tion they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, when it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed that the Constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their will to that of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It must therefore belong to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute; the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.

"Nor does the conclusion, by any means, suppose a superiority of the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes the power of the people is superior to both; and that, when the will of the legislature, declared in the statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges oughta be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by those that are not fundamental."'

af

"But, in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and subordinate authority, of original derivating power,

1 Federalist, p. 434.

the nature and reason of the thing indicate the course of that rule as proper to be followed. They teach us that a prior act of a superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior and subordinate authority; and that, accordingly, whenever a particular statute con-travenes the Constitution, it will be the duty of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter, and disregard the former.”1

In answer to an objection made to the above construction of the powers of the Supreme Court, he adds,

"In the first place, there is not a syllable in the plan which directly empowers the national courts to construe the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution, or which gives them greater latitude in this respect than may be claimed by the courts of every State. I admit, however, the Constitution ought to be the standard of construction for the laws; and, whenever there is an evident opposition, the laws ought to give place to the Constitution. But this doctrine is not deducible from any circumstance peculiar to the plan of the convention, but from the general theory of a limited constitution; and, as far as it is true, is equally applicable to most, if not all, of the State governments. There can be no objec tion, therefore, on this account, to the federal judicature, which will not be against the local judicatures in general, and which will not serve to condemn every constitution that attempts to set bounds to legislative discretion." 2

"It may be esteemed the basis of the Union, that 'the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.' And, if it be a just principle, that every government ought to

'Federalist, p. 436.

2 Idem, p. 450,

possess the means of executing its own provisions by its own authority, it will follow that, in order to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one State or its citizens are opposed to another State and its citizens." I

"After having discussed and laid down the principles which ought to regulate the Constitution of the federal judiciary, we will proceed to test, by these principles, the particulars of which, according to the plan of the convention, it is to be composed :

"First, to all cases in law and equity, arising under the Constitution and the laws of the United States.' It has been asked, what is meant by 'cases arising under the Constitution,' in contradistinction to those arising under the laws of the United States? The difference has already been explained. All the restrictions upon the authority of the State legislatures furnish examples. They are not, for instance, to emit paper money; but the interdiction results from the Constitution, and will have no connection with any law of the United States. Should paper money, notwithstanding, be emitted, the controversies concerning it would be cases arising under the Constitution, and not under the laws of the United States, in the ordinary signification of those terms. This may serve as a sample of the whole.

"It may also be asked, what need of the word 'equity?' What equitable causes can grow out of the Constitution and the laws of the United States? There is

1 Federalist, p. 415.

2 A question may here be asked: If the States may not issue paper money under the Constitution, can they authorize an agent to do it? in other words, can they grant a charter to a bank, agreeably to this provision of the Constitution?

hardly a subject of litigation between individuals which may not involve those ingredients of fraud, accident, trust, or hardship, which would render the matter an object of equitable rather than legal jurisdiction, as the distinction is known and established in several of the States. It is the peculiar province, for instance, of a court of equity, to relieve against what may be called hard bargains. There are contracts in which, though there may have been no direct fraud or deceit, sufficient to invalidate them in a court of law, yet there may have been some undue and unconscionable advantage taken of the necessities or misfortune of one of the parties, which a court of equity would not tolerate. In such cases, when foreigners were concerned on either side, it would be impossible for the federal judicatures to do justice without an equitable as well as legal jurisdiction."1

In the foregoing quotations, we think it must be apparent to every one, that, in Mr. Hamilton's opinion, the court held the rights of every individual in their keeping, and that, when appealed to, they would, in duty bound, be obliged to see him protected against all claims or authority over his inalienable rights, or even rights which are not inalienable; and, if wronged or oppressed, either by individuals or a State, the power of the court was sufficiently great to overrule their acts, and restore the man to his just rights. For, if they have jurisdiction in case of hard bargains, we would ask what harder bargain can there be, than that a man and all his posterity should be sold into slavery, even if the man consented, under peculiar

difficulties, to his own sale, and afterwards repents? would not the court have jurisdiction? If Mr. Hamilton is correct in the above observations, we think they would. How much more, then, should the court have jurisdiction, when the slave, in opposition to all his entreaties, is sold, and in various ways maltreated in the most shameful manner! If the courts have jurisdiction in any case where the individual rights are concerned, we know of none which so loudly calls for their interference as that of the slave; and we sincerely trust the slave will call upon them for that interference.

On general subjects.

Mr. Hamilton, in answer to an objection that the convention did not adopt a bill of rights, remarks,

"There remains but one other view of this matter to conclude the point. The truth is, after all the declamation we have heard, the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, a bill of rights. The several bills of rights in Great Britain form its Constitution; and, conversely, the Constitution of each State is its bill of rights. In like manner, the proposed Constitution, if adopted, will be the bill of rights for the Union. Is it one object of a bill of rights to declare and specify the political privileges of the citizen in the structure and administration of the government? This is done in the most simple and precise manner in the plan of the convention; comprehending various precautions for the public security, which are not to be found in any of the State Constitutions. Is another object of a bill of rights to define certain immunities and modes of pro