CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.
3. Under the constitutional authority "to raise and support armies "
(Const., Art. I. § VIII.), Congress has power to bestow bounties and
pensions upon those who may engage in the military service of
the United States. United States v. Fairchilds, 74.
4. This power embraces and authorizes an enactment making it an
offense punishable in the national courts, to detain from a mili-
tary pensioner any portion of a sum collected in his behalf, as his
pension. Ib.
5. Sections 12 and 13 of the pension act of July 4, 1864, 13 Stat. at L.
389, limiting the fees of agents and attorneys for making out
and causing to be executed the papers necessary under the act,
and providing that the receiving of any greater compensation
than that prescribed shall be punishable as a misdemeanor, are,
therefore, constitutional. Ib.
6. The civil rights bill of 1866 is constitutional, and applies to all
conditions prohibited by it, whether originating in transactions
before or since its enactment. Turner's Case, 84.
7. The ordinance of 1787, for the government of the Northwest Ter-
ritory, has been superseded by the adoption of the Constitution
of the United States, and the admission to the Union of the
States formed from that Territory; and the provision of the
ordinance declaring the navigable waters leading into the Mis-
sissippi and the Saint Lawrence "common highways and forever
free," does not restrict the powers of Congress, or of the States,
to legislate respecting those waters. Woodman v. Kilbourn
Manufacturing Co., 158.
8. In the absence of any conflicting enactment by Congress relative
to the use of a navigable stream, the State within which such
stream lies has power to legislate respecting it. Ib.
9. The right of the public to use a navigable river as a highway, is
paramount to every other use of the water; but it does not
exclude or forbid the legislature of the State (where no conflicting
enactment by Congress exists) from authorizing the construction
of public improvements upon the stream, although they may
involve a partial obstruction or inconsiderable detention to navi-
gation. Ib.
10. Under the constitution and laws of Wisconsin, any obstruction
to the use of a navigable stream by the public for purposes
of navigation, which is erected without a constitutional legisla-
tive authority, is a nuisance, and liable to be abated either at
the suit of an individual or at the instance of the State. Ib.
11. It is competent to Congress to pass a law authorizing the presi-
dent to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-—Continued.
this power extends to enable them to pass laws indemnifying or
protecting officers against actions for arrests previously made.
McCall v. McDowell, 212.
12. But the president has no authority to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus, except as authorized and directed by Congress. Ib.
13. The government of a State may authorize alterations to be made
in the course, width, &c., of navigable streams, with a view to
afford greater facilities for navigation; and for this purpose may
take the property of a riparian owner, upon complying with the
constitutional requirement to make compensation therefor.
Avery v. Fox, 246.
14. The government of the United States may authorize similar alter-
ations in navigable streams, for the purpose of affording in-
creased facilities for navigation between the States; and for this
purpose may take the property of a riparian owner. But they
can only take such property upon making or providing for just
compensation. Ib.
15. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution
applies to whites as well as colored people, as citizens of the
United States; and is intended to protect them in their privi-
leges and immunities as such, against the action, as well of their
own State, as of other States in which they may happen to be.
Live Stock, &c. Association v. Crescent City, &c. Cv., 388.
16. These privileges and immunities do not consist merely in being
placed on an equality with others; but embrace all the funda-
mental rights of a citizen of the United States as such. Ib.
17. One of these fundamental rights is the right to pursue any lawful
employment in a lawful manner; or, in other words, the right to
choose one's own pursuit, subject only to constitutional regula-
tions and restrictions.
18. An exclusive privilege, granted to a few individuals, incor-
porated into a body politic, and to their successors, for twenty-
five years, to have cattle landings, stock yards, and slaughter
houses for several miles in extent in and around the city of New
Orleans; with a prohibition to all other persons from having
any such establishments in said district, is a restriction which
violates the fundamental rights of other citizens willing to con-
form to all police regulations adopted for the public comfort and
safety and a legislative act granting such an exclusive privilege
is a violation of the fourteenth amendment and void. Ib.
19. Such a law cannot be sustained under the right of the legislature
to pass license laws, and police regulations, and to grant exclu-
sive rights for the exercise of public franchises. Ib.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued.
20. It allows certain privileged persons to pursue an ordinary em-
ployment, and prohibits others from so doing; and thus goes to
establish one of those monopolies which are contrary to the
spirit of a free government. Ib.
21. If, however, the State courts sustain such a law, and attempt to
enforce it, the circuit court cannot issue an injunction to stay
proceedings, being prohibited by the act of 1793, and Congress
having passed no law to carry the fourteenth amendment into
full effect. The remedy is to carry the suit to the highest State
court, and then bring a writ of error to the supreme court of the
United States. Ib.
22. By the civil rights bill, however, which, as far as it goes, covers
the same grounds as the fourteenth amendment, the circuit
court may take cognizance of such a case, and grant an injunc-
tion; except as to staying proceedings already commenced in
a State court. Ib.
