Equality, Responsibility, and the LawCambridge University Press, 2001 M03 12 - 320 páginas This book examines responsibility and luck as these issues arise in tort law, criminal law, and distributive justice. In revealing how the problems that arise in tort and criminal law as well as distributive justice invite structurally parallel solutions, the author also shows the deep connection between individual responsibility and social equality. This is a challenging and provocative book that will be of special interest to moral and political philosophers, legal theorists, and political scientists. |
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Contenido
Equality Luck and Responsibility | 1 |
WHOSE BAD LUCK is IT? | 3 |
12 REASONABLE PERSONS IN PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICS | 6 |
13 THE BASIC STRUCTURE | 9 |
14 RESPONSIBILITY AS POLITICAL MORALITY | 12 |
15 THREE CONCEPTIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY | 15 |
16 POSITIVE LAW AND POLITICAL MORALITY | 18 |
17 IDEAL INTERPRETATION AND ACTUAL PRACTICE | 19 |
Mistakes | 172 |
62 SUBJECTIVISM | 173 |
63 MISTAKES AND REASONABLE BOUNDARIES | 188 |
64 SELFDEFENSE | 190 |
65 CONSENT | 201 |
66 CONCLUSION | 214 |
Recklessness and Attempts | 218 |
71 THE PUZZLE | 219 |
18 PLAN OF THE BOOK | 21 |
Corrective Justice and Spontaneous Order | 24 |
21 HOBBESS NATURAL CONDITION OF MANKIND | 25 |
22 HISTORICAL ACCOUNTS OF JUSTICE | 27 |
23 A VOLUNTARIST MINIMAL STATE | 30 |
24 A CAUSALIST MINIMAL STATE | 32 |
25 RISKS | 42 |
26 HISTORICAL JUSTICE WITHOUT LIBERTARIANISM | 46 |
A Fair Division of Risks | 48 |
31 DIVIDING RISKS | 50 |
32 RISKS AND OUTCOMES | 53 |
33 SOME CONTRASTS | 58 |
34 EXPLAINING TORT DOCTRINE | 64 |
Foresight and Responsibility | 94 |
41 FORESIGHT AS A CONDITION OF AGENCY | 96 |
42 AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT | 104 |
43 BOUNCING BALLS AND EXPANDING ACTS | 113 |
44 CONCLUSION | 131 |
Punishment and the TortCrime Distinction | 133 |
SOME COMPARISONS | 135 |
52 PUNISHMENT | 140 |
53 JUSTIFICATIONS AND EXCUSES | 163 |
54 CONCLUSION | 171 |
72 SOME FAILED ATTEMPTS | 222 |
73 HARM | 224 |
74 VINDICATING RIGHTS | 227 |
75 SOME FAMILIAR FEATURES OF ACTION | 230 |
76 PREPARATION AND ATTEMPT | 235 |
77 MANIFEST CRIMINALITY | 240 |
78 RECKLESSNESS AGAIN | 242 |
79 CONCLUSION | 245 |
Beyond Corrective and Retributive Justice? Marx and Pashukanis on the Narrow Horizons of Bourgeois Right | 246 |
81 PASHUKANIS ON THE LEGAL FORM | 249 |
82 FETISHISM | 252 |
83 BEYOND THE NARROW HORIZON? | 254 |
84 SCARCITY AND PERFECT COMMUNITY | 259 |
85 CONCLUSION | 262 |
Reciprocity and Responsibility in Distributive Justice | 264 |
91 HOLDING MISFORTUNES IN COMMON | 266 |
92 PROTECTING THE CAPACITY FOR RESPONSIBLE AGENCY | 272 |
93 BRUTE LUCK AND OPTION LUCK | 278 |
94 THE REASONABLE PERSON AGAIN | 291 |
95 UNDUE BURDENS AND PRIMARY GOODS AGAIN | 294 |
96 CONCLUDING REMARKS | 295 |
297 | |
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Términos y frases comunes
action activities agency agent another's Antony Duff attempt bear the costs behavior beliefs boundaries Cambridge causation cause chance Chapter choices circumstances claim committed completed crimes conception consent consequences corrective justice criminal law culpability danger deed defense depends deterrence distinction distributive justice duty equality example excused explain fail fair terms force foreseeable foresight G. A. Cohen H. L. A. Hart important injury intentional Joel Feinberg justified Law Review law's libertarian liberty and security losses luck misfortunes mistakes of fact mistakes of law moral negligence one's outcome particular parties Pashukanis Pashukanis's plaintiff political posed principle problem protect punishment punitive damages questions reasonable person reasonableness tests reckless relevant requires responsibility result risk ownership security interests self-defense sense someone sponsibility standard strict liability subjectivist suppose terms of interaction theory things thought tion tort law tort liability treated University Press unreasonable victim wrong wrongdoer wrongdoing