affair has become very much complicated, by reason of the irregular and extraordinary proceeding of the French government in proposing to take notice of the domestic disturbance which has occurred in this country. I do not know that even now I can clear the matter up effectually without knowing what may be the result of the communication which, in my despatch No. 19, I instructed you to make to the French government. I will try, nevertheless, to do so. The instructions contained in my despatch No. 4, dated 24th of April last, required you to tender to the French government, without delay, our adhesion to the declaration of the congress of Paris, pure and simple.

The reason why we wished it done immediately was, that we supposed the French government would naturally feel a deep anxiety about the safety of their commerce, threatened distinctly with privateering by the insurgents, while at the same time, as this government had heretofore persistently declined to relinquish the right of issuing letters of marque, it would be apprehended by France that we too should take up that form of maritime warfare in the present domestic controversy. We apprehended that the danger of such a case of depredation upon commerce equally by the government itself, and by its enemies, would operate as a provocation to France and other commercial nations to recognize the insurrectionary party in violation of our national rights and sovereignty. On the contrary, we did not desire to depredate on friendly commerce ourselves, and we thought it our duty to prevent such depredations by the insurgents by executing our own laws, which make privateering by disloyal citizens piracy, and punish its pursuit as such. We thought it wise, just, and prudent to give, unasked, guarantees to France and other friendly nations for the security of their commerce from exposure to such depredations on either side, at the very moment when we were delivering to them our protest against the recognition of the insurgents. The accession to the declaration of Paris would be the form in which these guarantees could be given-that for obvious reasons must be more unobjectionable to France and to other commercial nations than any other. It was safe on our part, because we tendered it, of course, as the act of this federal government, to be obligatory equally upon disloyal as upon loyal citizens.

The instructions waived the Marcy amendment, (which proposed to exempt private property from confiscation in maritime war,) and required you to propose our accession to the declaration of the congress of Paris, pure and simple, These were the reasons for this course, namely: First. It was as well understood by this government then, as it is now by yourself, that an article of that celebrated declaration prohibits every one of the parties to it from negotiating upon the subject of neutral rights in maritime warfare with any nation not a party to it, except for the adhesion of such outstanding party to the declaration of the congress of Paris, pure and simple. An attempt to obtain an acceptance of Mr. Marcy's amendment would require a negotiation not merely with France alone, but with all the other original parties of the congress of Paris, and every government that has since acceded to the declaration. Nay, more: we must obtain their unanimous consent to the amendment before being able to commit ourselves or to engage any other nation, however well disposed, to commit itself to us on the propositions actually contained in the declaration. On the other hand, each nation which is a party to the declaration of Paris is at liberty to stipulate singly with us for acceptance of that declaration for the government of our neutral relations. If, therefore, we should waive the Marcy proposition, or leave it for ultimate consideration, we could establish a complete agreement between ourselves and France on a subject which, if it should be left open,

might produce consequences very much to be deprecated. It is almost unnecessary to say that what we proposed to France was equally and simultaneously proposed to every other maritime power. In this way we expected to remove every cause that any foreign power could have for the recognition of the insurgents as a belligerent power.

The matter stood in this plain and intelligible way until certain declarations or expressions of the French government induced you to believe that they would recognize and treat the insurgents as a distinct national power for belligerent purposes. It was not altogether unreasonable that you, being at Paris, should suppose that this government would think itself obliged to acquiesce in such a course by the government of France. So assuming, you thought that we would not adhere to our proposition to accede to the declaration, pure and simple, since such a course would, as you thought, be effective to bind this government without binding the insurgents, and would leave France at liberty to hold us bound, and the insurgents free from the obligations created by our adhesion. Moreover, if we correctly understand your despatch on that subject, you supposed that you might propose our adhesion to the treaty of Paris, not pure and simple, but with the addition of the Marcy proposition in the first instance, and might afterwards, in case of its being declined in that form, withdraw the addition, and then propose our accession to the declaration of Paris, pure and simple.

