had an equal prospect before them of being redeemed from the oppression of their European brethren. Remember that, in the destruction of the slave-trade, it was generally thought slavery would cease; and, if it could be wholly stopped, it undoubtedly would. What, then, we ask, must be Mr. Madison's idea of guaranteeing the perpetual continuance of slavery to the South? It is evident. he never entertained the thought. He undoubtedly supposed it would die a natural death, when the trade ceased.

pau

Speaking of the rule of naturalization, he says,— "The dissimilarity of the rules of the several States has long been remembered as a fault in our system, and as laying a foundation for intricate and delicate questions. In the fourth article of the Confederation, it is declared 'that the free inhabitants of each of these States pers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice exceptedshall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges of trade and commerce,' &c. There is a confusion of language here which is remarkable. Why the term free inhabitants is used in one part of the article, free citizens in another, and people in another, or what was meant by superadding to all privileges and immunities of free citizens,' all the privileges of trade and commerce, cannot easily be determined.”1

But he says it seems to be an unavoidable conclusion, that the free inhabitants of one State shall enjoy all the privileges of a free citizen in another.

I Federalist, p. 239.

But, as different States have different laws of naturalization, there might be a confusion; and it was owing to mere casualty there had not been; and, to remedy any evil that might result from such expressions, congress very properly had the power to introduce "uniform rules of naturalization; while the right that our citizens had to go into any of the States was continued, and the word 'free' before the word 'citizen' was stricken out; " - another evidence that slavery, so far from its being guaranteed, was meant to be destroyed. The same subject of the powers of congress being continued, he said,

"In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic or monarchical innovations. The more intimate such a union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political constitutions of each other, and a greater right to insist that the forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be substantially maintained.” 1

This is different language from that held by the editor of the Boston Quarterly Review, when he says, because the abolitionists have taken an interest in the welfare of the slave, and would attempt to make the practices of the people of this country conform to their professions, and fulfil their obligations to the world, being themselves implicated in this nefarious business, their action

should be considered as a declaration of war.1 We think the editor and Mr. Madison do not agree on the right of interference. Neither do we think this language conforms to the ideas thrown out by Mr. Webster in his speech delivered in Richmond, Virginia, Oct. 1840, in which he says, "I hold, by the Constitution of the United States, that congress is absolutely precluded from interfering in any manner, directly or indirectly, with the institution of slavery, or with any other State institution." Again he repeats, "There is no power, either in congress or the general government, in the slightest degree, to interfere with the institution of domestic slavery!" Neither does it agree with the language held by President Harrison, in his inaugural address, on the subject of the members of one State interfering with the internal policy of another. For Mr. Madison continues:

"But a right implies a remedy; and where else could a remedy be deposited by the Constitution? Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort than those of a kindred nature. 'As the Confederate Republic of Germany,' says Montesquieu, 'consists of free cities and petty states, subject to different princes. experience shows us that is more perfect than that of Hnd and Switzerland.' 'Greece was undone,' he adds, as soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat in the amphictions.' In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the monarchical form of the new Confederate, had its share of influence on the events."

1 Boston Quarterly Review, vol. i. p. 489.

"It may possibly be asked what need there could be of such a precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for alterations in the State governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves. These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the general government shall not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers? To the second question it may be answered, that, if the general government should interpose in virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be, of course, to pursue the authority."

Speaking of the rule adopted for the ratio of representation and taxation, that they would both, in view of congress, depend upon numbers, he observes,

"All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said; but does it follow, from the admission of numbers for the measure of representation, or of slaves combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included in the numerical rule of representation? Slaves are considered as property, not as persons. They ought, therefore, to be comprehended in estimation of taxation, which are founded on property, and to be excluded from representation, which is regulated by a census of persons. This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its full force. I shall be equally as candid in stating the reasoning which may be offered on the opposite side.”

"We subscribe to the doctrine, might one of our southern brethren observe, that representation relates more immediately to persons, and taxation more immediately to property; and we join in the application of this

distinction in the case of our slaves. But we must deny the fact that slaves are merely considered as property, and in no respects whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that they partake of both of these qualities; they being considered by our laws in some respects as persons, and in other respects as property. In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for a master; in being vendable by one master to another master; and being subject, at all times, of being restrained in his liberty, and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of another, the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the master of his labor and his liberty, and in being punishable himself for all violence committed against others, the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the society, not as a part of the irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article of property. The federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed character of persons and of property. This is, in fact, their true character; it is the character bestowed on them by the laws under which they live, and it will not be denied that these are the proper criterion, because it is only under the pretext, that the laws have transferred the negroes into subjects of property, that a place is disputed them in the computation of numbers; and it is admitted, that, if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants." 1

Federalist, p. 306.