Mayor, &c. of Baltimore v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville R. R. Co. A charter may be vacated by the decree of a judicial tribunal in a proper proceeding taken for that purpose, without any such reservation in the act of incorporation. Then both parties are heard, and a verdict of a jury on the facts can be obtained; which concludes the question. But the legislature possesses no judicial authority under the constitution, and has no established course of proceedings in the exercise of such power. The party who is injured by its action is not heard. The reasons usually alleged in the preamble to such acts are the mere suggestions of some interested party, seeking to speculate at the expense of others. Professional solicitors, who infest the lobby, are ever ready, for a sufficient consideration, to impose on the good nature of honest but often careless legislators, by the suggestion of any necessary falsehood. If any one feels curious as to the methods used by agents of corporations to obtain such legislative acts as may be desirable, he will find them fully exposed in the opinion of the supreme court delivered in the case of Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 16 How. 314, 333. We do not intend even to insinuate that any such secret service by "skillful and unscrupulous" agents, stimulated "to active partisanship by the strong lure of high profits" to use most "efficient means" to get the vote of the "careless" mass of legislators, has been used in this case. But we do say that the recitals in the preamble to this act exhibit a labored attempt to justify a more than doubtful exercise of power by an array of reasons which, even if true in fact, might be demurred to in law as insufficient. The act does not contemplate the exercise of the right of domain by which the property of individuals or corporations may be taken for some public use, on making ample compensation. Its object is to transfer the franchises and property of one corporation, anxious by Mayor, &c. of Baltimore v. Pittsburgh & Connellsville R. R. Co. every means in its power to complete a valuable public improvement, to another, whose interest is not to complete the road, and which is not required to do so at any time in this or the next century. Where, in a case like the present, the legislature is asked to take the property of one corporation and give it up to another, on the ground that one has abused or misused its privileges, the just and proper mode would be to pass a resolution ordering the attorney-general to institute the proper legal proceedings to ascertain the fact of "misuse or abuse." If such issue be found true, then that the charter be revoked or resumed. We do not say that, without such judicial proceeding ascertaining the existence of the condition in which the right of appeal is reserved, the act is absolutely void. But we do say that in all such cases the party injured, if he denies the existence of such "misuse or abuse," has a right to be heard, and to have that question tried before he shall surrender his property or his franchise. We do not think it necessary to notice the numerous and conflicting cases which have been brought to our notice by the learned counsel. In the case of Erie & Northeastern R. R. v. Casy, 26 Pa. St. 287; S. C., 1 Grant's Cas. 274, the court found, after a full hearing of the parties, that the fact of "misuse or abuse" did exist, and therefore the act was not void. It cannot, therefore, be any precedent for a case which admits that such facts do not exist. The principles of law, so far as they affect this case, are very clearly and tersely stated by Chief Justice LEWIS, in his opinion to be found in 1 Grant's Cas. 274, with a review of the cases and a proper appreciation of that from Iowa. The sum of the whole matter is this: 1. The complainant has shown a proper case for the interference of the court in his favor. 2. The act complained of is unconstitutional and void under the admissions of the case. The Governor Cushman. 3. The complainant is entitled to the decree of the court on the pleadings, as they stand. 4. The defendants may have leave to withdraw their demurrer and answer over; and if they shall so request, an issue will be ordered to try whether the Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railroad Company have misused or abused their charter. MCCANDLESS, D. J., concurred. THE GOVERNOR CUSHMAN. District Court; District of Wisconsin, Sept. T., 1865. VIOLATION OF REVENUE LAWS.