duction of civil society; and there is no virtue but what is purely artificial, the mere contrivance of politicians, for the maintenance of social intercourse. But the reason he run into this absurd and impious doctrine, was, that he disbelieved the exist ence of an intelligent, superintending principle, who is the Governor, and will be the final judge of the universe.

As

you sometimes swear by him that made you, I conclude your sentiments do not correspond with his, in that which is the basis of the doctrine you both agree in: and this makes it impossible to imagine whence this congruity between you arises. To grant, that there is a supreme intelligence, who rules the world, and has established laws to regulate the actions of his creatures; and, still, to assert that man, in a state of nature, may be considered as perfectly free from all restraints of law and government, appears, to a common understanding, altogether irreconcilable.

Good and wise men, in all ages, have embraced a very dissimilar theory. They have supposed, that the Deity, from the relations we stand in to Himself, and to each other, has constituted an eternal and immutable law, which is indispensably obligatory upon all mankind, prior to any human institution whatever.

This is what is called the law of nature, "which, being coeval with mankind, and dictated by God himself, is, of course, superior in obligations to any other. It is binding over all the globe, in all countries, and at all times. No human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and such of them as are valid, derive all their authority, mediately, or immediately, from this original."-BLACKSTONE.

Upon this law depend the natural rights of mankind: the Supreme Being gave existence to man, together with the means of preserving and beautifying that existence. He endowed him with rational faculties, by the help of which, to discern and pursue such things as were consistent with his duty and interest; and invested him with an inviolable right to personal liberty and personal safety.

Hence, in a state of nature, no man had any moral power to deprive another of his life, limbs, property, or liberty; nor the

least authority to command, or exact, obedience from him, except that which arose from the ties of consanguinity.

Hence, also, the origin of all civil government, justly estab lished, must be a voluntary compact between the rulers and the ruled; and must be liable to such limitations, as are neces sary for the security of the absolute rights of the latter: for what original title can any man, or set of men, have to govern others, except their own consent? To usurp dominion over a people, in their own despite; or to grasp at a more extensive power than they are willing to intrust; is to violate that law of nature, which gives every man a right to his personal liberty; and can, therefore, confer no obligation to obedience.

"The principal aim of society, is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature; but which could not be preserved, in peace, without that mutual assistance and intercourse, which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities. Hence it follows, that the first and primary end of human laws, is to maintain and regulate these absolute rights of individuals."-BLACKSTONE.

If we examine the pretensions of Parliament by this criterion, which is evidently a good one, we shall presently detect their injustice. First, they are subversive of our natural liberty, because an authority is assumed over us, which we by no means assent to. And, secondly, they divest us of that moral security, for our lives and properties, which we are entitled to, and which it is the primary end of society to bestow. For such security can never exist, while we have no part in making the laws that are to bind us; and while it may be the interest of our uncontrolled legislators to oppress us as much as possible.

To deny these principles, will be not less absurd, than to deny the plainest axioms. I shall not, therefore, attempt any further illustration of them.

You say, "When I assert, that since Americans have not, by any act of theirs, empowered the British Parliament to make laws for them, it follows they can have no just authority to do it; I advance a position subversive of that dependence, which

all colonies must, from their very nature, have on the mother country." The premises from which I drew this conclusion, are indisputable. You have not detected any fallacy in them; but endeavor to overthrow them by deducing a false and imaginary consequence. My principles admit the only dependence which can subsist, consistent with any idea of civil liberty, or with the future welfare of the British empire, as will appear hereafter.

"The dependence of the colonies on the mother country," you assert, "has ever been acknowledged. It is an impropriety of speech, to talk of an independent colony. The words independent and colony, convey contradictory ideas; much like killing and sparing.* As soon as a colony becomes independ ent on the parent state, it ceases to be any longer a colony, just as when you kill a sheep, you cease to spare him."

In what sense the dependence of the colonies on the mother country, has been acknowledged, will appear from those circumstances of their political history, which I shall, by and by, recite. The term colony, signifies nothing more than a body of people drawn from the mother country, to inhabit some distant place, or the country itself so inhabited. As to the degrees and modifications of that subordination, which is due to the parent state, these must depend upon other things besides the mere act of emigration, to inhabit or settle a distant country. These must be ascertained by the spirit of the constitution of the mother country; by the compacts for the purpose of colonizing; and, more especially, by the law of nature, and that supreme law of every society-its own happiness.

