CHAPTER VI.

QUOTATIONS FROM THE FEDERALIST.

We have now passed over the Secret Proceedings of the Convention, which recommended the Constitution to congress, and, through it, to the several States. We have seen, in some measure, the anxiety that was felt that a Constitution should be adopted, the objections made, the influence that slavery exerted, and the attempt made to incorporate it into that instrument, and the manner that attempt was frustrated. This, together with the struggle between the large States and small ones, independently of the slavery question, was almost the only point that produced any protracted discussion, and prevented any decision at once of the kind of government to be adopted. On the part of some, a confederation of the States was urged, and these desired the old Confederation should be amended; while those of the larger States wanted to have a weight in the government proportioned to their population: this, after long and laborious discussion, was settled by a compromise.

The framing of the language of the Constitution, in those parts that are said to relate to slavery, and have been acted on as such, show what care

was used, and what exertions were made, by those who were opposed to the obnoxious practice of holding slaves, to prevent this practice, as a system, being incorporated in the body politic. However great the exertions to the contrary, unless a complete and entire perversion of the meaning of words is made, saving in the instance where the "three fifths of all other persons" was named, (which may have, or may not have, any meaning at all,) no person could make the language apply to slaves; and, being so, we must suppose the friends of freedom gained the day, expecting, though the South might not give up their slaves immediately, they would yet so do in a short time. And, although there was no express provision in the Constitution as reported, that would give the slave his rights, yet, if the purposes for which it was adopted, as expressed in its caption, should be truly carried into effect, slavery would be destroyed by them.

We will now make a few quotations from the Federalist. This book, it is well known, was written by Mr. Hamilton, and Mr. Madison, for the purpose of recommending and explaining the Constitution that had been proposed to the people of this country for its adoption. It was published in successive numbers over the signature of Publius, in the newspapers of that day, and afterward they were collected and put into a volume, having the above title prefixed.

They were written in concert by the gentlemen named above, who took upon themselves to answer

the objections that were made to the Constitution, on its being published to the world, with their attempt to do away any wrong impressions that might be entertained respecting its object, and the purposes that induced the convention to promulgate it. They undoubedly had much influence at the time to satisfy the American people of the good intentions of those who framed it, and the advantages that might be expected to result from its being carried into execution.

Great fear was expressed throughout the country that liberty would be endangered, and powerful objections, on that account, were brought against its adoption. Consequently, great anxiety was felt by its friends that all the real objections against it should be answered, and that it should be made at least to appear as perfect as possible. These gentlemen, therefore, undertook its defence, and the various conventions that were called were undoubtedly more or less influenced in their decisions by these writings. These gentlemen stood high in the affections of the people, and much confidence was placed in their judgment.

In these papers, we shall find they asserted that the foundation principle of this government was liberty; that it was for the security of this that they proposed this system of government. They believed liberty could not be secured without there being a power some where, sufficiently great to keep in check any outbreak arising from the ambition of individuals, or the turbulence of the multitude, or attacks from external foes. Whether

right in these ideas or not, these were the expressed reasons given why a government for the whole country, arising directly from the people, independent of, and in some measure dependent on, the State governments, should be adopted.

Some of the States, particularly Rhode Island, had not fulfilled their engagements, or answered to the requisitions made upon them: there was no power to coerce them, and they refrained from making good the obligations that the country, at that time, was under, and they feared what might be the result if such a state of things continued. Whether these fears were well founded, or not, is another question; but such were expressed, and such, undoubtedly, many entertained. They therefore exerted themselves to establish a government that would have the power to coerce that justice which would not be rendered without coercion, and that security to individuals in their lawful and peaceful occupations which might be liable to be interrupted by lawless and ambitious men, and to secure them from that rapacity which seemed to be the governing policy of many of the European nations.

As this country might be expected to have extended commercial relations, it was thought necessary they should be prepared for such exigencies as might arise in those relations; and, in alluding to this last consideration, Mr. Hamilton remarks respecting the memorable struggle for superiority between the rival houses of Austria and Bourbon, and between England and Holland

for mastery of the seas, where the wars were urged on by the people against the wishes of the actual government. Speaking of the wars between England and France, he says,

"The wars between these two last mentioned nations have, in a great measure, grown out of commercial considerations; the desire of supplanting, and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of traffic, or in the general advantages of trade and navigation, and, sometimes, even the more culpable desire of sharing in the commerce of others without their consent."1

After speaking of the distracted state of the Grecian and Roman republics, he cites the arguments which the advocates of despotism have drawn, not only against the forms of republican government, but against the very principles of civil liberty. He says,

"Happily for mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted their gloomy soph isms. And I trust America will be the broad and solid foundation of other edifices not less magnificent, which will be permanent monuments of their error.

The question may he asked here, what is the basis of liberty of which Mr. Hamilton speaks? Does it consist simply in having a representative government, where laws can be made by the people through their representatives, without any regard at all to the nature of those laws? Does he mean that when the representatives get to

1 Federalist, p. 31.

2 Federalist, p. 45,