CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.
3. Under the constitutional authority "to raise and support armies " (Const., Art. I. § VIII.), Congress has power to bestow bounties and pensions upon those who may engage in the military service of the United States. United States v. Fairchilds, 74.
4. This power embraces and authorizes an enactment making it an offense punishable in the national courts, to detain from a mili- tary pensioner any portion of a sum collected in his behalf, as his pension. Ib.
5. Sections 12 and 13 of the pension act of July 4, 1864, 13 Stat. at L. 389, limiting the fees of agents and attorneys for making out and causing to be executed the papers necessary under the act, and providing that the receiving of any greater compensation than that prescribed shall be punishable as a misdemeanor, are, therefore, constitutional. Ib.
6. The civil rights bill of 1866 is constitutional, and applies to all conditions prohibited by it, whether originating in transactions before or since its enactment. Turner's Case, 84.
7. The ordinance of 1787, for the government of the Northwest Ter- ritory, has been superseded by the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, and the admission to the Union of the States formed from that Territory; and the provision of the ordinance declaring the navigable waters leading into the Mis- sissippi and the Saint Lawrence "common highways and forever free," does not restrict the powers of Congress, or of the States, to legislate respecting those waters. Woodman v. Kilbourn Manufacturing Co., 158.
8. In the absence of any conflicting enactment by Congress relative to the use of a navigable stream, the State within which such stream lies has power to legislate respecting it. Ib.
9. The right of the public to use a navigable river as a highway, is paramount to every other use of the water; but it does not exclude or forbid the legislature of the State (where no conflicting enactment by Congress exists) from authorizing the construction of public improvements upon the stream, although they may involve a partial obstruction or inconsiderable detention to navi- gation. Ib.
10. Under the constitution and laws of Wisconsin, any obstruction to the use of a navigable stream by the public for purposes of navigation, which is erected without a constitutional legisla- tive authority, is a nuisance, and liable to be abated either at the suit of an individual or at the instance of the State. Ib. 11. It is competent to Congress to pass a law authorizing the presi- dent to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-—Continued.
this power extends to enable them to pass laws indemnifying or protecting officers against actions for arrests previously made. McCall v. McDowell, 212.
12. But the president has no authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, except as authorized and directed by Congress. Ib. 13. The government of a State may authorize alterations to be made in the course, width, &c., of navigable streams, with a view to afford greater facilities for navigation; and for this purpose may take the property of a riparian owner, upon complying with the constitutional requirement to make compensation therefor. Avery v. Fox, 246.
14. The government of the United States may authorize similar alter- ations in navigable streams, for the purpose of affording in- creased facilities for navigation between the States; and for this purpose may take the property of a riparian owner. But they can only take such property upon making or providing for just compensation. Ib.
15. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to the constitution applies to whites as well as colored people, as citizens of the United States; and is intended to protect them in their privi- leges and immunities as such, against the action, as well of their own State, as of other States in which they may happen to be. Live Stock, &c. Association v. Crescent City, &c. Cv., 388. 16. These privileges and immunities do not consist merely in being placed on an equality with others; but embrace all the funda- mental rights of a citizen of the United States as such. Ib. 17. One of these fundamental rights is the right to pursue any lawful employment in a lawful manner; or, in other words, the right to choose one's own pursuit, subject only to constitutional regula- tions and restrictions.
18. An exclusive privilege, granted to a few individuals, incor- porated into a body politic, and to their successors, for twenty- five years, to have cattle landings, stock yards, and slaughter houses for several miles in extent in and around the city of New Orleans; with a prohibition to all other persons from having any such establishments in said district, is a restriction which violates the fundamental rights of other citizens willing to con- form to all police regulations adopted for the public comfort and safety and a legislative act granting such an exclusive privilege is a violation of the fourteenth amendment and void. Ib. 19. Such a law cannot be sustained under the right of the legislature to pass license laws, and police regulations, and to grant exclu- sive rights for the exercise of public franchises. Ib.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Continued.
20. It allows certain privileged persons to pursue an ordinary em- ployment, and prohibits others from so doing; and thus goes to establish one of those monopolies which are contrary to the spirit of a free government. Ib.
21. If, however, the State courts sustain such a law, and attempt to enforce it, the circuit court cannot issue an injunction to stay proceedings, being prohibited by the act of 1793, and Congress having passed no law to carry the fourteenth amendment into full effect. The remedy is to carry the suit to the highest State court, and then bring a writ of error to the supreme court of the United States. Ib.
22. By the civil rights bill, however, which, as far as it goes, covers the same grounds as the fourteenth amendment, the circuit court may take cognizance of such a case, and grant an injunc- tion; except as to staying proceedings already commenced in a State court. Ib.