-FORFEITURE. The fact that prohibited articles are secretly introduced on board a vessel by persons employed as hands (such as a cook or waiter) at the will of the master merely, does not necessarily expose the vessel to forfeiture under a statute (such as the act of March 2, 1799, § 103, 1 Stat. at L. 701), which imposes, as the punishment for importing specified articles, a forfeiture of the ship in which they have been imported; provided the articles in question are brought on board without the knowledge or consent of the master or owners, and in defiance of reasonable regulations prescribed on board the ship for securing conformity to the law. If the master connives at such acts of the hands on board the vessel, she may be rendered liable to forfeiture; as the owners are liable for the acts of the master in the discharge of his duties as such. But they are not necessarily liable for the acts of all persons employed by the master on board the ship. A vessel is not liable to forfeiture for every apparent violation of a revenue law, although the law imposes forfeiture as the punishment for a breach of its provisions. Evidence of a violation throws the burden of proof upon the claimant to show innocence. But accidental mistakes may be explained; and the existence of an in The Governor Cushman. tent to defraud the revenue may be the subject of inquiry, and the claimant may show the act complained of to have been innocent. Information for a breach of the revenue laws. The libel was filed against the propeller Governor Cushman, for smuggling distilled spirits in violation of section 103 of the act of March 2, 1799, 1 Stat. at L. 703. John B. D. Cogswell, District-Attorney. Emmons & Van Dyke, for respondent. MILLER, J.—This propeller was seized by the collector at the port of Milwaukee, on the seventh day of August, 1865. The information alleges and propounds, as causes for the seizure:-1. That distilled spirits in jugs and bottles, and not in casks or vessels of the capacity of ninety gallons wine measure and upwards, said jugs and bottles containing less than ninety gallons wine measure each, were imported and brought in the propeller, not being for the use of the seamen on board, from the port of Sarnia, in Canada, to Big Summer Island and Fox Island, in the United States, contrary to section 103 of the act of Congress, approved March 2, 1799. 2. That brandy contained in jugs and bottles, and not in casks or vessels of the capacity of fifteen gallons and upwards, was imported and brought in said propeller to the port of Milwaukee, in the United States, from the port of Sarnia, in Canada, the same not being for the use of the seamen on board. 3. That no manifest containing the said jugs and bottles of distilled spirits was exhibited at the first port in the United States, as required by law. The vessel was seized in pursuance of information from one Royall Campbell, who had been employed as mate, and was discharged for drunkenness and incapacity for duty. From the opening of navigation, in the spring of 1865, until seized, the vessel was running between Green The Governor Cushman. Bay and Sarnia, Chicago and Milwaukee and Buffalo, touching at Sarnia. The cook and a waiter, on May 12, 1865, secretly, in the night time, at Sarnia, purchased and had brought on board the vessel, three gallons of whiskey, three gallons of brandy, and three gallons of gin. On the 23rd of the same month, at Sarnia, they secretly, in the night time, purchased and had brought on board, three gallons of whiskey. And on the 1st of June, at Sarnia, they, in the same manner, and at night, purchased and had brought on board three gallons of whiskey. It was a standing rule of the vessel that no distilled spirits should be brought on board at Canadian ports, by employees. And the cook and waiter, being aware of the rule, and also of the positive orders of the captain to that effect, in purchasing ship stores at Sarnia, requested that the jugs containing spirits purchased of a grocer there, should be secreted in barrels under the stores. They deposited the jugs of spirits in a state room occupied by the waiter, and in a pantry adjoining the kitchen, out of view. Distilled spirits were purchased at Chicago and Milwaukee by officers and men, in the several trips of the vessel. Whiskey was delivered to workmen at Summer Island and Fox Island. And at these places men drank on board secretly, and carried, in bottles placed in their pockets, some of the spirits smuggled at Sarnia, with some purchased at American ports. The cook received payment for those spirits so sold. The clerk and the owner of the pier at Fox Island settled for whiskey which some of the men had purchased of the cook, by crediting the amount on a bill of wood supplied to the vessel, under the belief that the liquor had been brought from Chicago or Milwaukee. The captain and clerk drank liquor handed them by the cook, without compensation. They had no knowledge that any distilled spirits had been brought on board at Sarnia or any other Canadian port, |