upon by a State, or its courts; and they therefore gave the persons in this case what they asked,a hearing before the higher courts of Virginia, though the lower courts of that State had refused to grant them their consent so to do. The rights of the individual they considered in their keeping.

In these quotations we think the power of the courts is clearly sustained, if a case of a slave could be brought before them, when that slave is held either without or by any law of any one of the States; and that the objects for which the Constitution was formed was for far other purposes than for the continuance of slavery. They say one of the express objects for which the judiciary department was established, is the decision of controversies between States, and between a State and individuals. "The mere circumstance that a State is a party gives jurisdiction to the court." Again, "The Constitution gave to every person having a claim upon a State a right to submit his case to the court of the nation." The court, in effect, have here said their jurisdiction, unless in case of crime, extends to the individual, whenever his rights or the liberty of his person is at stake. Will they now say the color of the skin determines their jurisdiction? or, because a person is born under peculiar circumstances, they, in consequence, have no right to be heard before them, or no rights as individuals? We think it would be hard for judges so to decide; but, on the contrary, if the Constitution was adopted by our fathers "to secure justice, the blessings of liberty to themselves and their

posterity," as the court here says it was, then we say, that as our Declaration of Independence declares all men have an inalienable right to their life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, and that to secure these rights our revolution was brought about, and the Constitution was adopted to carry out this truth, and every State has agreed to this Constitution, then, if they keep within this Union, and they violate the doctrines here advanced, and take away the liberty of an individual, or suffer it to be taken away by any of its citizens- the court, if appealed to, has a right, and it is its bounden duty, to restore the citizen or person to that freedom which is by nature his birthright, and which the Constitution of the country says shall not be unduly taken away; for it declares, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated," "nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," &c. &c. and that it would be in violation of the liberty of themselves or their children, if their rights were not secure. We see not how these arguments can be disposed of, or how it can be otherwise supposed than that slavery, or the restraining men in slavery, is in direct violation of the Constitution, unless it is maintained the colored man does not belong to the human species; but we presume no one will maintain this doctrine.

The court says, in speaking reposed in the different States,

of the confidence

and the language

is remarkable, considering how much need there was to be guarded on the subject, and how far the States had continued in their departure from the grand idea of the object of making this land the land of the free, as slavery has been affirmed to be a blessing instead of a curse, that there was little or no confidence to be placed in the States; that they had "habitually disregarded constitutional requisitions made by the old congress;" and therefore it was not "improbable " that congress should give the court the power of construing the Constitution "in the last resort; " consequently nothing has been left in confidence to any one of the States; the rights of each have been, so far as possible, clearly and explicitly defined.

But it was objected to the jurisdiction of the court, in cases between a State and one of its citizens, on the ground that a State would not wrong one of its own citizens, but that it might wrong an alien, or a citizen of another State. This is answered in the quotation from page 233, and we think it also has been answered in the events which are constantly occurring in slaveholding States. The States, it is well known, pay no sort of attention to the rights of those who are considered slaves, whether they are white or black to all intents and purposes they are put without the pale of protection ; and, if the Supreme Court have jurisdiction where individual rights are concerned, "whoever may be the parties," if those rights arise under the Constitution, we cannot see who have greater reasons for being pro

tected by this court than those whose every right has been taken away from them, not only by laws of the States, but by force and fraud of individuals.

In the quotation from page 244, the court speaks of the cause that gave rise to the eleventh amendment of the Constitution. It cannot but be perceived, as we have before remarked, that this amendment clashes, in some measure, with the article in the body of the Constitution on the powers of the judiciary. Why such an amendment was made, it would have been difficult to have explained, unless one was well acquainted with our history.

On first reading this amendment over, and comparing it with the original article, we did not know what to make of it. There evidently was something meant that was not explained on the face of the instrument; but what that something was we could not conjecture. We did not know but it was intended to meet the very case under consideration, to prevent any person out of the slave States from bringing an action, where slavery would be involved; and although a case could be got into court, yet this amendment, it was thought, would stand in the way; but the court, it appears, gives a different version to the subject, and says it was intended merely to prevent foreigners and people out of the State from sueing their demands when a State was a creditor.

It is also to be remarked, in these quotations, how distinctly the court refers to the caption of the Constitution to ascertain the purposes for

which the Constitution was formed, and that from this its intent and meaning were to be gathered. How far and how foreign from expressing the least idea, that the establishment of slavery was one of its objects, we need not attempt to explain. No person could think such a thing existed, or could exist, among a people whose representatives could write such language. In this case, we think, according to the opinion here expressed by the court, our proposition respecting the power of the courts is clearly established; and that they would have power and jurisdiction over the subject of slavery; and, if a case should be brought before them, they would be obliged to take cognizance of it, and declare the man to be free.

In the case of Gibbens vs. Ogden, a case in which the State of New York had granted to R. R. Livingston and Robert Fulton exclusive privilege to navigate the waters of that State by steamboats, Ogden, deriving his right from them, obtained an injunction against Gibbens, who had established two steamboats on these waters. Gibbens, having been defeated in the highest court of the State, brought his cause before the United States Court, which court, as is well known, reversed the decisions of the courts of the State of New York.

Speaking of the objects of the Constitution, and the powers granted by it, the court says,

"As preliminary to the very able discussion of the Constitution which we have heard from the bar, and as having some influence on its construction, reference has