In answer to an objection made, that, in the exposition of the Constitution, the federal government would follow the example of the States which held slaves, where the slaves neither voted nor increased the votes of their masters, which, if done, all of the slaves would be represented, it will be perceived he places it in the power of the different States to arrange the right of suffrage as they see fit; and, consequently, the moment the slave is freed he may at once have a right to a full representation, —an evidence it was expected such would be the case; for he says,

“It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Constitution, that, as the aggregate number of representatives allotted to the several States is to be determined by a federal rule, founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted number in each State is to be exercised by such parts of the inhabitants as the State itself may designate. The qualifications on which the right of suffrage depend are not, perhaps, the same in any two States. In some of the State's the difference is very material. In every State a certain proportion of the inhabitants are deprived of this right by the Constitution of the State, who will be included in the census by which the federal Constitution apportions the representatives. In this point of view, the Southern States might retort the complaint, by insisting that the principle laid down by the convention required that no regard should be had to the policy of particular States towards their own inhabitants, and, consequently, the slaves, as inhabitants, should have been admitted into the census according to their full number, in like manner with other inhabitants, who, by

the policy of other States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens. A rigid adherence to this principle is waived by those who would be gainers by it.

"All they ask is, an equal moderation be shown on the other side. Let the case of the slave be considered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the compromising

expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal level of free inhabitants,-which regards the slave as the fifth of the man."

He then goes on and takes another ground to justify the convention. In the ratio of representatives they considered that property should be represented. "Government is instituted no less for the protection of property than of the persons of individuals." The one as well as the other, therefore, may be considered as represented by those who have charge of the government; and, consequently, he infers from this circumstance that the southern person would conclude that the property of the slaveholder should be represented in the manner it was proposed, as he adds, "Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the southern interest might employ on this subject; and, although it may appear a little strained in some points, yet, on the whole, I must confess it fully reconciles me to the scale of representation which the convention has established.”

Mark, in these expressions of Mr. Madison's, he speaks of the southern man's arguments, not his own; and that the whole of the arguments results

1 1 Federalist, p. 307.

in this, that when the master wants to maltreat the slave, then he is property; but when the slave maltreats his master, then he is a person; and when taxation and representation are to be considered, he is neither one thing nor another, a sort of hermaphrodite, he is three fifths of a man. Natural history gives no account of such an animal; he is a sort of being conjured up, just about that time, in the brain of some wiseacres. If there had been any record in history of any new animal created since the first formation of the world, we might suppose the slave was a sort of new creation, a being unique in his kind,south-western man would say, a sort of half horse, half alligator; though, perhaps, no touch of the snapping turtle, or he might have been considered one of the descendants of the centaurs of

old,

as a

half horse, half man, and, consequently, he must be treated as such. We must, on the whole, confess that, while Mr. Madison appears very ingenious in this chapter, his reasoning is very weak. Patrick Henry's analysis of the proposed Constitution might very well apply here. It would seem Mr. Madison was very easily reconciled, provided the Constitution should be established, though he had observed there should be no contradictory principles embodied in the instrument.

The amendments to the Constitution, however, as it will be our object to prove, put at rest this reasoning, and has, or should have, restored the slave, ere this, to his rights. We think, on the whole, Mr. Madison-not only here, but in other

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places tries to blind his own eyes and that of others to the real nature of the consequences which would naturally result on the adoption of the Constitution with regard to the slave.

In speaking of the house of representatives, in relation to the supposed tendency of the plan of the convention to elevate the few above the many, he remarks,

"If it be asked, what is to restrain the house of representatives from making legal discriminations in favor of themselves, and a particular class of society? I answer, the genius of the whole system, the nature of just and constitutional laws, and, above all, the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates the people of America, — a spirit which nourishes freedom, and, in return, is nourished by it.

"If this spirit should ever be so debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the legislature, as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to tolerate any thing but liberty."

We will ask here, if, in the new position which the South has now taken on the subject of slavery, it is a blessing, and not an evil; that it must and should be sustained by laws, thereby constituting two distinct classes of society, one favored, and the other treated with contumely; is it not just the state of society of which Mr. Madison speaks? and if the American people sanction it, will they not tolerate any thing "but liberty?" and have we not already had a foretaste of what may be expected, if slavery is much longer continued, in the lynchings and burnings, gaggings

and rifling post-offices, refusing petitions by congress, &c. &c.? These things cast a shadow before not to be misunderstood, and we think this view of the subject completely puts to rest the ideas expressed in the previous quotation, and shows what a baseless foundation Mr. Madison had there to stand upon.

Respecting the power of the Courts.

Mr. Hamilton, in speaking of the judicial department, makes the following observations:

"Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce legislative acts` void, because contrary to the Constitution, has arisen from the imagination that the doctrine would imply a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power. It is urged, that the authority which can declare the acts of another void must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared void. As this doctrine is of great importance in all of the American constitutions, a brief discussion of the grounds. on which it rests may not be unexceptionable.

"There is no position which depends on clearer principles than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal, that the servant is above his master, that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves, that mere actions, by virtue of powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.

"If it be said that the legislative body are the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construc