1. The securities known as "Confederate treasury notes," issued by
the self-styled Confederate States, during the civil war of
1861-65, although not "bills of credit," issued by a State, and
as such prohibited by the Constitution of the United States,
Art. I. x. subd. 1, were, nevertheless, illegal; because they
were issued by a pretended government, organized in the name
of certain States, by subjects of the United States, who were at
the time in rebellion against the rightful government of the
United States, with design to dismember and destroy it. Bailey
v. Milner, 261.
2. A promissory note given in consideration of such bills is void, and
does not constitute a debt provable in bankruptcy. Ib.
3. An instrument in the following form,-"Due the bearer or "
[naming a payce]
"dollars in merchandise out of our
store," signed on behalf of an employer, by his bookkeeper
under his general instructions, and delivered to a person em-
ployed to enable him or any one to whom he may transfer it to
obtain the goods, in payment for services rendered, is a contract,
and requires a five-cent stamp. United States v. Learned, 483.
1. Where the exhibitor of a dramatic composition made no sufficient
proof of title thereto by authorship or purchase from an author,
and the facts indicated that his play was a colorable imitation
of the performance which he sought to restrain, his application for
a provisional injunction was refused. Martinetti v. Maguire, 356.
2. The act of August 18, 1856, 11 Stat. at L. 138,-declaring that
any copyright granted to the author or proprietor of any
dramatic composition designed or suited for public representa-
tion, shall be deemed to confer the sole right of representa-
tion,-does not extend so far as to protect mere spectacles or
arrangements of scenic effects, having no literary character. An
exhibition, spectacle, or scene, is not a "dramatic composi-
tion." Ib.
3. Nor does the act above mentioned extend so far as to protect a com-
position of an immoral or indecent character. Such composition
should not be deemed "suited for public representation" within
the meaning of the act. Ib.
4. It seems, that Congress have not power to pass a law conferring
the privilege of copyright upon immoral or indecent works or
compositions. The power to pass copyright and patent laws,
embraces such only as tend to "promote the progress of science
and useful arts." Ib.
1. Where a charter of a corporation reserves to the legislature an
unconditional power to alter or repeal the act, the corporation
cannot complain that a subsequent repealing act is passed with-
out adequate reasons. The legislature may repeal the charter
arbitrarily. Mayor, &c. of Baltimore v. Pittsburgh & Connells-
ville Railroad Co., 9.
2. But where a charter provides that "if the corporation shall at any
time misuse or abuse" its franchises, the legislature may revoke
the grant, the power of revocation is thereby made conditional
upon the fact of some misuse or abuse; and this fact must be
proved upon some inquiry giving the corporation an oppor-
tunity to be heard in defense, before the charter can be
revoked. Ib.
3. It seems, that a proper mode for the legislature to institute the
necessary preliminary inquiry into the fact of misuse, would be
to pass a resolution directing that the attorney-general institute
the proper proceeding in the courts, to ascertain the fact; and
that if, in such proceeding, the charge be found true, the charter
be revoked. Ib.
4. The word "corporation," as used in a revenue law declaring that
every person or corporation owning a railroad, &c. shall be sub
ject to a tax in respect thereof (Act of June 30, 1864, § 103, 13
Stat. at L. 275, as amended by Act of March 3, 1865, 14 Id. 135),
does not include a State. A railroad wholly owned by a State,
managed by State agents, and the profits of which form a part
of the revenue of the State, is not liable to taxation under such
a law. Georgia v. Atkins, 22.
5. In an action brought by plaintiffs, claiming to sue as a corpora-
tion, the defendant, by plea, denied the plaintiffs' incorporation
setting up a general statute of the State which prohibited any
charter from taking effect until a certain fee should have been
paid into the State treasury; and averring that the plaintiffs
had not made the required payment. It appeared in proof that
the fee was not paid until after the plea was filed.
Held, 1. That the circuit court was bound to take notice of the
State statute, and to enforce it, in the same manner as the State
courts would do.
2. That, under the statute, the plaintiffs were not competent
to sue as a corporation, at the time of commencing their action,
by reason of the omission to make the payment required; and
that the plea must therefore be sustained. Union Horse Shoe
Works v. Lewis, 518.
1. The fact that a contract of affreightment is to be performed
wholly between ports within the same State, does not exclude
it from the admiralty jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States. The admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the constitution
upon these courts, extends to all contracts of a maritime charac-
ter to be performed upon navigable waters. The Mary Wash-
ington, 1.
2. The courts of the United States have not jurisdiction of actions
against warehousemen, as such, prosecuted between citizens.
of the same State. Ib.
3. A carrier transported goods to the port of delivery, and then,
without notifying the consignee that they had come, stored
them in his warehouse; where they were injured before the
consignee knew of their arrival.
Held, 1. That the carrier was liable as such, and not as ware-
houseman only; in the absence of affirmative proof of some facts
excusing him from the duty of giving notice.
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