In that immortal congress that adopted the Declaration of Independence- a muniment of liberty in comparison with which the famed Magna Charta sinks into insignificance sat many merchants. It was the merchant John Hancock that presided over its deliberations, and that first put a bold unshrinking hand to that perilous Declaration. With him in glory and in danger, were the merchants, Robert Morris, and George Clymer, of Pennsylvania; Elbridge Gerry, and Samuel Adams of Massachusetts; William Whipple of New Hampshire; Phil'p Livingston, and Francis Lewis of New York; Joseph Hewes of North Carolina; and Burton Gwinnett of Georgia. The pledge of life and fortune to

the cause with them was a substantial pledge, and nobly, faithfully, and disinterestedly was it redeemed.

It was a merchant of New York, Alexander McDougall, that, after braving the resentment of the colonial Legislature-on the breaking out of hostilities, abandoned his counting house, received the command of a regiment, and in the disastrous battle of Long Island, in September, 1776, and more especially in the masterly retreat, in the face of a triumphant enemy across the East river, signally distinguished himself. He served throughout the war, rising to the rank of Major General; and when it was over, he returned to his commercial pursuits, and became the first President of the Bank of New York.

Again, when during the war, all was gloom and distrust in congress, and the army of Greene in the Carolinas, with the enemy within its grasp, was paralyzed for the want of supplies-without munitions, food or clothing-it was the merchant Robert Morris, that on his own credit, and through his own means, when the country had neither credit nor available means, created resources and organized victory. No one can read the letters written to him at the time by General Greene, nor those by General Washington, without feeling that this testimony to the services of Morris is in no degree exaggerated.

Having thus essayed to make good the proposition originally laid down, and especially to show that however regarded elsewhere, here at least, no pursuit can assume to take precedence, either in dignity, objects or means of that of commere -and that in all time a contempt of this calling, and of those addicted to it, has been the companion of barbarism, ignorance, or prejudice-it remains only in conclusion to say a few words in the way of practical application, of what may be deemed general truths.

It is obvious to remark of every vocation that, however recommendable or honorable in theory, the public estimate concerning it will be formed from the conduct and not from the profession of its followers, from actual' experience and not from traditionary or historical honors. Hence the importance not only in an individual but professional point of view, that he who is training himself to the career of a merchant should feel that as he may act his part, will credit or disgrace attach not to himself alone but to a great and honorable brotherhood in which he is enrolled. In this particular our merchants are not sufficiently sensitive. They lack somewhat that esprit de corps, that regard for the character and honor of the profession which looks upon a stain on one of its members as an imputation upon all; and which imparts unity of purpose and efficiency of action in all matters connected with its interests or reputation.

In other pursuits, civil or military, this esprit de corps, is cherished as

an arm of strength and an incentive to virtue. In effect, as the certainty of being discountenanced and disowned for any unworthy act by his fellow laborers and associates, must ere now have given pause to many a man when sorely tempted to swerve from his integrity; so, on the other hand, the consciousness that under unmerited imputation he would be supported by the pride and sympathy of the body to which he belonged, has doubtless nerved many a man to withstand injustice and wrong.

But not only in regard to the character, but to the interests of the profession, is this unity of feeling and sentiment important. The merchants, as a body, are comparatively less felt, in our political relations, for instance, than any other class of men-not, certainly, because they have less at stake in these matters, or are less capable of wisely determining concerning them-but because they have habituated themselves too much each for himself, to pursue his own business, trusting to those who have more taste or more leisure for political inquiries, to take care of the commonwealth. They have not acted together and as a class. This course which looks very like an abandonment of the sacred trust shared in a republican government by the merchant equally with every other citizen, of watching over the general safety, must, necessarily, tend to throw political power into the hands of those, who feeling they have nothing to expect and nothing to apprehend from mercantile favor or opposition, will be very little concerned to look after mercantile interests.

Politics, as a profession, belong not to the merchant; but attention to political questions in proportion to their importance-scrupulous discharge of the duty of aiding in the selection of fitting candidates-of that of voting-and of mingling with his fellow citizens in primary and public meetings, are obligations of good citizenship which a merchant may not rightfully and cannot safely leave unfulfilled.

This point is the more emphatically dwelt upon, because, without committing the indecorum of trenching in any degree upon party grounds, it may be said, probably with universal consent, that if there were, or for some years past had been, a larger infusion of educated and intelligent merchants among our public men, the general course and measures of the government could hardly have been so much at variance as they now notoriously are, with the interests and feelings of the mercantile classes.