The idea of colony does not involve the idea of slavery. There is a wide difference between the dependence of a free people, and the submission of slaves. The former I allow; the

* I find, sir, you take a particular delight in persisting in absurdity. But if you are not totally incorrigible, the following interpretation of the unfortunate adverb, will secure it from any future stripes. It is taken from Johnson's Dictionary: SPARINGLY, not abundantly, Bacon; 2, frugally, parsimoniously; not lavishly, Hayward; with abstinence, Atterbury; cautiously, tenderly. Substitute frugally, or, not lavishly, for sparingly, and you must blush at your own conceit. "Kill your sheep frugally, or, not lavishly." Where is the impropriety of this?

latter I reject with disdain. Nor does the notion of a colony imply any subordination to our fellow-subjects in the parent state, while there is one common sovereign established. The dependence of the colonies on Great Britain, is an ambiguous and equivocal phrase. It may either mean dependence on the people of Great Britain, or on the king. In the former sense, it is absurd and unaccountable. In the latter, it is just and rational. No person will affirm that a French colony is independent on the parent state, though it acknowledge the king of France as rightful sovereign. Nor can it, with any greater propriety, be said, that an English colony is independent, while it bears allegiance to the king of Great Britain. The difference between their dependence, is only that which distinguishes civil liberty from slavery; and results from the different genius of the French and English constitutions.

But you deny that "we can be liege subjects to the king of Great Britain, while we disavow the authority of Parliament.” You endeavor to prove it thus:* "The king of Great Britain was placed on the throne, by virtue of an act of Parliament: and he is king of America, by virtue of being king of Great Britain. He is, therefore, king of America by act of Parliament: and, if we disclaim that authority of Parliament which made him our king, we, in fact, reject him from being our king; for we disclaim that authority by which he is king at all."

Admitting that the king of Great Britain was enthroned by virtue of an act of Parliament; and that he is king of America, because he is king of Great Britain; yet, the act of Parliament is not the efficient cause of his being the king of America. It is only the occasion of it. He is king of America, by virtue of a compact between us and the kings of Great Britain. These colonies were planted and settled by the grants, and under the protection, of English kings, who entered into covenants with us, for themselves, their heirs, and successors; and it is from these covenants, that the duty of protection, on their part, and the duty of allegiance, on ours, arise.

* Vide" Congress Canvassed."

So that, to disclaim the authority of a British Parliament over us, does by no means imply the dereliction of our allegiance to British monarchs. Our compact takes no cognizance of the manner of their accession to the throne. It is sufficient for us that they are kings of England.

The most valid reasons can be assigned for our allegiance to the king of Great Britain; but not one of the least force, or plausibility, for our subjection to parliamentary decrees.

We hold our lands in America by virtue of charters from British monarchs; and are under no obligations to the Lords or Commons for them. Our title is similar, and equal, to that by which they possess their lands; and the king is the legal fountain of both. This is one grand source of our obligation to allegiance.

Another, and the principal source, is, that protection which we have hitherto enjoyed from the kings of Great Britain. Nothing is more common than to hear the votaries of Parliament urge the protection we have received from the mother country, as an argument for submission to its claims. But they entertain erroneous conceptions of the matter. The king himself, being the supreme executive magistrate, is regarded by the constitution as the supreme protector of the empire. For this purpose, he is the generalissimo, or first in military command. In him is vested the power of making war and peace; of raising armies, equipping fleets, and directing all their motions. He it is, that has defended us from our enemies; and to him alone we are obliged to render allegiance and submission.

The law of nature, and the British constitution, both confine allegiance to the person of the king; and found it upon the principle of protection. We may see the subject discussed at large, in the case of Calvin. The definition given of it by the learned Coke, is this: "Legiance is the mutual bond and obligation between the king and his subjects; whereby subjects are called his liege subjects, because they are bound to obey and serve him: and he is called their liege lord, because he is bound to maintain and defend them." Hence it is evident, that while we enjoy the protection of the king, it is incumbent upon us to