CHAPTER XII. OFFICERS OF THE SENATE, HOW CHOSEN-IMPEACHMENT. The Senate shall choose their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice-President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States. The Vice-President is the only officer of the Senate the Constitution provides for. The other officers are created by that body and provided for by law. They are the Secretary, Chief Clerk, Executive Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, Door Keeper and Chaplain and are elected like the officers of the House of Representatives. The President pro tempore of the Senate is elected President of that body for the time. In the absence of the Vice-President, or should the latter be exercising the office of President, he would act as President of the Senate. It is the custom of the Senators to elect one of their number President pro tempore, who serves throughout his senatorial term, and who if absent has authority to appoint some other Senator to preside until his return. Judge Story says, "It has grown into a general practice for the Vice-President to vacate the senatorial chair a short time before the termination of each session, in order to enable the Senate to choose a president pro tempore, who might already be in office if the Vice-President in the recess should be called to the chair of State. The practice is founded in wisdom and sound policy, as it immediately provides for an exigency which may well be expected to occur at any time, and prevents the choice from being influenced by temporary excitements or intrigues arising from the actual existence of a vacancy." 1 Story on Constitution, sec. 741, 5th ed. Mr. Jefferson, when Vice-President, addressed the Senate as follows: "To give the usual opportunity of appointing a President pro tempore I now propose to retire from the chair of the Senate." Ford's Jefferson, Vol. 7, 501. The first President pro tempore of the Senate was Senator Langdon of New Hampshire, elected the day the Senate first organized, April 6, 1789. In his official capacity he notified Washington of his election as President. Sparks' Life of Washington, Vol. 9, 491n. Mr. Pinckney's plan for a constitution contained a provision that, "The Senate shall choose its own officers.''2 The report by the Committee of Detail contained the clause "The Senate shall choose its own President and other officers. The report by the Committee on Style contained the clause as it appears in the Constitution. The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of twothirds of the Members present. The Constitutions of Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Virginia contained provisions on impeachment which doubtless had an influence on the Convention. While the Committee of Detail was considering the subject of impeachment, Mr. Gerry moved that the committee report "a mode of trying the Supreme Judges in cases of impeachment." The committee therefore reported: "The Judges of the Supreme Court shall be triable by the Senate, on impeachment by the House of Representatives." The matter then went to the Committee on Unfinished Business, which reported in favor of enlarging the jurisdiction of the Senate as a body to try impeachments, by providing that the "Senate shall have power to try all impeachments; but no person shall be convicted without April 21, 1789, when the Vice-President was installed, Mr. Langdon, President pro tempore, meeting him on the floor of the Senate, addressed him: "Sir, I have it in charge from the Senate, to introduce you to the chair of this House; and also to congratulate you on your appointment to the office of Vice-President of the United States of America." Maclay's Debates in the Senate, 2. The election of Senator Langdon on the first day was probably because there was no Vice-President to preside. While the Constitution does not fix the time, it is a fair inference from Story and Jefferson that it was the custom in the earlier days to elect such officer near the close of the session. The custom seems, however, to have been abandoned, and such election has for many years taken place early in the session. 2 Journal, 66. the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present." This was amende on motion of Gouverneur Morris by adding and every member shall be on oath," and "affirmation" was inserted after "oath.” Much opposition arose in the Convention to the trial of impeachments by the Senate, and this was renewed in many of the State Conventions during the debates over ratifying the Constitution. Some members of the Convention wished the Supreme Court to hear and try impeachment proceedings, others favored a joint session of the Court and the Senate, while still others proposed a separate tribunal. The Convention, however, chose to confer the power on the Senate alone, and its wisdom has been justified by experience. Mr. Hamilton, in the Federalist, defends the Convention and answers every argument for every other plan. So complete was the answer of Mr. Hamilton that it has been made the basis of every later argument on the subject. He said: "A well constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired, than difficult to be obtained in a Government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offences which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of them for this reason will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties, more or less friendly, or inimical, to the accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side, or on the other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger, that the decision. will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt. "The delicacy and magnitude of a trust, which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the administration of public affairs, speak for themselves. The difficulty of placing it rightly in a • Journal, 690. 6 Government resting entirely on the basis of periodical elections, will as readily be perceived, wit it is considered that the most conspicuous characters in it will, from that circumstance, be too often the leaders, or the tools of the most cunning or the most numerous faction; and on this account, can hardly be expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny. "The Convention, it appears, thought the Senate the most fit depository of this important trust. Those who can best discern the intrinsic difficulty of the thing, will be least hasty in condemning that opinion; and will be most inclined to allow due weight to the arguments, which may be supposed to have produced it. "What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution itself? Is it not designed as a method of national inquest into the conduct of public men? If this be the design of it, who can so properly be the inquisitors for the nation, as the representatives of the nation themselves? It is not disputed that the power of originating the inquiry, or in other words, of preferring the impeachment, ought to be lodged in the hands of one branch of the Legislative body; will not the reasons which indicate the propriety of this arrangement, strongly plead for an admission of the other branch of that body to a share of the inquiry? The model, from which the idea of this institution has been borrowed, pointed out that course to the Convention. In Great Britain, it is the province of the House of Commons to prefer the impeachment; and of the House of Lords to decide upon it. Several of the State Constitutions have followed the example. As well the latter, as the former, seem to have regarded the practice of impeachments as a bridle in the hands of the Legislative body upon the Executive servants of the Government. Is not this the true light in which it ought to be regarded? "Where else, than in the Senate, could have been found a tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? What other body would be likely to feel confidence enough in its own situation, to preserve unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an individual accused, and the representatives of the people, his accusers? "Could the Supreme Court have been relied upon as answering this description? It is much to be doubted whether the members of that tribunal, would at all times, be endowed with so eminent a portion of fortitude, as would be called for in the execution of so difficult a task; and it is still more to be doubted whether they would possess the degree of credit and authority, which might, on certain occasions, be indispensable towards reconciling the people to a decision that should happen to clash with an accusation, brought by their immediate representatives. A deficiency in the first, would be fatal to the accused; in the last, dangerous to the public tranquillity. The hazard in both these respects could only be avoided, if at all, by rendering that tribunal more numerous than would consist with a reasonable attention to economy. The necessity of a numerous court for the trial of impeachments, is equally dictated by the nature of the proceeding. This can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the delineation of the offence by the prosecutors, or in the construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to limit the discretion of courts in favor of personal security. There will be no jury to stand between the judges, who are to pronounce the sentence of the law, and the party who is to receive or suffer it. The awful discretion, which a court of impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy the most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the community, forbids the commitment of the trust to a small number of persons. "These considerations seem alone sufficient to authorize a conclusion, that the Supreme Court would have been an improper substitute for the Senate, as a court of impeachments. There remains a further consideration, which will not a little strengthen this conclusion. It is this: the punishment, which may be the consequence of conviction. upon impeachment, is not to terminate the chastisement of the offender. And having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence, and honors and emoluments of his country, he will still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law. Would it be proper, that the persons, who had disposed of his fame, and his most valuable rights as a citizen in one trial, should in another trial, for the same offence, be also the disposer of his life and his fortune? Would there |