requires it, he will, with cautious wisdom, forego its exercise on all other occasions.

His legislative responsibility will, therefore, lie in a narrow compass; it will depend upon the single consideration whether, under all the circumstances attending the proposition of laws submitted to him, the public welfare will be promoted by his sanction.

This view has been taken for the purpose of separating the legislative from the executive responsibility of the government. It is no less incorrect, than it is common, to consider the executive responsible for all the acts of the government. However this opinion may prevail among the friends of a monarchical system, it is not the less a heresy under ours. As neither the legislative or judicial departments are responsible for the acts of the executive department, so neither is the executive answerable for theirs. The constitution forbids the President, except in the prescribed orbit we have delineated, or by advice given to Congress, to interfere with the powers of the legislature. No less is all such interference forbidden by the jealous independence with which every public agent, equally with every private citizen, is in this country accustomed to assert his rights. No doubt can be entertained, that under the joint influence of these considerations, the chief magistrate, who should attempt to usurp the legislative power either by direct or indirect means, would soon learn that the high power of impeachment was not fruitlessly reposed in the legislature. It is not then true, that the President is absolutely responsible for all the legislative acts passed during his administration. The probability is that many of these acts are such as he, in the character of a legislator or a citizen, would never have assented to.

Among these acts are two of the first importance; the judiciary act, and the amendment to the constitution; neither of which were recommended, or even suggested by the President. It will be most regular to consider these measures, in this place, as they do not properly fall under either of the great provisions we have proposed; and as they have little, if any necessary connection with executive duties.

On no occasions, perhaps, has there been a more daring spirit of falsehood than on these. Both these measures have, without the least reason, been ascribed to the President. Whereas, the truth is, that in his official capacity, he has not, and could not even notice the one; and has no otherwise noticed the other than by giving his assent to a bill previously passed by the two Houses. Nor has any proof of his private opinions, on either of these points, transpired to this day. Even that ardor of mind, so apt in the estimation of his enemies to betray him into an imprudent exposure of his opinions, has not furnished occasion for a solitary charge. By a bold assumption, that, inasmuch as his general politics coincided with those of the legislature who devised these measures, he must therefore be considered as friendly to them, and being friendly to them, must be considered as their author, an attempt has been made to make him pre-eminently responsible for all their effects. Thus does party fury, as blind as headstrong, without discrimination seek its victim, and having once marked him, hunt him to destruction, not for sins actually committed by him, but for all the sins committed by others.

It is true that the general subject of the judiciary was recommended, in the first message, to the attention of Congress. But in what terms? Not in those of hostility to the new system; but in the following dispassionate language:

"The judiciary system of the United States, says the President, and especially that portion of it recently erected, will of course present itself to the contemplation of Congress; and that they may be able to judge of the porportion which the institution bears to the business it has to perform, I have caused to be procured from the several states, and now lay before Congress, an exact statement of all the causes decided since the first establishment of the courts, and of those which were depending when additional courts and judges were brought in to their aid."

No opinion is expressed of the origin or the tendencies of the new judiciary system; information only is given on this, as on a variety of other objects viz. on the receipts of the several taxes, their application to the various objects designated by law; on the state of the militia: on our foreign relations; on our naval strength; on the establishment of the mint; on fortifications, and many other objects. As well might it be inferred that from the mere exhibition of the situation of the various establishments of the government, the President intimated the propriety of their destruction or radical modification, as that, by this information, relative to the judiciary, he intended to inculcate the expediency of repealing the act of 1800. As his conduct is similar in all these cases, it is but just to ascribe to him a common motive applicable to them all. The constitution expressly commanding him to "give to Congress information of the state of the union" --and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient;" assigns two distinct and separable duties.In relation to the judiciary, he discharged the one uninterwoven with the other.

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In other cases where he judged certain measures necessary and expedient, he did not scruple to de

clare his opinion, as in the case of the internal taxes, and the retrenchment of numerous sources of expence; thus evincing to every correct mind, capable of deducing a sound inference, that as on points where he expreessed an opinion, he wished that opinion to operate as a recommendation; so on points where no opinion was expressed, he deliberately withheld all recommendation.

This measure must then be considered as purely legislative in its origin, as well as nature; and of consequence, Congress, and not the President, are responsible for it.

It is not the object of these remarks to supercede the necessity of its investigation. Viewed as a great question of policy, destined, according to its solution, to have a leading agency in its effects on the public welfare, it becomes the duty of every intelligent citizen to understand it. This shall be our apology, for dwelling on it a few minutes longer.

In reviewing the voluminous discussions to which the repealing law gave rise, we perceive a mixed mass of eloquence, of party animadversion, and of argument. Being the first important debate, after the change of the administration, it was seized as the occasion of contrasting, in all their features of dissimilitude, the two hostile parties. The minority, unaccustomed to submission, resolved to make a desperate effort to regain their power; and fancied they saw in this measure the means.— This accounts for this heterogeneous mixture; for which, however, another reason may be assigned. No class of men are less competent to the discussion of great questions of policy than lawyers. In the habit of testing all contested points by precedent, they rarely bend the powers of their mind to the developement of principle. Looking out of their own minds for every thing, it is not strange that

they gradually sink into the vehicles of the ideas of others. Their faith insensibly, like that of the church, in proportion as it distrusts its own powers, clings to that of the saints. It may be added that the routine of their duties, by exhausting their capacity on little things, necessarily disqualifies them from taking those inlarged views which national legislation demands. Of this description of men the minority was principally composed. We are not, therefore, surprised at minds thus feeble, instead of courting, the distinction of a strong, plain, and concise view of the subject, endeavoring to develope it by a mass of inapplicable precedents, of crude opinions, and fanciful analogies.

Notwithstanding the volumes written upon this subject, it is apprehended that its merits lie in a narrow compass. Two views have been taken of it, and it is capable of no other. Is it constitutional? and is it expedient? Its justification required that it should be both.

Is it constitutional?

It is allowed on all hands, that Congress possessed the power of modifying, at pleasure, the existing judiciary laws, so far as they regarded the duties of the judges. The first words of the Constitution declare that "all legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."-The power is unlimited.

A subsequent section says "Congress shall have power to constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court."

The language is not imperative. They may, or may not, exercise it.

A subsequent section gives the further power, "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing

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