been made to the political situation of these States anterior to its formation. It has been said that they were sovereign, were completely independent, and were cônnected with each other only by a league. This is true. But, when these allied sovereigns converted their league into a government, when they converted their congress of ambassadors, deputed to deliberate on their common concerns and to recommend measures of general utility, into a legislature, empowered to enact laws upon the most interesting subjects, the whole character in which the States appear underwent a change, the extent of which must be determined by a fair consideration of the instrument by which that change was effected.

"This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It has been said these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the Constitution which gives countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated powers, that which grants expressly the means of carrying all others into execution, congress is authorized to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper' for the purpose. But this limitation on the means which may be used is not extended to the powers which are conferred, nor is there one sentence in the Constitution which has been pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been able to discover, that prescribes this rule. We do not, therefore, think ourselves justified in adopting it. What do gentlemen mean by a strict construction? If they contend only against that enlarged construction which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory. not to be found in the Constitu

tion, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument, for that narrow construction which would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent, then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as the rule by which the Constitution is to be expounded. As men whose intentions require no concealment generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who formed our Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to employ words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well settled rule that the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction. We know of no reason for excluding this rule in the present case.

Here the court admits, what every one in his sober senses must admit, that the men of that age meant what they said, and employed "words which most directly and aptly expressed the ideas they intended to convey;" that they "employed words in their natural sense." We hope this will always be borne in mind when it is attempted to construe their words, when they speak of human rights; and, if it is done, we think there will be no

1 Marshall on the Constitution, p. 288.

difficulty in the way. When they say a man has inalienable rights, they mean he has them; and when they say a man may be given up when he owes service, they mean, when it is proved that service is owed, it is time to give the creditor his due; and we hold the amount of service due should be proved, as well as that it is for value received.

This, however, may be called a strict construction; too strict for the intent and meaning of those who adopted it as a part of the Constitution. If such would be maintained, we would then appeal to the spirit of the Constitution, and to the objects for which it was formed: these objects, as the court has said, are to be found in the caption. Now, taking this in as strict or in as enlarged view as possible, not the least shadow or "color" of an idea could be gathered from that, that the continuation of slavery, or its guaranty, was to be effected by it; on the contrary, the general happiness, prosperity, and liberty, was the purpose to be gained. But, again, it may be objected, that the liberty, happiness, and prosperity of the individual was left and confided to the States; the general government had nothing to do with him: but the doctrine of the court, and the decision made in this case, give a different version to that subject. They here in effect declare, and undoubtedly with truth, that, on the adoption of the Constitution, the States resigned the protection of the individual to the care of the general government: they gave up their sovereignty of him to a power which they

thought would be better able to preserve his liberty and shield him from danger than they, either in their divided or confederated capacity, could do. Before the adoption of the Constitution, the individual looked to the State to guard his individual rights; since the adoption of that instrument, the individual, as in the case cited, looks to the general government, when the State fails to afford him that protection. He first looks to the State, and, if he finds they cannot, or will not, afford him protection, he then appeals to the courts of the country, and the State courts must bow to their decision. If, however, they will not so do, the Supreme Court has the power to call on all the military force of the country to put their mandate into execution. If it is not so, for what purpose does the individual owe any allegiance to the general government? for what purpose does he sustain it? Is it that he may have the pleasure of having a president, and a congress of the United States, and, in the course of time, that he may run his chance of being one of the distinguished men to fill these stations, and thereby gain a name? Is it, as Patrick Henry suggested, that we might be a great nation, and be able to make a figure in the world? and, even if it is so, wherein do we show our power? Is it not in the ability we possess of protecting the individual not only from foreign, but from domestic foes? Wherefore are our ships of war sent upon every ocean, and in every sea, but that the rights of the individual, let him be in what sea or ocean he may,

should be protected? Wherefore are our ambassadors and consuls despatched to every country on the globe? Is it not that each and all of our citizens, if they have taken up a residence there for business, or have gone on a visit to those countries, should be protected in their lawful. undertakings, and be preserved from the despotic power of others? We hold it so. The government, as a government, wants no protection, then ; neither do the States, as States.

We do not send

either our sailors or ambassadors abroad for conquest. The whole object of all our naval forces that are now cruising in foreign seas, is to protect the various individuals of our country who may have wandered there, either in quest of business, pleasure, or science. This, perhaps, may be granted, so far as relates to the white man, to the Anglo-Saxon, or even to the descendants of the German, French, or Spaniard, Greek or Hindoo, but not to the descendants of Africa; of these we take no account; they are not to be considered as persons coming within the meaning of the Constitution; they are nonentities. But is this so? In what part of the Constitution is there any exception made to the African race? Where does it say this principle applies to one people, and that principle to another? Where does it say justice may be meted to one class of persons, and the most horrid injustice to the other? Where, in that instrument, is there any distinction made on account of the color of the skin, and, on account of that color, must the decision of the judge be