Sea-Service of Volunteer Naval Officers. Previous to the appointment of Mr. Bradbury on the retired-list he had performed, in the aggregate, four years and one month sea-service as a volunteer officer, with which he has been credited. He now claims to be entitled for that period, under the provisions of the section above mentioned, to the difference between the pay of the grade held by him when such sea-service was performed and the pay of the grade at present held by him on the retired-list. The question submitted by you is as to the validity of this claim. I am unable to discover anything in the said section which gives Mr. Bradbury a right to an allowance such as is claimed by him. The provision in that section declaring that the transferred officers, by whom sea-service has been performed as volunteers, "shall receive all the benefits of such duty in the same manner as if they had been during said service in the Regular Navy," obviously means that they shall receive whatever benefits their past sea-duty would entitle them to, if, during the period of its performance, they had belonged to the regular naval service, holding (not the same grades as those to which they are transferred, as the claimant interprets it, but) grades corresponding to those at that period held by them in the volunteer naval service. Now, there was no difference between the pay of volunteers and the pay of regulars of corresponding grades when on sea-service; so that, in respect to compensation for such service, the transferred officers having already received as volunteers what they would have been allowed as regulars, it is not perceived that any benefit of a pecuni. ary character could be claimed by them on that account. The intention of that provision, I think, may be satisfactorily explained thus: By the statutes in force at the date of its enactment authorizing officers of the volunteer naval service to be transferred to the regular naval service, (see act of July 25, 1866, 14 Stat., 222; also, act of May 17, 1864, 13 Stat., 79,) the transfers were confined to the four grades in the latter service, from ensign to lieutenant-commander, inclusive; and by the regulations of the Navy a certain period of service (formerly two years, at present one year) was required of officers in those grades before, as a general rule, they were nominated for promotion to the next higher grades. Claims for Property Lost in the Military Service. (See Regulatious of 1865, page 46, par. 257, Regulations of 1870, page 130, par. 899.) Besides, officers in the Navy generally are credited with their sea-service, with a view to its being taken into consideration in their future assignment to duty; but, excepting those who belong to the four grades mentioned, they derive no other advantage therefrom that I am aware of. The design of the provision referred to, then, was to give the transferred officers the full benefit of their former sea-service, in so far as it might go to complete the period of such service required in their respective grades previous to nomination for promotion, and in so far as it ought properly to be taken into account in the matter of assignment to duty. Beyond these advantages, the provisiou would seem to confer nothing. I am, accordingly, of the opinion that the claim of Mr.. Bradbury is invalid. I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, Hon. Wм. A. RICHARDSON, GEO. H. WILLIAMS. Secretary of the Treasury. CLAIMS FOR PROPERTY LOST IN THE MILITARY SERVICE. The 1st and 2d sections of the act of March 3, 1849, chap. 139, provide respectively for a separate and distinct class of claims. The two classes distinguished from each other. Claims of officers and soldiers for horses lost in the military service, where their horses were in service simply as a part of the equipment belonging to and furnished by them, are allowable only under the provisions of the 1st section. But where the property was in service by impressment or contract, and not merely by being a part of the equipment furnished by the officer or soldier, such claims are allowable under the provisions of the 2d section, which contains no restrictions as to persons. Horses which constitute a part of the equipment of officers aud soldiers, furnished by themselves, are not in the military service by "contract," much less by "impressment," within the meaning of the term as employed in the latter section. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: Your letter of the 22d December last, referring to a difference of opinion shown by the papers transmitted there Claims for Property Lost in the Military Service. with to exist between the Adjutant-General of the Army and the Second Comptroller of the Treasury in relation to the settlement of claims under the act of March 3, 1849, chap. 139, asks an opinion from me touching the question upon which those officers differ. That question seems to be this: Whether claims of officers and others described in the 1st section of said act, for horses lost in the military service, are allowable under the provis ions of that section solely; or whether such claims may also be allowed under the provisions of the 2d section of the same act. It appears to me, upon examination of the two sections mentioned, that they provide each for a separate and distinct class of claims. The 1st section is manifestly limited to cases of damage sustained in any of the ways therein described, by officers and soldiers who, by reason of their grade, or arm, or duties, are required to be mounted; and it is very clear that the provisions thereof respecting horses lost by such persons while in the military service are applicable only to the loss of horses