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tion. As, however, we are not connected with the law technically so called, we may and undoubtedly we shall be excused, if we do not, or cannot, explain and illustrate all the bearings of its different phrases, or be able to illustrate in so full a manner as we could wish the meaning of the term “law and equity, that may arise under this Constitution.” But we do think, if we know the meaning of the words “law and equity,” that it would be in the power of the slave, or any of his friends, to bring his case before the Supreme Court of the United States, to ascertain whether he can be held in bondage consistently with “law " or with “equity,” or consistently with our present Constitution; whether it acknowledges in terms, or by language, in its ordinary acceptation, that could be so construed as to give one citizen or one person of the United States the right over the liberty of another; whether, in the view of this Constitution, all of the people of the United States do not stand on an equal footing, and that it does not acknowledge, by that clause in the 4th article of the amendments, “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ; ” and also, in the 5th article of the amendments, no person shall “be deprived of his life, liberty, and property, without due process of law; ” and also, in the 8th, “excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted,” — the great truth put forth in the Declaration of Inde

pendence, that “all men are created equal, and that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness,” &c.; and that this is the principle on which to found their judgment as to the “law and equity” that should be awarded to every individual embraced within the limits of the United States, universally — not to particular individuals, — not to black, yellow, or white, – not to the free alone, — but to the bond, if there were any such. The words are “the right of the people to be secure,” &c.; not to the FREE people, but “the people,” without distinction, and “no person shall be compelled,” &c.; not no free person, or no white person, but no person, applying person universally ; nor shall “excessive bail be required,” &e. “nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted; ” and, consequently, if the black man, or the yellow man, can maintain his character as a man, then must he come under the denomination of one of the persons or people spoken of ; and, consequently, no State legislature, or any person in a State, no, nor even congress itself, could dare presume, under this clause, and these articles, to hold, or restrain, or punish, any individual, unless for crime or in case of rebellion, against their consent. The language, it appears to us, is explicit, plain, and straight forward; and if there were, or could have been, slaves, after the Declaration of Independence was adopted, this article, with these amendments, were amply broad to meet every case ; and nothing but the not bringing their case before the courts, on the part of those interested to be free, could have prevented them from becoming so. It appears to us the court was given jurisdiction in the premises, and the language in the amendments is sufficiently clear, that the rights of no person, or any of the people, should be violated in their persons, their property, their liberty, or their life. No allusion whatever is made to there being two classes of persons, or that this language was to be applied to two distinct people; but, on the contrary, every person, and all the people embraced within the jurisdiction of this government were to receive impartially its protection; and the faith of the government is clearly in fault, if there are any now within its jurisdiction who are denied the privileges here set forth in the 4th, 5th, and 8th articles of the amendments, if a case where a man's liberty was involved has been decided by the courts in favor of slavery; but we believe, in the highest court of the country, no such decision has been made. The 11th article of the amendments appears to clash with this section; for it says the court shall have jurisdiction in “controversies arising between two or more States, between a State and citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects.” The 11th article of the amendments says, “The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced , or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.” In the one it expressly says it shall have jurisdiction in controversies arising between a State and citizens of another State, or a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign State; in the other, it says it shall not be so construed. The meaning of the amendment, if we understand it, is, the court shall not take cognizance of any action, brought by a citizen of another of the States, or a citizen or subject of a foreign state, against one of the States of the Union. On first reading this, we knew not the object of this clashing, or why this amendment was put in. Mr. Marshall, as we shall perceive in another part of this work, says it was occasioned by the indebtedness of the States, and, in their sovereignty, they did not wish to be brought by a member of another State, or by foreigners, before the court in an action of debt. We know not our case is affected by this inconsistency, or that it does prevent a suit being brought before the court to liberate a man held as a slave; and therefore we shall leave it for our lawyers to speculate upon, and reconcile the differences that exist between the original article and the amendment, whenever they may have an occasion. The courts, however, have jurisdiction in all cases, both original and appellate, in a controversy

between a State and the “citizens thereof,” and this is sufficient for our purpose; for, if the negro, or the slave, whether white or black, should bring his cause into a State court, and that court decide he can be held in servitude against his consent, without crime, and punished also for no crime, then may he not appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, and inquire whether it is lawful, under and in pursuance of the Constitution, “the people may be seized in their persons, houses, papers, and effects; ” or that “any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; ” or that “cruel and unusual punishments” may be “inflicted.” But, it may said, the slave is not a citizen, and therefore he cannot come before the court; but is not the court competent to try that fact, whether he be a citizen or no, if his citizenship should be denied ? and whether, if there is any technicality in the meaning of the word citizen in some cases, the use of the word person in the amendments does not destroy that technicality with regard to the people of the United States? This, it would seem, would be the first point in the case for their decision; and whether the expression, “nor shall any person be subject for the same offence,” &c. “nor be deprived,” &c. will not include all persons, whether white or black, bond or free ; and, whether in the expression, “the right of the people to be secure in their persons,” &c. the colored man must not be included as one of the people, and that he should be defended against any “cruel or unusual punish

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