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offer a project of a convention, which he was properly empowered to sign, after satisfying himself that the incorporation of the amendment which had been proposed by Mr. Marcy for the government of the United States, at a former stage of the proceedings, was not attainable.

On the eighteenth of May last, being the day of the first interview had with his lordship, the subject was only opened by the undersigned as one on which he had power to negotiate, and the disposition of her Majesty's gov ernment to proceed here was tested. It was then that he received a distinct impression from his lordship that the matter had been already committed to the care of Lord Lyons at Washington, with authority to agree with the government of the United States on the basis of the adoption of three of the articles, and the omission of the fourth altogether. Considering this to be equivalent to declining a negotiation here, and at the same time relieving him from a duty which would be better performed by his own government, the undersigned cheerfully acquiesced in this suggestion, and accordingly wrote home signifying his intention not to renew the subject unless again specifically instructed so to do.

One month passed away, when the Secretary of State of the United States, after a conference with Lord Lyons, learning that his lordship did not confirm the representation of the powers with which the undersigned had understood him to be clothed, and, so far from it, that he did not feel authorized to enter into any convention at all at Washington, directed the undersigned to inform the government in London of this fact, and to propose once more to enter into convention, if agreeable, here.

Immediately upon the receipt of these instructions, the undersigned wrote a letter on the 11th of July, as his lordship may remember, reciting these facts and renewing the question whether a proposal of negotiation at this place would be acceptable to her Majesty's government. To this letter a favorable reply was received on the 13th, and an interview took place the same day, at which, after ascertaining that the amendment desired by his government would not be successful, the undersigned had the honor to present to his lordship the project in the same form in which it had been, nearly two months before, placed in his hands, and in which it has been since accepted, and to offer a copy of his powers to negotiate. His lordship, after examining the former, remarked that he would take it for consultation with his colleagues, and in the meantime that there was no necessity for a copy of the powers.

The next step in the negotiation was the receipt, by the undersigned, of a letter from his lordship, dated the 18th of July, calling his attention to the fact that the declaration of Paris contemplated a concurrence of various powers, and not an insulated engagement of two powers only, and requiring an assurance that the United States were ready to enter into a similar engagement with France and with other maritime powers, parties to the declaration, and not with Great Britain alone. But, inasmuch as this process itself might involve the loss of much time, that her Majesty's government would deem themselves authorized to advise the Queen to conclude a convention with the President of the United States so soon as they should have been informed that a similar convention has been agreed upon between the President and the Emperor of the French.

Upon receiving this reply the undersigned, not unwilling to do everything within his power to forward an object considered by him of the greatest value, immediately opened a correspondence with Mr. Dayton, the representative of the United States at Paris, to learn from him whether such an arrangement as that contemplated in his lordship's note could not be at once carried out by him. With some reluctance Mr. Dayton consented to promote it, but only upon the production of evidence satisfactory to his own mind

that the amendment originally proposed by Mr. Marcy was not attainable. The undersigned then addressed himself to his lordship, and with entire success. The evidence was obtained, Mr. Dayton acted with success, and no further difficulties then seemed to be in the way of a speedy and simultaneous affirmation of concurrence in the principles of the declaration of Paris by the United States, in conjunction with the other powers.

The public law thus declared to be established, embraced four general propositions, to wit:

1. Privateering is abolished.

2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, except contraband of war. 3. Neutral goods safe under an enemy's flag, with the same exception. 4. Blockades, to be binding, must be effective.

The government of the United States, in proposing to join in the establishment of these principles, are believed by the undersigned to be acting with the single purpose of aiding to establish a permanent doctrine for all time. Convinced of the value of it in ameliorating the horrors of warfare all over the globe, they have, perhaps against their notions of their immediate interest, consented to waive temporary considerations of expediency for the attainment of a great ultimate good. They are at last prepared to sign and seal an engagement pure and simple, and by so doing to sacrifice the hope of attaining, at least for the present, an improvement of it to which they have always attached great value. But just at the moment when their concurrence with the views of the other maritime powers of the world would seem to be certain, they are met with a proposition from one, if not more, of the parties, to accompany the act with a proceeding somewhat novel and anomalous in this case, being the presentation of a written declaration, not making a part of the convention itself, but intended to follow the signature, to the effect that "her Majesty does not intend thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States."