While you were acting on these views on your side of the Atlantic, we on this side, not less confident in our strength than in our rights, as you are now aware, were acting on another view, which is altogether different, namely, that we shall not acquiesce in any declaration of the government of France that assumes that this government is not now, as it always has been, exclusive sovereign, for war as well as for peace, within the States and Territories of the federal Union, and over all citizens, the disloyal and loyal all alike. We treat in that character, which is our legal character, or we do not treat at all, and we in no way consent to compromise that character in the least degree; we do not even suffer this character to become the subject of discussion. Good faith and honor, as well as the same expediency which prompted the proffer of our accession to the declaration of Paris, pure and simple, in the first instance, now require us to adhere to that proposition and abide by it; and we do adhere to it, not, however, as a divided, but as an undivided nation. The proposition is tendered to France not as a neutral but as a friend, and the agreement is to be obligatory upon the United States and France and all their legal dependencies just alike.

The case was peculiar, and in the aspect in which it presented itself. to you portentous. We were content that you might risk the experi ment, so, however, that you should not bring any responsibility for delay upon this government. But you now see that by incorporating the Marcy amendment in your proposition, you have encountered the very difficulty which was at first foreseen by us. The following nations are parties to the declaration of Paris, namely: Baden, Bavaria, Belgium, Bremen, Brazils, Duchy of Brunswick, Chili, the Argentine Confedera tion, the Germanic Confederation, Denmark, the two Sicilies, the Republic of the Equator, the Roman States, Greece, Guatemala, Hayti, Hamburgh, Hanover, the two Hesses, Lubeck, Mecklenburgh Strelitz, Mecklen burgh Schwerin, Nassau, Oldenburgh, Parma, Holland, Peru, Portugal, Saxony, Saxe Altenburgh, Saxe Coburg Gotha, Saxe Meiningen, Saxe Weimar, Sweden, Switzerland, Tuscany, Wurtemburg, Anhault Dessau, Modena, New Granada, and Uruguay.

The great exigency in our affairs will have passed away-for preservation or destruction of the American Union-before we could bring all these nations to unanimity on the subject, as you have submitted it to Mr. Thouvenel. It is a time not for propagandism, but for energetic acting to arrest the worst of all national calamities. We therefore expect you now to renew the proposition in the form originally prescribed. But in doing this you will neither unnecessarily raise a question about the character in which this government acts, (being exclusive sovereign,) nor, on the other hand, in any way compromise that character in any degree. Whenever such a question occurs to hinder you, let it come up from the other party in the negotiation. It will be time then to stop and wait for such further instructions as the new exigency may require.

One word more. You will, in any case, avow our preference for the proposition with the Marcy amendment incorporated, and will assure the government of France that whenever there shall be any hope for the adoption of that beneficent feature by the necessary parties, as a principle of the law of nations, we shall be ready not only to agree to it, but even to propose it, and to lead in the necessary negotiations.

This paper is, in one view, a conversation merely between yourself and us. It is not to be made public. On the other hand, we confide in your discretion to make such explanations as will relieve yourself of embarrassments, and this government of any suspicion of inconsistency or indirection in its intercourse with the enlightened and friendly government of France. I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

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SIR: Since writing the above I have received your despatches, Nos. 12, 19, and 20. I infer, from the contents of No. 19, that Mr. Mercier is aware of your original instructions to me on the subject of an accession to the treaty of Paris of 1856, and that you hold yourself open to negotiate with him. there on that subject. As Mr. Adams has referred this question back to be treated of at Washington, and it is evident, I think, that Great Britain and France will act upon advisement at least with each other, it seems to me that it will be more convenient, in every respect, that you should take charge of the whole question at Washington, rather than have it dealt with by different persons, at the same time, each ignorant to a great extent of the action of the other. Besides, it is due to frankness to say that, if a convention is to be negotiated for an accession by the United States to the treaty of Paris, without amendment to the first clause, I would prefer it should be done at Washington rather than Paris. Still, I hold myself subject to the orders of the government in this as in other matters. I have already said I should await further instructions from your department on this subject.

With much respect, I have the honor to be, truly yours,
WILLIAM L DAYTON.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Secretary of State.

