Members of Congress Elect. rectly, or agreeing to receive from any person or persons, any money, property, or other valuable consideration, for procuring or aiding to procure any contract, office, or place from the Government, or any Department thereof, or from any officer of the United States, for any person or persons whatsoever, or for giving or bestowing any such contract, office, or place to any person whomsoever. The prohibition in this clause is laid upon members of Congress-not members-elect, but those who have taken the oath of office and qualified. A subsequent clause prohibits members of Congress, from the time of their election as such, from receiving or agreeing to receive any money, property, or other valuable consideration, for attention to services, action, vote, or decision on any question, matter, cause, or proceeding which may then be pending, or may by law or under the Constitution be brought before them in their place as such members of Congress. Without stopping to consider whether the case stated by Mr. Lawrence comes within the prohibitions of this act, it will be sufficient to state the provisions of the act of July 11, 1864, evidently passed for the purpose of more effectually guarding against the mischief intended to be provided against in the first clause above cited of the act of 1862. The act of 1864 is more comprehensive in terms, its prohibitions being directed to members of Congress from the time of their election, to heads of Departments, hea ds of bureaus, clerks, and every other officer of the Government, forbidding each and all of them to receive any compensation whatsoever, directly or indirectly, for any services rendered or to be rendered to any person, either by themselves or another, in relation to any proceeding, contract, claim, controversy, charge, accusation, arrest, or other matter or thing in which the United States is a party or directly or indirectly interested, before any Department, court-martial, bureau, officer, or any civil, naval, or military commission whatever. This act is too plain in its terms to require exposition, Members of Congress elect cannot lawfully receive compensation for services rendered by them as counsel or otherwise in the instances mentioned in the act, and Mr. Lawrence is Military Reservation at Fort Leavenworth. clearly debarred from acting as counsel in the case referred to in his communication to you if he has received or shall agree to receive any compensation whatever, directly or indirectly, therefor. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. WM. W. BELKNAP, Secretary of War. GEO. H. WILLIAMS. MILITARY RESERVATION AT FORT LEAVENWORTH. The provisions of the acts of July 20, 1868, chap. 179, and July 27, 1868, chap. 268, granting to railroad companies rights of way through the Fort Leavenworth military reservation, are to be construed strictly as against the grantees of such rights. The grant made by those acts does not impart to the railroad companies referred to the right to establish cattle yards or pens, or build structures for a like purpose, either in the roadway or elsewhere upon said reservation. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 18th instant, submitting for my official opinion the question "whether the acts of Congress granting right of way to railroad companies through the military reservation at Fort Leavenworth authorize them to erect such structures within the limits of the right of way as they may choose, or whether the privilege granted them by the said acts was simply for the construction of their roads." From the papers and map which accompany your communication, it appears that the Chicago and Southwestern Railroad Company have constructed from a point within the reservation two tracks for their road, leading to Leavenworth City, one for passenger and one for freight cars, and between these tracks, at a distance of 300 feet from each, another leading to a cattle-yard, established for the use of the company. The acts of Congress referred to are the act of July 20, 1868, authorizing the construction of a bridge across the Missouri River, the 3d section of which provides "that for the use of railroads leading to said bridge from either side of the river there is hereby granted a right of way through said Military Reservation at Fort Leavenworth. Fort Leavenworth military reservation, not exceeding for all said roads 300 feet in width, provided that said roads do not in any way interfere with the public buildings on said military reservation," and the act of July 27, 1868, granting severally to two railroad companies the right of way, not exceeding 100 feet in width for each, "to construct and operate a railroad across and over the military reservation at Fort Leavenworth * upon s uch line as shall be designated and fixed by the Secretary of War." * According to well-recognized rules of law, these acts should be construed strictly against the grantees. (Mills et al. vs. Saint Clair County, 8 How., 581.) Justice Clifford, delivering the opinion of the court in the case of Rice vs. Railroad Company, (1 Black, 358,) says: "Whenever privileges are granted to a corporation, and the grant comes under revision in the courts, such privileges are to be strictly construed against the corporation and in favor