Obviously a consent to accept a particular exception, susceptible of so wide a construction of a joint instrument, made by one of the parties to it in its own favor at the time of signing, would justify the idea that some advantage is, or may be suspected to be, intended to be taken by the other. The natural effect of such an accompaniment would seem to be to imply that the goverment of the United States might be desirous, at this time, to take a part in the declaration, not from any high purpose or durable policy, but with the view of securing some small temporary object in the unhappy struggle which is going on at home. Such an inference would spoil all the value that might be attached to the act itself. The mere toleration of it would seem to be equivalent to a confession of their own weakness. Rather than that such a record should be made, it were a thousand times better that the declaration remain unsigned forever. If the parties to the instrument are not to sign it upon terms of perfect reciprocity, with all their duties and obligations under it perfectly equal, and without equivocation or reservation of any kind, on any side, then is it plain that the proper season for such an engagement has not yet arrived. It were much wiser to put it off until nations can understand each other better.

There is another reason why the undersigned cannot at this moment consent to proceed under the powers conferred on him to complete this negotiation when clogged with such a declaration, which is drawn from the peculiar construction of the government of his own country. By the terms of the Constitution, every treaty negotiated by the President of the United States must, before it is ratified, be submitted to the consideration of the Senate of the United States. The question immediately arises in this case, what is to be done with a declaration like that which his lordship proposes to make.

Is it a part of the treaty, or is it not? If it be, then is the undersigned exceeding his instructions in signing it, for the paper made no part of the project which he was directed to propose; and in case he should sign, the addition must be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent, together with the paper itself. If it be not, what advantage can the party making the declaration expect from it in modifying the construction of the project, when the Senate have never had it before them for their approval? It either changes the treaty or it does not. If it does, then the question arises, why did not the undersigned procure it to be incorporated into it? On the other hand, if it do not, why did he connive at the appearance of a desire to do it without effecting the object?

The undersigned has ever been desirous of maintaining and perpetuating the most friendly relations between her Majesty's kingdom and the United States, and he continues to act in the same spirit when he deprecates the submission of any project clogged with a similar exception to the consideration of the Senate of the United States. He has reason to believe that already a strong disinclination exists in that body to the acceptance of the first of the four propositions embraced in the declaration itself, and that mainly because it is esteemed to be too much of a concession to the great maritime powers. Were he now to consent, without further instructions, to accept a qualification which would scarcely fail to be regarded by many unfavorably disposed persons as more or less directly an insult to the nation in its present distress, he should deem himself as incurring the hazard of bringing on difficulties which he professes an earnest wish to avoid.

For the reasons thus given the undersigned has reluctantly come to the conclusion to decline to fix a day for proceeding in the negotiation under its present aspect, at least until he shall have been able to submit the whole question once more to the judgment of the authorities under which he has the honor to act.

A copy of this letter will also be forwarded to Mr. Dayton for his information.

The undersigned prays Lord Russell to receive the assurances of the most distinguished consideration with which he is his obedient servant.

Right Hon. EARL RUSSELL, &c., &c., &c.

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS.

Lord Russell to Mr. Edwards.

FOREIGN OFFICE, May 14, 1861.

It is for the Spanish government to weigh in the balance of their judgment the advantages and inconveniences which may arise from the annexation of the territory of the Dominican state to the dominions of Spain; and any opinion which her Majesty's government may form on the subject can be founded on no other consideration than a regard for what they may look upon as the real and permanent interests of Spain.

Her Majesty's government would, no doubt, have felt a strong and decided dissatisfaction at the proposed annexation if it had been likely to lead to the introduction of slavery into a community which is free from the taint of that pernicious institution; but the formal and repeated declarations of Marshal O'Donnell, that under no circumstances will slavery be introduced into the Dominican territory, have removed the main cause which would have led her

Majesty's government to view the proposed annexation with dislike and repugnance.