The ethics of commerce, must, of course, enter largely into the estimate which the world forms of the pursuit itself, and of those who embrace it. It is the essence of every liberal calling, that its duties should be fulfilled under a high sense of moral obligation. Wherever the interest and feelings of others are in question, a reference to the brief, yet allembracing injunction, "do unto others as you would be done by," will be found to cover the whole ground of duty, and to present the all-sufficient rule of conduct. Commerce is a mutual interchange for mutual benefit, which neither requires nor justifies the employment of cunning, that counterfeit of cleverness. Good faith and fair dealing, disdain of little advantages, and the frank rectification of unintentional error, lie at the foundation of mercantile honor, and lead, as certainly, in the long run, both to reputation and success, as the opposite practices induce suspicion, discredit, and eventual disaster.

I hasten to a conclusion. It has been my aim to vindicate commerce from the illiberal and prejudiced estimate to which it is exposed, even at

this period of the world, and in parts of this land of equality, by showing, that in all time its companions have been liberty, science, civilization, morality, and religion-that its spirit is one of enlarged liberality and benevolence that its practices have been in consonance with its spirit, and that wherever it extends, and as far as it extends, it is a benefit and a blessing.

If I have at all succeeded in this undertaking, I may hope it will encourage such of my hearers as may be devoted to mercantile pursuits, to press on with ardor in their career, to cherish it as one surpassed in real dignity by no other, as affording abundant opportunities for the display of the highest talent and for the development of the most exalted virtues, and finally, as one, which embracing within its comprehensive range the whole family of man, and pushing its civilizing adventures to the remotest corner of the habitable globe, may proudly take a foremost rank among liberal pursuits, and challenge for itself the title of Universal Benefactor.

ART. II.—EXAMINATION OF THE POLICY OF THE LAWS AGAINST USURY.

[The following lecture, now first published, was one of a course delivered upon mercantile law, ten years ago, to the Mercantile Library Association of Philadelphia. Since that time, the subject has engaged much of the public attention, and many stronger views may have been presented of it, than those here given. It was the intention of the writer to present what seemed to him to be a practical, common sense, examination of the policy of the laws against Usury, suitable to a class generally composed of young men, so far as it could be done in the short space of a single lecture.]

HAVING sufficiently delineated the characteristic features which distinguish an usurious loan of money from those contracts in which an interest is allowed to be taken beyond the legal rate, and pointed out the penalties which, by the law of England, and by that of Pennsylvania, are inflicted upon an offender, we shall dismiss this part of the subject, which may be said to be the legal consideration or view of it. The political question remains; that is, the wisdom and policy of any such regulations. I cannot promise you to be as decided and explicit in my opinions and conclusions here, as it was easy to be in relation to the law. Whether commercial men have greatly differed or not on this question, I am unable to say, but certainly political economists and legislators have maintained the most opposite doctrines concerning it. It is my intention to present to you the most prominent arguments on both sides, for the zeal and ability of the respective advocates have left little to be added for either. Those who have contended against any legal regulation of the rate of interest, have, indeed, as we have shown in the last lecture, to oppose themselves to the practice and experience of many ages and various nations. For more than two thousand years, we know, it has been considered in Europe to be a proper subject of legislative enactment, while every other species of property has been left to be used and disposed of according to the will and contracts of its owner, providing only for honesty and good faith in the transaction. Money, only, has been restricted in its profits and increase, and placed under the government of the law.

We acknowledge the weight of this authority, but we must not shut our ears against the voice of reason, or refuse to give a full and fair audience to those who deny the justice and wisdom of this ancient usage. The change in the condition of society, the great and enlarged improvements in commercial knowledge and dealing, may afford ample reasons for a change in this policy. As to the antiquity and universality of the law against Usury, we must remark, that those against witchcraft are quite as ancient, and have been, at least, as universal. 66 Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live," was the injunction of the Mosaic law. The punishments of these dreaded criminals continued, even in this enlightened country, down to a very late day. It is held by the law of England to be an offence against God and religion, and is punishable with death; and this sentence has been inflicted by great and wise judges. This is the reverence for antiquity, and the adoption of ancient laws, without allowing ourselves to inquire into the evidence of the existence of the crime or the reason of the punishment. Since this offence has been stricken out of the penal code of Pennsylvania, we have not suffered more than before by the practices of witchcraft; on the contrary, witches have disappeared with the power to punish them. It may be that we can dispense with the laws against Usury with as little injury; at least the argument of long usage and ancient authority is much weakened by this as by many other examples.