of the public, and that nothing passes but what is granted in clear and explicit terms." Whether the railroad companies have the right to erect structures within the limits of the graut made to them by said acts is partly a question of fact as well as of law. All rights necessary to enable them to construct and operate their roads are undoubtedly conveyed by the grant. (Appleton vs. Fullerton, 1 Gray, 186.) Admitting that to operate a railroad successfully in Kansas it is necessary to have cattle-yards connected with the road, it does not follow that wherever there is a right of way for such a road there is a right also to have such yards. To grant to a railroad company a right of way through the streets of a city would not imply a right of the company to build cattle-yards in such streets, while under some circumstances such a grant through wild public lands might be construed to give that right. Associated with the idea of a military reservation are those ideas as to use and appearance which make it doubtful whether Congress intended to give to the companies any more than, after the construction of a suitable road, the right of transit with their trains thereon; but be that as it may, it is clear to my mind that Congress did not intend to give to the companies the right to erect unsightly or offensive structures upon the reservation. Assum Claim of C. A. Perry & Co. ing it to be true that (as the commanding general states) "the establishing of cattle-yards anywhere within the limits of the reservation will seriously interfere with the public interests," it thence follows, in my judgment, that such structures are not warranted by law. Possibly it may be more convenient, but it cannot be indispensable to the operation of the railroad to have cattle-yards located inside instead of outside of the reservation; and it is too plain for controversy that the erection and ordinary use of such inclosures are wholly incompatible with the military use of the reservation. Congress evidently made the grant with a view to the continued use and enjoyment of the reservation by the military; and it seems to me, therefore, that the railroad companies have no right to interfere with those ends further than the reasonable necessities of their roads and the business upon them may require. I cannot, upon the information I have as to the circumstances of the reservation and railroads running through it, decide definitely as to whether any building or structure connected with such roads is allowable within the right of way across the reservation; but I am clearly of the opinion that the right of way granted by said acts does not give to the railroad companies the right to build or have cattleyards, or structures of a like description, in their roadway or elsewhere upon said reservation. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Hon. Wм. W. BELKNAP, Secretary of War. GEO. H. WILLIAMS. CLAIM OF C. A. PERRY & CO. The facts and circumstances presented in this case failing to show that the claimant's property was destroyed while in the military service of the United States, either by impressment or contract: Held that the claim is not within the provisions of the 2d section of the act of March 3, 1849, chap. 129. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 28th ultimo, inclosing the findings of Claim of C. A. Perry & Co. fact by the Second Comptroller in the matter of the claim of C. A. Perry & Co. to compensation for cattle, wagons, &c., lost or destroyed in accompanying the march of the United States military forces into Utah in the autumn of 1857, and requesting my opinion whether their claim is within the provisions of the 2d section of the act of March 3, 1849, (9 Stat., 414,) which provides for the payment for horses and other property lost or destroyed "while in the military service of the United States, either by impressment or contract." In this case I understand the claim to be that the property in question was lost or destroyed while in the military service by impressment. The Comptroller states the facts as follows: "First. That the following order was issued to one of the claimants: "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF UTAH, "SOUTH PASS, EN ROUTE TO SALT LAKE CITY, "October 19, 1857. "SIR: The colonel commanding directs me to inform you, in reply to your letter of to-day, that no goods or supplies of any kind will be permitted to pass the Army for Salt Lake City or other point in the possession of the Mormons, nor any communication whatever to be had with them so long as they manifest a hostile attitude to the Government of the United States. "To J. C. IRWIN, Esq.' "F. J. PORTER, "Assistant Adjutant-General. "Second. That prior to the issue of said order the train of the claimants, en route for Salt Lake City, pursued its journey subject only to the direction or control of its owners or agents. "Third. That by order of Colonel Johnston, the merchanttrains, included in which was the train of the claimants, were assigned a position in the rear of the Army trains proper, and of the Army contractors' trains; that the entire train stretched out eight or ten miles in length; that the daily march was regulated by military order; that all the trains were always subject to military control, and orders were |