CHAPTER XIX.

THE CANDIDATES AND CANVASS OF 1864.

NOMINATIONS of Parties for President and Vice-President Generais Premiont and Cochrane withdraw - General McClellan, a good Soldier and Patriot, falls into Evil Hands - Mr. Pendleton a Disunionist - The Piot of the "Peace" Democrats McClellan's Letter for War confuses them - The Chicago Candidates diametrically opposed - The real Question "Union" or “Disunion" - Lincoln and Johnson the Representatives of Union - Was the War a Failure? Secretary Chase's Reply-The Army Successes ruin the Chicagoites - Military History of 1864, its Losses and Gains - Permanent Achievements of Union Generals Wails from the South sound the Death of "Peace" Sedition in the North- Reorganization of TennesseeLetters and Speeches by Governor Johnson - Negro Equality a Humbug On his Early Life - Orders an Election and prescribes a Test Oath -- Protest against it presented to President Lincoln, its Reception - A Moses for the Enthralled Race Elected Vice-President Inaugural Speech Unmeaning Censure -The Fall of Richmond - Great Enthusiasm Johnson's Speech in Washington.

A WEEK previous to the nomination of Abraham Lincoln and Andrew Johnson at Baltimore, a Convention assembled at Cleveland, O., and nominated John C. Fremont for the Presidency and John Cochrane for the Vice-Presidency. On the 29th of August the "Democratic" Convention assembled at Chicago, and on the 31st nominated George B. McClellan and George H. Pendleton as candidates for the same offices. Generals Fremont and Cochrane subsequently withdrew, indicating with various personal and political reservations and explanations their preferences for Mr. Lincoln so the Presidential Contest was between the respective supporters of the Baltimore and Chicago nominees.

It is unnecessary to reiterate the position occupied by Mr. Lincoln and Governor Johnson. General McClellan was a

gentleman of excellent nature and sympathies, a soldier of distinguished ability and a patriot of undoubted purity. His military successes had been achieved at epochs of such general gloom that his failures or want of success, from whatever cause, at other periods were overlooked by the masses of the people. Great responsibilities had devolved upon him at moments of national peril and disaster; and he successfully retrieved, if he did not permanently exalt, the national character. He is not fairly to be judged by contrast with the greater successes which followed, but by the disorder which reigned before him. He was greatly beloved by the soldiers, and their affection extending in a large degree to the masses, pointed him out as the most popular man for the purposes of the anti-administrationists. As a candidate little fault could be found with General McClellan; but the antecedents and present purposes of the managers, by whose intrigues an anti-national platform was adopted at the Chicago Convention, were not such as to command either private respect or public enthusiasm. Had General McClellan exercised the same caution toward his political friends he had on some occasions exhibited to the country's enemies, he would not have permitted himself to be surrounded by men who had no faith in national honor, no hope of national success, and no charity save for those in arms against the life of the Republic.

Mr. Pendleton much more suitably filled the desires and designs of these men. He was comparatively unknown. He never made a figure in Congress; and could not by any means be considered a leader in that body or out of it. What he had done since the secession had taken place tended to encourage it and weaken the National Government. In January, 1861, when four States had seceded, he delivered a calm and carefully prepared speech, in which, while expressing great solicitude for the Union, he avowed his belief that in the face of united action by the seceding States, the Con

