the privilege of debating upon it; but, sir, no State is bound by it, as it is, without its own consent. Should all the States adopt it, it will then be a government established by the thirteen States of America, not through the intervention of the legislatures, but by the people at large. In this particular respect the distinction between the present and proposed government is very material. The existing system has been derived from the dependent derivative authority of the legislatures of the States; whereas this is derived from the superior power of the people. If we look at the manner alterations are to be made in it, the same idea is in some degree attended to. By the new system, a majority of the States cannot introduce amendments; nor are all the States required for that purpose; three fourths of them must concur in amendments in this there is a departure from the federal idea. The members of the national house are to be chosen by the people at large, in proportion to the numbers in the representative district. When we come to the senate its members are elected by the States in their equal and political capacity; but had the government been completely consolidated, the senate would have been chosen by the people in their individual capacity, in the same manner as the members of the other house. Thus it is of a complicated nature; and this complication, I trust, will be found to exclude the evils of absolute consolidation, as well as a mere confederacy. If Virginia was separated from all the States, her authority would extend to all cases: in like manner, were all power vested in the general government, it would be a consolidated government; but the powers of the general government are enumerated; it can only operate in certain cases; it has legislative powers on defined and limited objects, beyond which it cannot extend its jurisdiction."

'Elliot's Reports, vol. ii. p. 95.

Mr. Corbin, in answer to Mr. Henry, and approving of the Constitution, and of its adoption of the expression "we the people," and of its powers of direct taxation, and of its nature to secure the liberties of the country and of the people, says,"What power is given that will endanger liberty? I consider all of the traits of this system as having a tendency to the security of our liberty." He also spoke of the distracted state of the country, particularly in other States, and the ease with which Virginia herself might be convulsed.

On the request of Mr. Henry, Gov. Randolph concluded his remarks on the divided state of the country, and the necessity of adopting the Constitution. "The debts of the country must be paid. We were much in debt to Europe, and we were unable. to pay." Rhode Island, it appeared, had resisted many of the laws of the Confederation, and he thought the powers given were not too great.

"Go through these powers, examine every one, and tell me if the most exalted genius can prove the liberty of the press is in danger. The trial by jury is supposed to be in danger also. It is secured in criminal cases, but supposed to be taken away in civil cases. It is not relinquished by the Constitution; it is only not provided for. Look at the interest of congress to suppress it. Can it be in any manner advantageous for them to suppress it? In equitable cases it ought not to prevail, nor with respect to admirality causes, because there will be an undue leaning against those characters of

Elliot's Reports, vol. ii. p. 106.

whose business courts of admirality will have cognizance. I will rest myself secure under this reflection, that it is impossible that the most suspicious or malignant mind to show that it is the interest of congress to infringe on this trial by jury." 1

In continuing his remarks, in answer to Mr. Henry's objections, which, by the way, he thought very unreasonable, he said,

"He would take notice of what the honorable gentleman had said with respect to the power to provide for the general welfare. The meaning of this clause has been perverted to alarm our apprehensions. The whole clause has not been read together. It enables "congress to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States." The plain and obvious meaning of this is, that no more duties, taxes, imposts, and excises shall be laid than are sufficient to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States."

This same opinion we have seen advanced by the Hon. John Q. Adams. Here is a metaphysical distinction we have not yet been able to perceive. Whatever is for the general welfare, it would seem by the expression, it would be in the power of congress to adopt; but this is denied. It is said, if we understand the expression of the

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1 We have quoted these remarks, and others that will appear in this work, respecting the trial by jury, partly because this subject has been considerably agitated in this community, and to show how jealous the men of that age were on this subject.

of

gentlemen, that the powers of congress is in laying the tax; and, after getting the money in its possession, it must then be spent for the general welfare, &c. Nothing is said about the purpose for which the tax is to be raised. This question of raising a tax is the one we should suppose would be the last to be answered. The first, what is for the general welfare? This having been determined on, then comes the power taxation to pay for it. Or shall it be said we must first raise the money, and after getting it in our possession, we may then look for objects for the general welfare on which to expend it. True, a great diversity of opinions might be entertained on the subject of the general welfare: the bank, for instance, was instituted for the general welfare; it was put down on the same principle, not because it was unconstitutional, for the putting of it down was called an "experiment;" and we have been inclined to think it was an experiment well worth trying. Internal improvement is another instance, and the Cumberland road has been laid out, and yet neither of these powers are expressly granted, though it has been said the establishing either of them is unconstitutional. But they are objected to rather on the ground that the general welfare is better promoted by letting the currency be regulated by individuals, and internal improvements be carried forward by the same means, greater economy, safety, &c. being secured; or it is said the government, in carrying out the general welfare of the community, requires these several

agents to perform with facility its operations; and therefore these agents are introduced, not because they are any benefit to individuals, having no immediate connection with the government, but because the government, in its own business, requires their introduction. This, perhaps, is what is meant, and yet we see not how, in establishing a navy, a post-office, in making a road, in granting patents, &c. &c. the general welfare is not first consulted, and the tax laid to pay the expense incurred for carrying into operation these several objects. The power, to us, seems to be granted for the government, in the first place, to see what is for the general, welfare; and, having decided what may be for that welfaré, then she has the power of laying a tax to carry the object into execution. The power of laying a tax was a secondary power, but a necessary one, to carry the former power into execution: the former power being of no avail without the latter, they certainly were not granted the power of taxing the people for no object; but, if they had an object, that object must first be ascertained. It was, for instance, asserted it would be for the general welfare that a national government should be established; and, after that government was established, it had the power of taxation to pay the officers who should administer it. There could have been no power to tax the people before the people had established a government, unless it had been an usurped power. The granting power to the general government to consult for the general