The disputants, on this question, set out with the sagacity of skilful polemics, each endeavoring to throw the burden of the argument and proof on his adversary. The advocates for the free use of money say, that inasmuch as in relation to all other property, men are permitted to make their own contracts according to their own opinions of their convenience and advantage, to ask and to give what they may think expedient and just for the sale or the hire of any article of property, it is therefore incumbent on those who maintain a different doctrine as to money, to support the exception by clear and satisfactory arguments, or to let money fall under the general rule which is applied to other things of traffic or exchange. The advocates, on the other hand, of the restrictions on Usury, insist, that as money has been an exception to the general rule of property from the remotest time, it falls upon those who question the justice or wisdom of the exception, to make out their case, and to prove it to be impolitic or unjust, before they require the restriction to be removed. All this, however, is but preliminary, and the question should be discussed and decided on a fair, full, and rational consideration of the whole subject, as applicable to the present state of the world. We should not be held, arbitrarily, in the trammels of opinions and systems of former times; great changes have taken place in the business of men; society has altered its relations in many important matters; the rights of persons and property, the interests of trade, are better understood, and conducted on principles widely different from those which formerly prevailed; and these changes have swept away much of the policy and many of the prejudices and superstitions of earlier ages. Still, we should not look carelessly or scornfully at the lessons of experience, because they may be assailed by plausible analogies and ingenious reasoning. We live in an age of inquiry and ratiocination, and in a country where the freest latitude is given to the spirit of examination and improvement. The authority of time goes for little, perhaps too little, and of names for still less. Every

man will have his reason addressed, and his judgment convinced, before he yields his assent to any thing. This is all well, if it run not into licentious excesses; into a wrangling, sceptical propensity to question every thing, to unsettle every thing; to demolish or change what has been long received and sanctioned, from the mere love of innovation, or a dangerous indulgence in rash, untried, and undigested theories. We will, then, enter upon our cursory examination, for such it must be, of the question of Usury, with a due respect for the opinions that have been long entertained of it, but without surrendering ourselves submissively to their authority, or refusing to listen to those who have impeached it. We begin with the opposition.

The broad principle taken by Bentham, the most distinguished of the opponents of the laws against Usury, is, "That no man of ripe years and of sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view to his advantage, from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit; nor any body hindered from supplying him upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to." Every word of this postulate has been well considered, and it certainly presents, prima facie, an imposing front. It seems, indeed, to be almost a selfevident proposition; and, apart from the right assumed by society to govern men in the use of their property, and to put restraints on their natural rights, it is so. We admit that this right is wise and beneficial, when exercised wisely; and if the welfare and safety of the community require that a contract for money, or any other contract, should be put under certain restrictions, the right of society to impose them is undeniable.

I hold it to be a sound principle in all governments, whether political or domestic, that too much law-making, too much governing, should be avoided, and that the great object of every general regulation should be some important, general benefit. To impose fetters on individuals, unless they be really insane or incompetent to act with reason, to prevent them from injuring themselves, is always of doubtful policy, and a doubtful right. The task of the legislator would be interminable, and as multifarious as the follies of mankind, if he were to undertake this extensive protection of their interests, and to preserve every one from rash and ruinous bargains; from absurd speculations and injudicious sales and purchases, which are a much more common and seductive means of wasting an estate than borrowing money at too high a rate. On this system of government which descends to the personal guardianship of every individual, every species of bad management by which he may injure himself should be interdicted; every wild project and improvident expenditure would come under legislative superintendence. But nothing of this sort is pretended or could be accomplished. A man may go to ruin in every way he pleases, except by borrowing money. If he wants a thousand dollars under a pressing necessity, or for some beneficial object, he is not permitted to give more for it, whatever may be its real value, than it was thought to be worth by a legislative calculation made a century ago; but he may make any sacrifice he pleases of his property by way of sale, to obtain the money he wants. He may pay, without limit, any amount, at his pleasure, for horses, for wine, for the indulgence of the most wanton waste and extravagance. There is no prodigality of this description, however vicious, which the law will restrain; no ruin