stitution of the United States was a virtual nullity and did not provide for the execution of its own clauses. He did not see how we could carry out the enactments of the supreme law of the Republic if the people of the seceding States were opposed to our so doing. He clearly mistook the spirit of the Constitution while expressing his own sentiment against coercion. Because he did not think it feasible to carry out the spirit of the Constitution which authorizes Congress to raise and support an army and navy; and "provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasion"-because he thought we had not strength to do it, he expressed himself as though we had no right to do it. Deeming it impracticable, he completely overlooked the constitutional right and the constitutional duty to attempt it. He was for letting the seceded States go, and instituted a parallel-degrading to the revolutionary fathers of 1776-between the Colonies and Great Britain, and the rebellious States and the Union. While Mr. Pendleton's talents were certainly respectable, he was, until his nomination at Chicago, the least known of the Ohio representatives; which fact, in the minds of party tacticians, was doubtless not the least recommendation to his availability as a candidate for the Vice Presidency. It was thought his nomination would not materially affect McClellan, while at the same time a recognition of the peace policy might be surreptitiously achieved, and thus receive the ostensible endorsement of the people at the election. General McClellan's letter of acceptance, in which he declared himself in favor of prosecuting the war, however, completely turned the tables on these managers. The Peace men rebelled against him, saying he did not accept the platform; and fell back on Pendleton, who was thus made to act a more important part in the drama, than the McClellan managers who regarded him as a comparative nonentity-or he himself ever dreamed of. Thus the ostensible war party

and the professed peace party which fraternized at Chicago, found that they had been respectively cheated by each other. These developments were fraught with great importance to the people; and no clear thinking man could have a rational doubt as to the result of the contest. Having sacrificed General McClellan, his political managers made a violent show of earnestness in the campaign: hoping by extravagant and malignant abuse of the national Executive to infer a devotion to their own candidate.

But the question at issue became narrowed down to the great and simple point: Should the traitors be encouraged, or the war for the Union endorsed? It was not a time for party. If " party," as a phrase, was to be recognized, it was only as indicating a Union party or a Disunion party: a party to save the Union by the arbitrament of the sword to which the traitors had appealed; or a party to dissolve the Union by overtures to the rebel chiefs or by the reception of such overtures from them as would make our dead heroes turn in their martyr graves. Before the world Mr. Lincoln was the recognized head of the Union party, as distinguished from Jefferson Davis as the representative man of Disunion. Those unfriendly to the United States, at home and abroad, had made war on Mr. Lincoln as the representative of the Union cause and army; and both the seceded States and sympathizers in foreign States looked forward to Mr. Lincoln's defeat as a defeat to the cause of the Union, and as a virtual recognition by the people of the doctrines for which Davis and his Generals had fought the Government of their fathers. On the other hand, the re-election of Mr. Lincoln and the election of Governor Johnson was an unquestionable guarantee to the people and the world that the cause of the Union would not be permitted to droop or waver; that in the words of Johnson, no peace or compromise could be thought of until the rebels grounded their arms in submis sion to the national authority and law. Thus the fact be

came settled in thoughtful minds that the success of Lincoln and Johnson was the success of nationality; their defeat, the success of secession. These considerations placed the chances of the Chicago nominees out of the question. Moreover, those who desired to support McClellan on principle, found in Johnson a War Democrat whose sacrifices and sufferings more fully illustrated the principle and commanded wider sympathy. If a man so tried as Johnson could support Lincoln, assuredly they as War Democrats could do likewise; and relieve themselves of contamination with the doctrines represented by Mr. Pendleton.

Other and equally convincing reasons were writing themselves on the page of history in justification of a loyal indorsement of the war policy. With equal want of truth and taste-considering the intention to nominate a soldier on it, and the hope to gain soldiers' votes in its favor-the Chicago platform declared the war a failure. The wish was father to the statement. It was also untrue. The Mississippi was open, which had been lined from Cairo to the mouth with rebel batteries. When Farragut went past Forts Jackson and Philip, and met their "invincible" fleet upon the Mississippi, and by one of the greatest achievements known to history, took New Orleans, and Vicksburg fell before Grant, then the Father of Waters was virtually, and in fact, open from the source to the gulf. As ex-Secretary Chase said at the time in reply to this statement: "Three years ago Kentucky was doubtful. Kentucky, I think, will vote the Union ticket in a few days. That is not a failure. Tennessee, so far as a Disunion legislature could effect it, was taken out of the Union. Now, Tennessee is under the government of Andrew Johnson, who is as loyal a man as breathes. Well, that is not a failure. Missouri was doubtful, and Missouri is loyal to-day. So, West Virginia was taken out of the Union, and West Virginia is a State in the Union to-day. We have taken back from the