1. The securities known as "Confederate treasury notes," issued by the self-styled Confederate States, during the civil war of 1861-65, although not "bills of credit," issued by a State, and as such prohibited by the Constitution of the United States, Art. I. x. subd. 1, were, nevertheless, illegal; because they were issued by a pretended government, organized in the name of certain States, by subjects of the United States, who were at the time in rebellion against the rightful government of the United States, with design to dismember and destroy it. Bailey v. Milner, 261.
2. A promissory note given in consideration of such bills is void, and does not constitute a debt provable in bankruptcy. Ib.
3. An instrument in the following form,-"Due the bearer or " [naming a payce] "dollars in merchandise out of our store," signed on behalf of an employer, by his bookkeeper under his general instructions, and delivered to a person em- ployed to enable him or any one to whom he may transfer it to obtain the goods, in payment for services rendered, is a contract, and requires a five-cent stamp. United States v. Learned, 483.
1. Where the exhibitor of a dramatic composition made no sufficient proof of title thereto by authorship or purchase from an author, and the facts indicated that his play was a colorable imitation
of the performance which he sought to restrain, his application for a provisional injunction was refused. Martinetti v. Maguire, 356. 2. The act of August 18, 1856, 11 Stat. at L. 138,-declaring that any copyright granted to the author or proprietor of any dramatic composition designed or suited for public representa- tion, shall be deemed to confer the sole right of representa- tion,-does not extend so far as to protect mere spectacles or arrangements of scenic effects, having no literary character. An exhibition, spectacle, or scene, is not a "dramatic composi- tion." Ib.
3. Nor does the act above mentioned extend so far as to protect a com- position of an immoral or indecent character. Such composition should not be deemed "suited for public representation" within the meaning of the act. Ib.
4. It seems, that Congress have not power to pass a law conferring the privilege of copyright upon immoral or indecent works or compositions. The power to pass copyright and patent laws, embraces such only as tend to "promote the progress of science and useful arts." Ib.
1. Where a charter of a corporation reserves to the legislature an unconditional power to alter or repeal the act, the corporation cannot complain that a subsequent repealing act is passed with- out adequate reasons. The legislature may repeal the charter arbitrarily. Mayor, &c. of Baltimore v. Pittsburgh & Connells- ville Railroad Co., 9.
2. But where a charter provides that "if the corporation shall at any time misuse or abuse" its franchises, the legislature may revoke the grant, the power of revocation is thereby made conditional upon the fact of some misuse or abuse; and this fact must be proved upon some inquiry giving the corporation an oppor- tunity to be heard in defense, before the charter can be revoked. Ib.
3. It seems, that a proper mode for the legislature to institute the necessary preliminary inquiry into the fact of misuse, would be to pass a resolution directing that the attorney-general institute the proper proceeding in the courts, to ascertain the fact; and that if, in such proceeding, the charge be found true, the charter be revoked. Ib.
4. The word "corporation," as used in a revenue law declaring that every person or corporation owning a railroad, &c. shall be sub ject to a tax in respect thereof (Act of June 30, 1864, § 103, 13
Stat. at L. 275, as amended by Act of March 3, 1865, 14 Id. 135), does not include a State. A railroad wholly owned by a State, managed by State agents, and the profits of which form a part of the revenue of the State, is not liable to taxation under such a law. Georgia v. Atkins, 22.
5. In an action brought by plaintiffs, claiming to sue as a corpora- tion, the defendant, by plea, denied the plaintiffs' incorporation setting up a general statute of the State which prohibited any charter from taking effect until a certain fee should have been paid into the State treasury; and averring that the plaintiffs had not made the required payment. It appeared in proof that the fee was not paid until after the plea was filed.
Held, 1. That the circuit court was bound to take notice of the State statute, and to enforce it, in the same manner as the State courts would do.
2. That, under the statute, the plaintiffs were not competent to sue as a corporation, at the time of commencing their action, by reason of the omission to make the payment required; and that the plea must therefore be sustained. Union Horse Shoe Works v. Lewis, 518.
1. The fact that a contract of affreightment is to be performed wholly between ports within the same State, does not exclude it from the admiralty jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. The admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the constitution upon these courts, extends to all contracts of a maritime charac- ter to be performed upon navigable waters. The Mary Wash- ington, 1.
2. The courts of the United States have not jurisdiction of actions against warehousemen, as such, prosecuted between citizens. of the same State. Ib.
3. A carrier transported goods to the port of delivery, and then, without notifying the consignee that they had come, stored them in his warehouse; where they were injured before the consignee knew of their arrival.
Held, 1. That the carrier was liable as such, and not as ware- houseman only; in the absence of affirmative proof of some facts excusing him from the duty of giving notice.
« AnteriorContinuar » |