marked with unusual violence on the side of the dominant party, he manifested a dignity and moderation that earned the esteem even of his opponents. It is true, that this moderation was shielded by spirit, and that while he scrupulously respected the feelings of others, he compelled others to respect his own. No man, perhaps, had a more powerful agency in accomplishing the revolution in public opinion which took place about the period of the presidential election. To powers of mind highly cultivated by study, he added habits of the closest application, with which he united manners of the greatest urbanity and politeness.

Levi Lincoln, a citizen of Massachusetts, was appointed Attorney General. This gentleman had just received an evidence of the confidence of his fellow-citizens, by an election as their representative in Congress. The short period, during which he held his seat, had not admitted of a develope-. ment of his talents. But he entered the body with the reputation of eminent talents. The competence acquired by his legal labors, proved the estimation in which they were held in a state distinguished by an eminent bar. Without invidious comparison, he had long stood along side of a Parsons and a Sullivan. These qualifications for the first legal officer of the government, were crowned by manners the most simple, and a disposition the mildest that ever fell to the lot of man.The spirit of liberty and reform often inspires the heart with austerity; in the heart of this man the purest philanthropy was mingled with the sweetest amenity.

Such was the adininistration, which the chief magistrate formed as the depository of his confidence, and as worthy to guide the great departments of the Republic. On a late occasion Mr. Nicholson, on the floor of the House of Represen

tatives, has pronounced this the strongest administration in the world. How far this is the award of truth, the review of the proceedings of the government, which we are about to commence, will shew.

It is sufficient, for our present purpose, to have sketched the characters and prominent services of the members of the cabinet, when they came into office. By this inadequate delineation, it will appear, that the motives which guided the President in the selection were pure, patriotic and enlightened. There is not a better criterion of true greatness, than the nomination by the chief execu tive magistrate of the high officers of state; and when these officers necessarily become his confidential friends, accessible to him at all times, and on all occasions, and thus become observers of his frailties as well as his accomplishments, the ordeal becomes still more decisive. If he appoint men of loose morals his own virtues become questiona ble; and if he appoint men of feeble minds, it may be permitted to doubt his talents or patriotism; talents which can alone enable him to discern the merit of others, and patriotism which can alone impel him to divide the government with men of sense.

Mr. Jefferson composed his cabinet of men of unsuspected virtue, and of acknowledged talents. In this act he presented the nation with the strongest pledge of his determination to be directed by an upright policy, and to call to his aid the best talents of the country. Had he been prompted by the jealousy of a grovelling mind, he would have surrounded himself with men of moderate powers and of plastic tempers. Then he would have enjoyed the distinction of wielding the government alone; and might have governed with an absolute sway. But, above the petty ambition of tyrants, with his eyes fixed on the public welfare, he called to his

D

aid men incapable of seduction, or of sacrificing their independence.

In reviewing the measures of the administration we shall divide them according to their connection with the great departments of the government. By this course we shall be enabled to make some ap. proaches to system, and to assign responsibility its proper limits.

Before we proceed to this enquiry, it is necessary to take a short view of the distribution of powers under the constitution, which appears in the discussions of the day, to have been entirely lost sight of, and which it is essentially necessary to understand to avoid running into error in the estimates made of executive conduct.

The constitution establishes three great departments of power, the legislative, executive and judicial. Congress constitute the first, the Presi dent the second, and the judges the last. In the discharge of judicial functions the President does not, in the least, co-operate, except so far as to nominate the judges. In those of legislation he has a qualified agency. In the formation of treaties this agency is only limited by the will of the Senate; but in the enaction of laws it is extremely circumscribed. It is limited to a simple negative, which is unavailing in case two thirds of each House repass, a bill. In Congress laws are initiated; there all their details are examined. That body is constituted for this express, and almost exclusive object. One of its branches is chosen directly by the people every two years, while the other is the representative of the states. From these considerations, there can be no doubt that the responsibility of making good laws was intended by the constitution to reside in Congress. Was it likewise the intention of that instrument that the chief magistrate should share it with them?

To a certain extent, it certainly was; but to what extent is not so certain. The theory of the British constitution, which appears to have been steadily in the contemplation of the Convention, vests this power, without any qualification, in the king. Yet that magistrate, notwithstanding the monarchical structure of the government, and the little respect paid to public opinion, has waved the exercise of it for more than a century. It may be said that the President has stronger claims to participate in the enaction of laws than the king, from his being elected by the people; but to this it is a sufficient answer to say, that it is inadmissible in a republic, to consider one man, for the enaction of laws, as faithful a representative as many men, brought from every section of the union; and further, that the British Parliament, composed of an hereditary house of lords, and a house of commons, which have long since ceased to represent the people, cannot be considered as filling the same political sphere with an American Congress; inasmuch as the latter is the bona fide representative of the people and the states; while the former is little more than an aristocratic association. If, therefore, under such a government, experience has evinced the danger and impolicy of interposing the executive veto; how much more dangerous and impolitic would its exercise be likely to be in frustration of the decided will of the nation, expressed through their immediate representatives.

It will not be concealed that the constitution requires the approbation of the President to every bill before it becomes a law. "If he APPROVE, be shall sign it." It is absolutely necessary, then, that he should approve before he signs a bill; it follows that if he disapprove a bill he shall not sign it Of what nature are we then to consider this approbation?

It

may

be assumed as certain that the same unqualified approbation is not implied as by the legislative body. The latter are called upon to pursue bills into all their details, to accept or reject different parts, and to introduce whatever modification they think proper. The former is only permitted to approve or reject, in the whole, without the power of suggesting any amendment. Farther-before a bill can be submitted to him, it must have received the approbation of both branches of the legislature, the representatives of the people and of the states. When, therefore, a bill, under these circumstances is submitted to him, it is apparent that the case is essentially varied from that which existed during its progress through the legislature. All enquiry into its details arising from the desire of improving them is foreclosed. The opinion of the legislature, virtually that of the people, is declared in its favor. It only remains to the President to decide whether, under these circumstances, the public good may be promoted or injured by his approbation. The bill may be unwise or imperfect; and yet the public good be subserved by suffering it to go into effect. It may be advisable that the experiment should be tried, and the public profit by their own errors. But paramount to these motives to forbearance, the chief magistrate, if sincerely devoted to republican institutions, will feel the necessity of restraining a disposition to array his own individual opinion in hostility to that of the nation, as conveyed through their peculiar organs of legislation. He will habitually distrust the suggestions of his own mind when opposed to their will. While, therefore, he will not hesitate to exert the high prerogative, with which he is invested, on great occasions, in which the voice of duty is loud and commanding, and in which the public good unequivocally