pressions were used to avoid making observations that would, in their consequences, carry him too far in the cause of individual liberty and rights; and, as these latter were specially confided to the keeping of the United States, when a State could not or would not maintain them, we must presume he meant in the expressions "vested legal rights," &c. all the rights of an individual, unless those rights had been forfeited by some peculiar criminal act on the part of the individual.

The case of Sturgis vs. Crowningshield. This was a case on the obligation of contracts. An argument was adduced, when the States had, from their earliest legislation, discharged contracts, and, consequently, as this was a case that would be beneficial in the operation of a discharge, it would not come within the meaning of the Constitution. The court answer this objection by saying,

"That, although the spirit of an instrument, especially of a constitution, is to be respected, not less than its letter, yet the spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words. It would be dangerous in the extreme to infer, from extrinsic circumstances, that a case, for which the words of an instrument expressly provide, should be exempted from its operation. When words conflict with each other, when the different clauses of an instrument bear upon each other, and would be inconsistent unless the natural and common import of words be varied, construction becomes necessary, and a departure from the obvious meaning of words is justifiable. But if in any case the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be

disregarded, because the framers of that instrument did not mean what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provisions to the case would be so monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.” '

In the Constitution of the United States, what is the spirit to be gathered from the words, and what construction should be put upon them? Are the amendments made to this instrument in conflict with other parts of it? do they contradict any other of its provisions, or are they not rather in harmony? or were they not meant to elucidate or to fortify the principles of liberty, which were thought not to be sufficiently clear or prominent in the instrument proposed? or did the framers of these amendments not intend what they said? Would the applying the provisions here made to all the people of the land be so "monstrous," or "absurd" and "unjust," "that all mankind would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application;" or is the not applying them, as was the known intention of those by whose influence they were introduced in the form they were, the crying sin of the land, producing the monstrosities, absurdities, and injustice that are now manifested, and that have exhibited themselves in almost all the legislative halls of our land? For ourselves, we cannot but suppose our practices, having been so opposed to the general principles of that instrument, have been the cause

'Marshall on the Constitution, p. 155.

of nearly all our internal dissensions, and that our departure from these general principles is the cause. why we may be pointed at by the finger of scorn for our inconsistency. We know of no other

reason why it could be done.

The case of McCulloch vs. the State of Maryland. This case was one for testing the right of the State in taxing a branch of the United States Bank by the State of Maryland, and in which the constitutionality of establishing such an institution at all was called in question; and for our purpose we quote,

"The first question made in the cause is, has congress power to incorporate a bank?

"It has been truly said this can scarcely be considered an open question, entirely unprejudiced by former proceedings of the nation respecting it The principle now contested was introduced at a very early period of our history, has been recognized by many successive legislatures, and has been acted upon, by the judicial department, in cases of peculiar delicacy, as a law of undoubted obligation."

"The power now contested was exercised by the first congress elected under the present Constitution. The bill for incorporation of the Bank of the United States did not steal upon an unsuspecting legislature, and pass unobserved. Its principles were completely understood, and was opposed with equal zeal and ability. After being resisted first in the fair and open field of debate, and, afterwards in the executive cabinet, with as much persevering talent as any measure has ever experienced, and being supported by arguments which convinced minds as pure and as intelligent as this country can boast, it be came a law. The original act was permitted to expire;

but a short experience of the embarrassments to which a refusal to revive it exposed the government convinced those who were most prejudiced against the measure of its necessity, and induced the passage of the present law. It would require no ordinary share of intrepidity to assert that a measure adopted under these circumstances was a bold and a plain usurpation, to which the Constitution gave no countenance."

"In discussing this question, the council for the State of Maryland have deemed it of some importance, in the construction of the Constitution, to consider that instrument not as emanating from the people, but as the act of sovereign States. The powers of the general government, it has been said, are delegated by the States, who alone are truly sovereign, and must be exercised in subordination to the States, who alone possess supreme dominion.

"It would be difficult to sustain this proposition. The convention which framed the Constitution was indeed elected by the State legislatures; but the instrument, when it came from their hands, was a mere proposal, without obligation, or pretension to it. It was then reported to the then existing congress of the United States, with a request that it might be submitted to a convention of delegates, chosen in each State by the people thereof, under the recommendation of its legislature, for their assent and ratification.'

"This mode of proceeding was adopted; and by the convention, by congress, and by the State legislatures, the instrument was submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the manner they can act safely, effectively, and wisely, on such a subject, by assembling in convention. It is true, they assembled in their several States; and where else should they have assembled ? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to think of

breaking down the lines that separate the States, and of compounding the American people in one common mass. Of consequence, when they act, they act in their States. But the measures they adopt do not, on that account, cease to be measures of the people themselves, or become the measures of the State govern

ments.

"From these conventions the Constitution derives its whole authority. The government proceeds directly from the people; is ordained and established' in the name of the people, and is declared to be ordained in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, and secure the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity."

"The assent of the States in their sovereign capacity is implied in calling a convention, and thus submitting that instrument to the people. But the people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was final. It required not the affirmance, and could not be negatived by the State governments. The Constitution, when thus adopted, was of complete obligation, and bound the State sovereignties."

"To the formation of a league, such as was the confederation, the State sovereignties were certainly competent. But when, in order to form a more perfect union,' it was deemed necessary to change the alliance into an effective government, possessing great and sovereign powers, and acting directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to the people, and of deriving its powers directly from them, was felt and acknowledged by all.

"The government of the Union, then, (whatever may be the influence of this fact on the case,) is emphatically and truly a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanated from them. Its powers are grant