. Dean and Chapter of Dublin, 1 Stra. 538; Rex v. Barker et al. 1 W. Blacks. 352; Rex v. Marquis of Stafford, 3 T. R. 651; Rex v. Canterbury, 8 East, 219; Rex v. Margate Pier Company, 3 B. & A. 224; Rex v. Haythorne, 5 B. & C. 422, 429; Rex v. Severn and Wye Railway Comp. 2 B. & A. 646; Rex v. Dean, 2 M. & S. 80; Rex v. Bank of England, Doug. 526; Rex v. Commissioners of Customs, 1 Nev. & P. (K. B.) 536; 5 Adolph. & Ellis 380; The Commonwealth v. Rosseter et al. Trustees of St. Mary's Church, 2 Binn. (Penn.) R. 368; Shipley v. The Mechanics Bank, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) R. 484; People v. Trustees of Brooklyn, 1 Wend. (N. Y.) R. 318; The King v. The Free Fishers, &c. of Whitstable, 7 East, 356, per Lawrence, J.; Boyce v. Russel, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) R. 444; The People v. Mayor of New York, 25 Wend. (N. Y.) R. 680; Ex parte Lynch, 2 Hill (N. Y.) R. 45; The State v. Holiday, 3 Halst. (N. J.) R. 205; Oakes v. Hill, 8 Pick. (Mass.) R. 47; Rex v. Windham, Cowp. 378.

The King v. The Bank of England, Doug. 526; Boyce v. Russel, 2 Cow. (N. Y.) R. 444; Shipley v. The Mechanics Bank, 10 Johns. (N. Y.) R. 484; and see Asylum, &c. v. Phoenix Bank, 4 Conn. R. 172; Ex parte, The Firemen's Insurance Co. 6 Hill (N. Y.) R. 243.

Robins ex parte, 7 Dowl. (P. C.) 568.

• The King v. The Bank of England, 2 B. & A. 620, 622.

fishing company,' to produce their accounts, and divide, or pay over to the stockholders, or freemen, the profits; the remedy being in equity; nor will it be granted to compel a company to pay a judgment or to make calls to enable them to pay a judgment, it appearing that calls sufficient had been made, but not paid, and that the company had not now the proper officers to make such calls. Neither will a court grant a mandamus to compel the trustees of an incorporated church, to restore the prosecutor to the possession of a pew to which he claims title, inasmuch as he has another complete remedy, by an action on the case against the person disturbing him.' And in England, mandamus will not lie to a corporation, commanding it to pay a poor's rate, unless, indeed, it be shown in the applicant's affidavits, that the corporation had no effects upon which a distress could be levied. It is hardly necessary to add, that a mandamus will not be granted to enforce an act, as a reference to arbitrators, which it is evident from the facts could have no result."

It is said by Mr. Justice Buller, in The King v. The Marquis of Stafford, that if the party applying for a mandamus "show a legal right, and there be also a remedy in equity, that is no answer to an application for a mandamus; for when the court refuse to grant a mandamus, because there is another specific remedy, they mean only a specific remedy at law."

The King v. The Free Fishers, &c. of Whitstable, 7 East, 356, per Lawrence, J.

Reg. v. Victoria Park Company, 1 Adolph. & Ellis, (N. S.) 288; S. C. 41 Eng. C. L. R. 544.

The Commonwealth v. Rosseter et al. Trustees of St. Mary's Church, 2 Binn. (Penn.) R. 360; and see Francis v. Ley, Cro. Jac. 366; Dawney v. Dee et al. Ibid. 605; Kenrick v. Taylor, 3 Wils. 326; Stocks v. Booth, 1 T. R. 428.

• The King v. The Margate Pier Company, 3 B. & A. 221, 224, 225.

* Reg. v. Northwich Savings Bank, 9 Adolph. & Ellis, Q. B. 729; I Perr. & Dav. 477.

* 3 T. R. 651, 652; and see The People v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) R. 293; Ex parte Nelson, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) R. 423; The People v. Supervisors of Albany, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) R. 414.

It is true, that the courts in laying down the rule usually say, that mandamus will not lie where there is another specific legal remedy; but in The King v. The Free Fishers, &c. of Whitstable,' and in The King v. The Bank of England,' the Court of King's Bench gave as a reason for refusing a mandamus, that there was a complete remedy in chancery; and there seems but little reason, at the present day, for a court of law refusing to notice the relief that chancery can afford.

4

In order to exclude the writ of mandamus, the remedy must, however, be adequate, or must afford specific, or what in the case is equivalent to specific relief. Thus, though trover or detinue would lie for the insignia of office belonging to a corporation, yet as we have seen, mandamus lies to compel the old mayor to yield them to the new, because, as is said, the office is annual, and it is necessary that the mayor should have them immediately, in order to command the more respect. It lies, too, to compel an officer to execute the duties of his office, though he be liable to penalties or an action of the case, for the neglect of them. And though it was admitted, that an indictment would lie against a railway company for injuring their railway, so as to render it impassable, the act of parliament, by which they were incorporated, providing that the public should have the beneficial enjoyment of the same, yet it was also held, that mandamus would lie to compel the company to reinstate and lay down again the railway; for, it was said, that an indictment could not compel the corporation to repair the road, and that at all events a considerable delay must take place. In the case of Clarke v. The Bishop of Sa

17 East, 356, per Lawrence, J.

* 2 B. & A. 622, per Bayley, J.