Mr. Dayton to Mr. Seward.

[Extracts.]

No. 21.]

PARIS, July 22, 1861.

SIR: Your despatches, Nos. 24 and 25, are duly received. Despatches 19, 22, and 24, treat in whole or in part of the same general matter.

I have read despatch No. 19 with great interest. It had not occurred to me that you might deny to France and Great Britain an official reading of their despatches which announced to our government their concession of belligerent rights to the south; or that, if you should do so, it would alter the relations of parties to the question. If it has that effect diplomatically, or relieves you from noticing their position, you were certainly right. Indeed, I cannot see how, upon the ground that you put the matter, France has just cause of offence. You say merely you want no notice of a purpose by her to do what you consider an unfriendly act; that you will wait until the act is done before you choose to notice it; that, in other words, you choose to consider her as a friend until she shows herself by acts, not words, to be the contrary.

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The reasons assigned for your course you say I may communicate to the French government if I "shall find it necessary or expedient." I shall not fail to avail myself of this authority upon the earliest opportunity which shall be afforded for doing so. The just reasoning and friendly tone of your despatch will be invaluable for justification of your course and the prevention of difficulties. Unless, however, they refer to your action or make it a subject of complaint, it is, I suppose, not expedient for me to volunteer explanations. I was much surprised by one fact found in the despatch from the French government left with you for an informal reading, to wit: that you must not be surprised if France should address herself to a government which she says is to be installed at Montgomery for certain explanations. I could not have anticipated, from what had been said to me here, that such a course was in contemplation. Should they adopt it, the act would seem to me to approximate a recognition in this instance of the southern government more nearly than anything that has yet occurred. In that event, your future course will, no doubt, be guided by that wisdom which is so essential to carry us through the troubles of our present position. * With much respect, I have the honor to be your obedient servant, WM. L. DAYTON.

The President is not impatient about the negotiations concerning neutral rights. We trust that we have kept our own position right and clear.

You will probably find some anxiety on the part of the French government concerning a law which has passed Congress authorizing the President

to close the ports held by the insurgents. I send you a copy of my instructions to Mr. Adams on that subject, which you will receive for your own government in that matter.

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I am, &c.,

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WILLIAM L. DAYTON, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

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WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

No. 31.]

Mr. Seward to Mr. Dayton.

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[Extract.]

DEPARTMENT Of State, Washington, July 30, 1861.

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SIR: * You will receive the account of a deplorable reverse of our arms at Manassas. For a week or two that event will elate the friends of the insurgents in Europe as it confounded and bewildered the friends of the Union here for two or three days. The shock, however, has passed away, producing no other results than a resolution stronger and deeper than ever to maintain the Union, and a prompt and effective augmentation of the forces for that end exceeding what would otherwise have been possible. The heart of the country is sound. Its temper is now more favorable to the counsels of deliberation and wisdom.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM L. DAYTON, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

No. 22.]

Mr. Dayton to Mr. Seward.

PARIS, July 30, 1861. SIR: On the 21st of this month I received a note from Mr. Adams, a copy of which, marked A, is hereunto annexed, apprising me that, under renewed instructions from the government at Washington, he had proposed to the British government, on the 11th of this month, to negotiate on the basis of the project which had been transmitted to him soon after his arrival at London, touching the four points of the declaration of the convention at Paris in 1856, and inquiring whether I felt empowered and disposed to remove the obstacle of delay by entering at once into an arrangement for simultaneous action with the Emperor of the French. Accompanying his note was the copy of a communication from Lord John Russell, dated July 18, 1861, of which I send a copy, (though I doubt not Mr. Adams has anticipated me in doing so.) Feeling the great importance of this matter, and mindful of your request that we should confer together when we could, I immediately went over to London.

I found, by the date of your renewed instructions to Mr. Adams, that you did not intend the negotiation upon this question should be conducted at Washington, but that it should be done on this side; and further, that with a full knowledge of all the facts, the original purpose of acceding to the treaty of Paris of 1856 was adhered to. Under these circumstances, I felt it my duty to say to Mr. Adams that there need be no delay on my account.