which they had furnished and kept in service as a part of their equipment. The peculiar feature of the cases covered by this section, therefore, would seem to consist in the fact that the property lost constituted at the time of its loss a part of the equipment furnished by an officer or soldier whose duties, arm, or grade required him to be mounted. The 2d section, on the other hand, extends to cases of damage sustained by any person in the loss of property of the kind designated therein, including horses, from any of the causes or under any of the circumstances therein enumerated, where the property was, at the time of the loss, in the military service either by impressment or contract, and where the risk of the property was not agreed to be incurred by the owner. Horses belonging to the category adverted to in connection with the 1st section, that is to say, those which constitute a part of the equipment of officers and soldiers, furnished by themselves, are not, I think, to be considered as in the military service by "contract," much less by "impressment," within the meaning of the term as employed in the 2d section. By the conditions of the service in which the officer Moneys Paid into United States Courts. or soldier is employed, or by his engagement with the Government, he may be required to provide himself with a horse to perform that service; yet a horse which has entered the military service in this manner is not, in the said act or in any former act, contemplated as being in such service by contract. Regarded from this point of view, then, claims of officers and soldiers for the loss of such horses are not cognizable under the last-named section. But it is otherwise where the officer or soldier has sustained damage by the loss of a horse in the military service, which at the time of its loss was in such service, not by being a part of his equipment, but by actual impressment or contract; for there is no restriction in that section as to persons. With respect to the question presented, I am accordingly of the opinion that claims of officers and soldiers for horses lost in the military service, where their horses were in service simply as a part of the equipment belonging to and furnished by them, are allowable under the provisions of the 1st section of the act of 1849 only; but that where the property was in service by impressment or contract, and not merely by being a part of the equipment furnished by the officer or soldier, such claims may and should be allowed, if otherwise unobjectionable, under the provisions of the 2d section of the same act. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, Hon. Wм. A. RICHARDSON, Secretary of the Treasury. GEO. H. WILLIAMS. MONEYS PAID INTO UNITED STATES COURTS. The act of March 24, 1871, chap. 2, does not repeal the laws previously in force relating to moneys paid into the courts of the United States, or received by the officers thereof, which are of a special character and apply only to moneys thus paid or received in particular classes of cases, as proceedings in prize and bankruptcy proceedings; it repeals merely the general law on the subject, as embodied in the two statutes mentioned in the 6th section. Accordingly, the disposition of moneys paid into the United States courts or received by the officers of such courts, in bankruptcy proceedings, is governed since the act of 1871, as it was prior thereto, by the provisions of the bankruptcy acts and the rules prescribed in pursuance thereof. Moneys Paid into United States Courts. Semble that there is no law making it the duty of the assistant treasurers, with whom moneys are deposited under the provisions of the act of 1871, to keep a detailed account in respect of the causes to which the deposited moneys appertain. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: Your letter of the 3d of December last, in regard to the deposit of moneys paid into United States courts, or received by officers of such courts, in causes pending or adjudicated therein, presents for my consideration substantially the following questions: 1. Whether the act of March 24, 1871, entitled "An act relating to moneys paid into the courts of the United States," (17 Stat., 1,) is applicable to moneys paid or received as aforesaid in bankruptcy proceedings. 2. Whether it is incumbent on the assistant treasurer, with whom moneys are deposited under the provisions of that act, to open and keep a separate and detailed account for each cause in which the moneys so deposited had been received or paid. Previous to the act of 1871, mentioned above, the general law on the subject of moneys paid into said courts or received by officers thereof was embodied in the two statutes repealed by the 6th section of that act. In addition to this general law there also existed other laws, of a special character, enacted since the date of those statutes, which applied only to moneys there paid or received in particular classes of cases, as proceedings in prize and proceedings in bankruptcy. These special laws were not, I think, intended to be superseded by the act of 1871, but only the general law adverted to; and the express repeal by that act of the two statutes containing the latter, taken in connection with the circumstances that it does not enact any new provision wholly inconsistent with the continuance in force of the former, may be regarded as strongly corroborative of this view. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the act of 1871 has no application to moneys paid into the United States courts or received by officers of such courts in bankruptcy proceedings. The deposit of such moneys is governed by the provisions of |