Her Majesty's government certainly apprehended, when first this projected annexation was talked of, that it might, if carried into execution, involve Spain in unfriendly discussions, if not in conflict, either with France or with the United States, or with both. With regard to France, her Majesty's government have not learned that the French government has expressed any positive objection to the proposed arrangement, although she may not think it advantageous to Spain. It appears, also, from what has been stated to you, that there is no probability at present of any positive resistance to the measure, either by the northern or the southern confederation of North America. But the Spanish government should not too confidently rely on the permanent continuance of this indifference or acquiescence on the part of the North Americans; and it is not impossible that when the civil war which is now breaking out shall have been brought to an end, an event which may happen sooner than at present appears likely, both the north and the south might combine to make the occupation of the Dominican territory by Spain the cause of serious difference between the North American governments and that of Spain.

Her Majesty's government do not deny that Great Britain, as a power naturally inclined to peace, and systematically addicted to commerce, must always view a war between any two powers as an event not only at variance with her principles, but to a certain degree injurious to her interests. But with respect to Spain, the motives of the British government spring from far higher sources. Great Britain and Spain have for long periods of time, and in circumstances of high moment to each, been faithful and active allies; their alliance has been greatly useful and eminently honorable to both. It is a fundamental maxim of British policy to wish well to Spain, and earnestly to desire her welfare and prosperity; and therefore any combination of events which might at any time involve the possibility of Spain being engaged in a conflict which, from local circumstances and disadvantages, might be in the end seriously injurious to her rule over her ancient possessions, would be viewed by her Majesty's government with lively apprehension and sincere regret.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams.

[Extracts.]

No. 78.]

DEPARTMENT Of State, Washington, September 2, 1861.

SIR: Your despatch of the 16th of August, number 29, has been received.

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Steadily for the period of four months our forces have been coming into the field at the rate of two thousand a day, and the same augmentation will go on nearly at the same rate until 500,000 men will be found in the service. Our supplies of arms are running low.

My despatch, No. 42, acknowledged by you in the paper before me, was written, as you will see by its date, July 21, during the progress of the battle at Bull Run, though sent a few days afterwards. From this fact you will see that our policy and our claims upon the government of Great Britain are not affected by the caprices of military fortune.

We have now reached a new and important stage in the war. The enemy

is directly before us, invigorated and inspirited by a victory, which it is not the part of wisdom for us to undervalue. But that victory has brought with it the necessity for renewed and decisive action with proportionate results. The demoralization of our forces has passed away. I have already stated that they are increasing in numbers. You will learn through other channels that they are equally perfecting themselves in discipline. Commander Stringham and General Butler's success at Hatteras was not merely a brilliant affair. It brings nearly the whole coast of North Carolina under the surveillance of our blockade. I shall be entirely satisfied with the exercise of your own discretion as to the time and form you may choose for making the explanations to the British government on those subjects with which you are charged, and I regard the condition of things in that respect, as you have reported it to me, as, under the circumstances, quite satisfactory. No change of policy in regard to the blockade has been adopted since my former despatches.

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I can well enough imagine that your position has been made a trying one by the exultations of enemies of our country and its institutions over the disaster of the 21st of July. But you will be able to comprehend what they cannot, that faction ripens fast, whence its necessities impel to action which exhausts its energies. Loyalty in any free country organizes less rapidly and gains strength from time and even from reverses. The previous success of this government is a sufficient guaranty of the safety of our cause, and is a fact too important to be misunderstood in the political circle in which you are moving.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams.

No. 83.]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, September 7, 1861.

SIR: I have received your despatch of August 23, number 32. It is accompanied by a note which was addressed to you by Lord Russell on the 19th of the same month, and a paper containing the form of an official declaration which he proposes to make on the part of her Majesty on the occasion of affixing his signature to the projected convention between the United States and Great Britain for the accession of the former power to the articles of the declaration of the congress of Paris for the melioration of the rigor of international law in regard to neutrals in maritime war. The instrument thus submitted to us by Lord Russell is in the following words: “Draft of declaration. In affixing his signature to the convention of this day, between her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland and the United States of America, the Earl Russell declares, by order of her Majesty, that her Majesty does not intend thereby to undertake any engagement which shall have any bearing, direct or indirect, on the internal differences now prevailing in the United States."

Lord Russell, in his note to you, explains the object of the instrument by saying that it is intended to prevent any misconception as to the nature of the engagement to be taken by her Majesty.

You have judged very rightly in considering this proceeding, on the part of the British government, as one so grave and so novel in its character as to render further action on your part in regard to the projected convention inadmissible until you shall have special instructions from this department.

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