welfare and the security of liberty, does not grant them the power, as has been asserted, of doing any thing and every thing they might wish, whether their actions resulted in evil or not; but their consultations should be confined to the general welfare, and in protecting individual liberty. But, in performing these acts, they should not interfere with the liberty of speech and of the press, with conscience in religious affairs, &c. &c.; and no person should be seized in his person, papers, and effects, &c. without due process of law. If we are here correct, we cannot see how the general welfare and taxation can well be separated, or the distinction that has at times been set up can be made; and Mr. Randolph, in his closing remarks, seems to catch at this idea.

Mr. R. then went on and asked,

"What would be the consequences, if the government had not this power? Why, you would give it the power with one hand, and take it away with the other; and, had not this power have been given, his affection for it would not have been so great. When it obliges us to tread in the path of virtue, when it takes from the most influential man the power of directing our passions for his own emolument, and of trampling on justice, I hope to be excused when I say that, were it more objectionable than it is, I would vote for the Union."

"Mr. Munroe said he could not help expressing the anxiety which he felt on the occasion, not only from the importance of the subject, but from the profound respect he felt for this august and venerable assembly, [meaning the Virginia convention ;] and, after a short peroration, he went on to remark of the similarity of the proposed

government to those republics that had gone before. There were none, he thought, resembled this, but the Achæan league; and he read several passages from Polybius, tending to elucidate and prove the excellences of the structure of that league, and that it was not destroyed by any internal commotions, but by external foes, and at last by being swallowed up by the Roman empire. He did not think we at all resembled Holland, the Swiss, or the confederacy of Athens, Thebes, and Sparta; and, consequently, our policy must be different.”1

He seemed to think, when the country became settled to the Mississippi, it would be too great for a republic. His expression was, "It is too extensive to be governed but by a despotic monarchy." His opinion must have been changed when he was president, and realized he was presiding over this country, and found it not only settled as far as the Mississippi, but beyond it; and the change in his ideas must have been much greater, had he have. come to the conclusion that there was no necessity for any human government whatever, that mankind were so far willing to subject themselves to the laws of God, that they needed no human restraint. We could sincerely hope and pray that such may be the case. But, after all, we cannot perceive how society can get along without laws, rules, or regulations, for its government; and, if it has them, they must have sanctions. God has a government and has sanctions: must man, or must he not, imitate him in this particular?

But to return: Mr. M. thought we stood in no

'Elliot's Reports, vol. i. p. 171.

danger of external foes: he thought they were too far distant, separated as we are from them by the Atlantic and already different nations of Europe manifested a desire for peace, and were ready to make treaties with us; and that they would not unreasonably call for their claims they had on us for money. He therefore concluded we might, without danger, calmly adopt such a system of government as would be best adapted for the country. He then proceeded to take a comparative view of the Confederacy and of the Constitution, and divided his subject into two heads, -1st, the form, 2d, the powers, of the government. He considered the present system-the Confederacy He asked,

defective in both these respects.

"Is the Confederacy a bond of union sufficiently strong to bring the States together? Is it possessed of sufficient power to enable it to manage the affairs of the Union? Is it well organized, safe, and proper? I confess that in all these instances I consider it as defective; I consider it void of energy, and badly organized." He then asked, "What are the powers which the federal government ought to have? and said, to the former he would give control over the national affairs, and to the latter he would leave the care of local interests. Neither the Confederation nor this Constitution answer this discrimination." He would give the federal government one great power, absolute control over commerce, and take away from it the power of direct taxation. He thought on this latter subject the general government

would interfere with the States, and that revenue enough could be raised from lands and imposts, or loans, for all the purposes of government. He thought "congress could not discriminate over so great a territory as to lay direct taxes, that would be satisfactory to the people." He was also in favor of a bill of rights, "the polar star and great support of American liberty." He thought that, by giving congress all powers to make laws to carry into operation the powers granted, they might take away the trial by jury: "there were no limits pointed out."

I

They are not restrained or controlled from making any law, however oppressive in its operation, which they may think necessary to carry their laws into effect. By this general, unqualified power they may infringe, not only the trial by jury, and every right that is not expressly secured, or excepted from the general power. conceive that such general powers are very dangerous. Our great, inalienable rights ought to be secured from being destroyed by such unlimited powers, either by a bill of rights, or by express provisions in the Constitution. It is immaterial in which of these two modes rights are secured."

He alluded to the divisions of power in the Roman republic and in Great Britain; but he could see no real check in this Constitution. He thought the power of the president too great, and that he could secure his constant reëlection; and that the senate, combined with the president, would destroy the legislative influence of the States; and concluded, under his present impres

sions, he thought it a dangerous government, and calculated neither to secure the interests nor the rights of our countrymen. And under such a

government he should be adverse to embark the best hopes and prospects of a free people. We have struggled long to bring about this revolution, by which we enjoy our present security. Why, then, this haste, this wild precipitancy?

Mr. Madison, in answer, spoke of the "inefficiency of the federal government," of its "inability to pay the debts" of the country, and "to fulfil its treaties," and "of the contempt with which foreign nations were treating us;" of the "refractory conduct of some of the States;" of their not "paying" the quota of money which they ought; and of the manner in which the country were borrowing money to pay even the interest of what she owed; of the ruinous manner of conducting so; of the necessity of their altering their form of government, and that Washington had acknowledged there was a necessity for so doing, and that the Confederacy had, from the first, proved defective.

Mr. Henry, in reply to Mr. Madison, went on at great length, and said,

"He saw not the evils that had been stated. He did not know but the country was as well governed as any other; he referred to the Swiss Cantons, to the United Netherlands, the height of power and riches to which these had attained. He explained, as a reason why we

1 Elliot's Reports, vol. ii. p. 215.