Georgia v. Atkins. stricted or enlarged." And in Dunn v. Reid, 10 Pet. 524, it was remarked by Mr. Justice MCLEAN, in pronouncing the decision of the court, that "cases may be found where courts have construed a statute most liberally to effectuate the remedy; but where the language of the act is explicit, there is great danger in departing from the words used, to give an effect to the law which may be supposed to have been designed by the legislature." I am of the opinion that Congress intended the term "corporation," as used in this act, to be understood in its general, obvious, and natural meaning; and, therefore, it does not include the term "State." And so far as my limited researches go, I am unable to discover a single case in the supreme court, or in any of the circuit or district courts of the United States, wherein it has been decided that the term "corporation"-body corporate or politic-when used in a statute, includes a "State," or where the one term is used as a synonym for the other. It is therefore ordered that the demurrer be overruled; and that the writ of injunction issue in accordance with the prayer of the complainant, upon giving bond in the sum of thirty thousand dollars. Order accordingly. United States v. Rhodes. UNITED STATES v. RHODES. Circuit Court, Seventh Circuit; District of Kentucky, 1866. INDICTMENT.-CIVIL RIGHTS BILL.-ITS CONSTITUTIONALITY. An indictment need not aver the existence or the provisions of a public statute upon which the prosecution is founded. An indictment for burglary in entering the house of T. in Kentucky, averred that T. was of African descent, and a citizen; and that she was, by the laws of Kentucky, denied the right to testify against the defendants, they being white. There was a public statute of Kentucky, enabling white persons under similar circumstances to testify. Held, that the indictment was sufficient, and that the circuit court might take jurisdiction under section 3 of the act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. at L. 27, known as the "civil rights" bill, notwithstanding there was no averment of the statute of Kentucky. The circuit court should take judicial notice of such statute, and the indictment should be construed in the same manner as if the statute were averred. A prosecution for burglary is "a cause affecting" the owner of the building entered, within the meaning of section 3 of the civil rights bill, giving the courts of the Union jurisdiction of all causes affecting persons who cannot enforce in the courts of the State any of the rights secured to them by the first section. If the owner of the building entered, is, on account of color, incompetent, by the law of the State where the offense is alleged to have been committed, to testify in support of the indictment as a white person might, the circuit court has jurisdiction. The criminal jurisdiction conferred upon the circuit and district courts by section 3 of the civil rights bill, is not confined to offenses committed by colored persons. It extends to prosecutions against white persons for offenses affecting persons who cannot enforce in the State courts the rights secured to them by section 1. The civil rights bill is not a penal statute. It is a remedial one, and is to be liberally construed. The history of the adoption of the first thirteen amendments to the United States v. Rhodes. constitution, and the objects and proper construction of them, explained. Free persons of color, born within the allegiance of the United States, are citizens; and have always been entitled to be so regarded. The dicta to the contrary, in Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393, disapproved. The emancipation of a native born slave, by the thirteenth amendment, removed the disability of slavery, and made him a citizen of the United States; subject, however, to any lawful restrictions imposed upon his right to vote, or other powers or privileges. The act of April 9, 1866, 14 Stat. at L. 27, known as the "civil rights' bill, is constitutional in all its provisions. It is an appropriate method of exercising the power conferred on Congress by the thirteenth amendment. Motion in arrest of judgment. SWAYNE, J.-This is a prosecution under the act of Congress of the 9th of April, 1866, entitled "An Act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means for their vindication." The defendants having been found guilty by a jury, the case is now before us upon a motion in arrest of judgment. Three grounds are relied upon in support of the motion. It is insisted: I. That the indictment is fatally defective. II. That the case which it makes, or was intended to make, is not within the act of Congress upon which it is founded. III. That the act itself is unconstitutional and void. I. As to the indictment, if either count be sufficient, it will support the judgment of the court upon the verdict. Our attention will be confined to the second count. That count alleges that the defendants, being white persons, "On the 1st of May, 1866, at the county of Nelson, in the State and district of Kentucky, at the hour of eleven of the clock in the night of the same day, feloniously and burglariously did break United States v. Rhodes. and enter the dwelling house there situate of Nancy Talbot, a citizen of the United States of the African race, having been born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, who was then and there, and is now, denied the right to testify against the said defendants, in the courts of the State of Kentucky, and of the said county of Nelson, with intent the goods and chattels, moneys and property of the said Nancy Talbot, in the said dwelling house then and there being, feloniously and burglariously to steal, take, and carry away, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the United States." The objection urged against this count is, that it does not aver that "white citizens" enjoy the right which it is alleged is denied to Nancy Talbot. This fact is vital in the case. Without it our jurisdiction cannot be maintained. It is averred that she is a citizen of the United States, of the African race, and that she is denied the right to testify against the defendants, they being white persons. Section 669 of the Code of Civil Practice of Kentucky gives this right to white persons under the same circumstances. This is a public statute, and we are bound to take judicial cognizance of it. It is never necessary to set forth matters of law in a criminal pleading. The indictment is, in legal effect, as if it averred the existence and provisions of the statute. The enjoyment of the right in question by white citizens is a conclusion of law from the facts stated. Averment and proof could not bring it into the case more effectually for any purpose than it is there already. 1 Chitt. Cr. Law, 188; 2 Bos. & P. 127; 2 Leach, 942; 1 Bishop Crim. Pro., §§ 52, 53. This right is one of those secured to Nancy Talbot by the first section of this act. The objection to this count cannot be sustained. II. Is the offense charged, within the statute? United States v. Rhodes. . . . . The first section enacts:-"That all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery," "shall have the same right in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, sell and convey real and personal property; and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contray notwithstanding." The second section provides:-"That any person, who under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State or Territory to the deprivation of any right secured or protected by this act, or to different punishment, pains, or penalties on account of such person having at any time been held in the condition of slavery," "or by reason of his color or race, than is prescribed for the punishment of white persons, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor," &c. The third section declares :-"That the district courts of the United States within their respective districts, shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offenses committed against the provisions of this act, and also, concurrently with the circuit courts of the United States, of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State where they may be, any of the rights secured to them by the first section of this |