'See Rey v. The Bank of England, Doug. 526, per Lord Mansfield.

See ante, pages 572, 573; and Rex v. Dublin, 1 Stra. 537, 538, 539, per Powys, Jus; Rex v. Owen, Comb. 399; Rex v. Ipswich, 2 Ld. Ray. 1238; Crawford v. Powell, 2 Burr. 1016; Rex v. Monday, Cowp. 539.

' Rex v. Everet, C. T. H. 261; McCollough v. Brooklyn, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) R. 458; Western v. Brooklyn, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) R. 334.

* The King v. The Severn and Wye Railway Company, 2 B. & A. 646,

rum, reported in Strange,' and Andrews, it appears that the court ordered a mandamus, where a quare impedit would lie, upon the ground, that the former was a more expeditious and less expensive remedy than the latter. This case is not, however, to be considered as authority; for when it was subsequently cited, Lord Mansfield remarked, that Mr. Justice Dennison had always thought that case wrong; and added as a reason, that no case was proper for a mandamus, but where there is no other specific remedy. We have before seen, that as the remedy for a freehold office by assize has become obsolete, it never makes any part of the consideration whether a mandamus ought to be granted or not."

If discretionary power is granted to a corporation or its officers over any subject, though the court may issue a mandamus to compel them to exercise their discretion, yet it will not control them in the exercise of it. This principle is illustrated by the case of a visitor, before referred to, who may be enforced to hear and decide an appeal, but whose sentence cannot be reversed. And where all the powers of a religious corporation were vested in certain trustees, and a mode was prescribed by statute, in which any corporations desirous of altering or amending their charters might proceed, a mandamus, on the motion of several of the members of the corporation, to compel the trustees to take the necessary steps to alter the charter, was refused on the ground, that this was left to them as a matter of discretion."

650, 651; Reg. v. Bristol Dock Company, 2 Adolph. & Ellis (N. S.) 70; S. C. 42 Eng. C. L. R. 576, 577; Reg. v. Manchester and Leeds Railway Co. 3 Adolph. & Ellis (N. S.) 528; S. C. 43 Eng. C. L. R. 851; The King v. The Commissioners of the Dean Inclosure, 2 M. & S. 80; The People v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 10 Wend. (N. Y.) R. 293.

1 2 Stra. 1082.

• Andr. 20.

Powell v. Millbank, 1 T. R. 399, 400, 401, 402, in the note; Cowp. 103, n.

• Ante, p. 567.

5 Ante; p. 547, and see Chap. XIX. § 4 and 5.

Case of St. Mary's Church, 6 Serg. & Rawle (Penn.) R. 498.

In the case of the King v. The Bristol Dock Company,' too, where it appeared that the directors of the company were authorized and required "to make such alterations and amendments in the sewers, as were necessary in consequence of the floating of the harbor," it was held, that a mandamus in the terms of the act was in the proper form; and that it was neither requisite nor proper to call upon the company to make any specific alteration, the mode of remedying the evil being left at their discretion by the act of parliament. Indeed it is a general rule, that wherever there is a discretionary power vested in officers, the court will not interfere by mandamus; for they cannot, and ought not to control them in the exercise of it."

5. If the applicant for a mandamus makes out a probable case, in general, a rule is granted upon the defendant to show cause why the writ should not issue; and this rule must be directed to and served upon the persons to whom the writ is to be directed, all those principally interested in the defence. being included in it. Where, however, full notice has been

16 B. & C. 181; and see Reg. v. Eastern Counties Railway Company, 2 Adolph. & Ellis, 569; S. C. 42 Eng. C. L. R. 812.

Gile's Case, Stra. 881; Rex v. Nothingham, Sayer, 217; Reg. v. Middlesex Asylum, 2 Adolph. & Ellis (N. S.) 433; S. C. Eng. C. L. R. 747; Wilson v. Supervisors of Albany, 12 Johns. (N. Y.) R. 414; Hall v. Supervisors of Oneida, 19 Johns. (N. Y.) R. 259; Blunt v. Greenwood, 1 Cowen (N. Y.) R. 15; Ex parte Nelson, Ibid. 417; Ex parte Bailey, 2 Cowen (N. Y.) R. 479; Matter of Gilbert, 3 Ibid. 59; Ex parte Johnson, Ibid. 371; Ex parte Bacon, 6 Ibid. 392; Ex parte Benson, 7 lbid. 363; Com. v. The Judges of Common Pleas, 3 Binn. (Penn.) R. 273; Griffith v. Cochran, 5 Ibid. 87, 103; 6 Ibid. 456; Com. v. The County Commisioners, 5 Ibid. 536; Respublica v. Clarkson, 1 Yeates (Penn.) R. 46; Respublica v. Guardians of the Poor, Ibid. 476; Anon. 2 (Penn.) R. 576; Foreman v. Murphy, Ibid. 1024; The People v. The Sup. Court of the City of N. Y. 5 Wend. (N. Y.) R. 144; Chase v. Blackstone Canal Co. 10 Pick. (Mass.) R. 244; Rice v. Commmissioners of Middlesex 13 Pick. (Mass.) R. 225; Gibbs v. Commissioners of Hampden, 19 Pick. (Mass.) R. 298; Inhabitants of Ipswich, Petitioners, &c. 24 Pick. (Mass.) R. 343.

B. N. P. 200; Rex v. Bankes, 1 Wm. Black. 445; S. C. 3 Burr. R.