and nothing but the not bringing their case before the courts, on the part of those interested to be free, could have prevented them from becoming so. It appears to us the court was given jurisdiction in the premises, and the language in the amendments is sufficiently clear, that the rights of no person, or any of the people, should be violated in their persons, their property, their liberty, or their life. No allusion whatever is made to there being two classes of persons, or that this language was to be applied to two distinct people; but, on the contrary, every person, and all the people embraced within the jurisdiction of this government were to receive impartially its protection; and the faith of the government is clearly in fault, if there are any now within its jurisdiction who are denied the privileges here set forth in the 4th, 5th, and 8th articles of the amendments, if a case where a man's liberty was involved has been decided by the courts in favor of slavery; but we believe, in the highest court of the country, no such decision has been made.

The 11th article of the amendments appears to clash with this section; for it says the court shall have jurisdiction in "controversies arising between two or more States, between a State and citizens of another State, between citizens of different States, between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens, or subjects." The 11th article of the amendments says, "The judicial

power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced, or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." In the one it expressly says it shall have jurisdiction in controversies arising between a State and citizens of another State, or a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign State; in the other, it says it shall not be so construed. The meaning of the amendment, if we understand it, is, the court shall not take cognizance of any action, brought by a citizen of another of the States, or a citizen or subject of a foreign state, against one of the States of the Union. On first reading this, we knew not the object of this clashing, or why this amendment was put in. Mr. Marshall, as we shall perceive in another part of this work, says it was occasioned by the indebtedness of the States, and, in their sovereignty, they did not wish to be brought by a member of another State, or by foreigners, before the court in an action of debt. We know not our case is affected by this inconsistency, or that it does prevent a suit being brought before the court to liberate a man held as a slave; and therefore we shall leave it for our lawyers to speculate upon, and reconcile the differences that exist between the original article and the amendment, whenever they may have an occasion.

The courts, however, have jurisdiction in all cases, both original and appellate, in a controversy

between a State and the "citizens thereof," and this is sufficient for our purpose; for, if the negro, or the slave, whether white or black, should bring his cause into a State court, and that court decide he can be held in servitude against his consent, without crime, and punished also for no crime, then may he not appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, and inquire whether it is lawful, under and in pursuance of the Constitution, "the people may be seized in their persons, houses, papers, and effects;" or that "any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;" or that "cruel and unusual punishments" may be "inflicted." But, it may said, the slave is not a citizen, and therefore he cannot come before the court; but is not the court competent to try that fact, whether he be a citizen or no, if his citizenship should be denied? and whether, if there is any technicality in the meaning of the word citizen in some cases, the use of the word person in the armendments does not destroy that technicality with regard to the people of the United States? This, it would seem, would be the first point in the case for their decision; and whether the expression, "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence," &c. "nor be deprived," &c. will not include all persons, whether white or black, bond or free; and, whether in the expression, "the right of the people to be secure in their persons," &c. the colored man must not be included as one of the people, and that he should be defended against any "cruel or unusual punish

ment;" not simply as might be practised by the government of the United States, but whether practised towards him by a State or any of the citizens thereof; in fact, whether the United States, or a State, can allow any of its people to be deprived of their liberty by any one of its citizens; and, if so, whether the United States, or the State, is not itself guilty of the fact. If we should hazard an opinion in this case, we should say it was; and, if we are correct, is there not a suppression of the truth, when it is asserted that the different States have nothing to do with slavery as it may exist in any particular State, when it is known the United States have given the courts, both state and national, power over this subject, and made it their duty to protect the people in their life, liberty, &c. if they are called upon so to do? We leave those who have made the assertion to answer the question.

The next expression which is said to allude to the slave is contained in the third paragraph, 2d section, 4th article. It is in these words:

"No person, held to service or labor in one State under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such labor or service may be due."

This sentence may have been, or may not have been, inserted in the Constitution, whether there had been any slaves in the country or not, so long as it was considered important to collect debts of

those who might leave their employers for different parts of the country; and, in one so extensive as this, it might have been done to the employer's detriment; and as, according to the general rule of nations, they do not give up their inhabitants to any other without special laws on the subject, it might have been thought necessary that a perfect understanding on this subject should be had among the States, and that those bound or held to service in any one State, if they should leave that service and flee into another, if claimed as those that were held, should be given up; but even then not until the party who claimed should prove the service or labor was due. It may be well to observe, that, in that article which provides for the apportionment of the representatives and direct taxes, "those bound to service " were to be reckoned among the freemen, and as equal to them in determining the number to be chosen, and the amount to be raised; that this class of people, in that day, was so numerous as to be taken notice of independent of those held as slaves. If "those bound to service" was meant to be in contradistinction to the "three fifths of all other persons," why may not this section allude to them? For ourselves, we perceive no intrinsic difference in the meaning of the two words "bound" and "held," when applied to those in servitude, saving that, in using the word "bound," there seems to be some obligation attached to both parties, while there appears to be none in the word "held." A person may hold a thing without his possessing any right for so