under date of February 8, 1918, submitted his report with the following recommendation:

"It is my opinion that the action of the board was made after careful and conscientious consideration of all evidence available, but that Mr. Lemly will not receive sufficient compensation to replace the parts broken by the act of Pvt. Goldman. It is recommended that another board be convened to investigate this case and determine what damages should be paid Mr. Lemly by Pvt. C. V. Goldman, Battery A, 140th F. A.”

The Commanding General of the 39th Division has approved the report and recommendation of the division inspector by the second indorsement, supra.

2. The 105th Article of War (Comp. St. 1916, § 2308a) provides that a board may be convened by the commanding officer when complaint has been made to him that damage has been done to property by a person subject to military law. The proceeding is initiated by the claimant, who thereby invokes the remedies provided by this Article for the ascertainment and payment of the damages which he claims to have sustained.

In the present case the claimant, Mr. Lemly, made complaint and filed a claim for damages. Based thereon a board of three officers was convened in the usual manner to investigate the claim and assess the damages, if any. The record discloses, and the division inspector found, that the board was convened, made a careful, conscientious consideration of the case, and reached a conclusion upon the evidence submitted. There is no suggestion that it proceeded improperly, unlawfully, or failed to give the case a fair and impartial consideration.

3. The due and orderly administration of law, both civil and military, requires that controversies should be settled promptly, and that when a matter in controversy has been once tried and decided by a competent and impartial tribunal, proceeding in a lawful manner, its decision should be considered as final, and the litigation ended. The mere fact that one or the other party to the controversy feels himself aggrieved by the result should not be sufficient reason for a re-examination of the dispute. If it were otherwise there would be no end to the matter.

In the present case there is nothing in the record impeaching the fairness or legal competency of the persons who sat on the board, and it is conceded that their decision was the result of a full and careful consideration of all the pertinent facts.

4. In view of what has been said, this office recommended that the findings of the board convened to act upon the claim presented by Mr. Lemly be considered and acted upon as the final disposition of the case. [Signed] S. T. Ansell, Acting Judge Advocate General.

25. JURISDICTION OF OFFENSE BY SELECTIVE EN ROUTE TO CAMP Discipline-Articles of War LIX.

March 6, 1918.

From: The Office of the Judge Advocate General.
To: Chief, Military Intelligence Branch, Executive Division.
Subject: Prosecution of drafted men for offenses committed en route
to mobilization camps.

1. In your communication of February 25, 1918, you ask whether the civil authorities should be permitted to prosecute a person who has been drafted into the service, and who commits a civil offense after having been ordered to report to the mobilization camp.

2. A man who has been inducted into the military service and ordered to report to a mobilization camp is subject to military jurisdiction. U. S. ex rel. Koopowitz v. Finley (D. C.) 245 Fed. 871; Franke v. Murray (C. C. A.) 248 Fed. 865, decided February 14, 1918, by the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for the Eighth Circuit. The military jurisdiction is as complete in this case as in that of a soldier who has already entered the mobilization camp. No distinction therefore should be made in respect to the policy which should be pursued in his case and that of the soldier who is with his command when the civil offense is committed. The military authorities having a paramount right to his custody, the civil authorities should not arrest and hold him for the civil offense while he is in the act of reporting to the mobilization camp.

If, however, the civil offense committed by him is of a serious character, such as a common law felony, upon application by the civil authorities for the surrender of the man, accompanied by a statement of the offense, preferably in the form of a copy of the charge or indictment, with a citation of the statute under which it was returned, and a summary of the evidence relied upon to sustain the charge, the man will be turned over to the civil authorities for trial. The refusal, however, of the military authorities to deliver a soldier who has committed a civil offense to the civil authorities will not operate to relieve him from punishment, since the military authorities have jurisdiction and may take cognizance of the civil offense and punish the offender. [Signed] S. T. Ansell, Acting Judge Advocate General.

26. TRANSFER OR SALE OF UNITED STATES PROPERTY FROM ONE BUREAU TO ANOTHER

Public Property I B.

4th Ind.

War Department, J. A. G. O., March 25, 1918.-To the Adjutant General.

1. By the preceding indorsement is submitted the question whether six unserviceable horses belonging to the War Department, now at Ft. Myer, Va., and which have become incapacitated for the kind of work usually required of them, can be legally transferred, without reim

PART II. WAR-TIME SOURCES

bursement, to the Bureau of Plant Industry, Department of Agriculture.

2. By the papers in reference it appears that these animals could be used by the Bureau of Plant Industry for light work, and it is recommended by the Acting Quartermaster General that they be transferred, if not in conflict with any law or regulation relating thereto.

In a long line of decisions this office has held that where the property desired to be transferred is no longer needed for the purpose for which appropriated, it may be, without the consent of Congress, transferred to another department. These decisions turn upon the principle that a transfer is not a sale, and as the government does not thereby part with its title, the objection could not be urged that public property had been disposed of without the authority of Congress. 3. It may serve a good purpose to refer to several of the decisions of this office holding that where the property was no longer needed for the purposes for which it was appropriated it could be legally transferred. It was held, March 14, 1900 (C. 7840), that certain cooking utensils, table ware and soap purchased from a river and harbor appropriation to be used in connection with the improvement of the rivers and harbors of Florida, could be turned over to an officer for use in connection with a river and harbor improvement in Georgia; it was further held (April 25, 1901, c. 10300) that five mules purchased in connection with certain harbor improvements in Alabama could be transferred to the Quartermaster Department of the Army; on the 26th of November, 1897 (C. 3679), it was ruled that a sail boat in the possession of the United States Engineer office at San Juan could be transferred to the Light House Board; on the 29th of April, 1901 (C. 10,315), it was held proper to exchange a Remington typewriter, in possession of the Chattanooga National Park Commission, for a. Smith Premier belonging to the Quartermaster Department. And it has been likewise held that a cable laid between Narragansett Pier and Block Island could be properly transferred to the Weather Bureau, Department of Agriculture; and that certain property belonging to the Medical Department of the United States Army, which had been condemned and ordered to be destroyed, could be properly transferred to the Forest Service of the Department of Agriculture. These citations are sufficient to illustrate the recognized rule that the transfer of public property from one bureau or department to another is not regarded as a sale; and that where the property desired to be transferred is no longer fit for the purposes for which it was originally purchased, there is no objection to transferring it to another bureau or executive department without first obtaining the consent of Con

gress.

4. It is the opinion of this office that the six unserviceable horses now in the possession of the War Department at Fort Myer, Va., can be properly transferred without reimbursement, to the Bureau of Plant Industry, Department of Agriculture.

[Signed] S. T. Ansell, Acting Judge Advocate General,

27. ACCRUAL OF WAR RISK BENEFITS FOR INDUCTED MEN

4th Ind.

War Department, J. A. G. O., March 26, 1918.-To the Adjutant General.

1. The opinion of this office is asked upon a suggestion made by the Commanding General, 85th Division, Camp Custer, Michigan, to the effect that the obligations and benefits of the War Risk Insurance Act with reference to allotments and insurance should not accrue to drafted men until they have been physically examined at camp and accepted for service. The second indorsement by the Bureau of War Risk Insurance holds this suggestion to be contrary to the provisions of the War Risk Insurance Act (40 Stat. 398).

2. By the terms of the 2d Article of War (Comp. St. 1916, § 2308a), of section 2 of the Selective Draft Act (40 Stat. 76, 78), and of section 157 of the Selective Service Regulations, drafted men are in the military service from the dates they are required by the terms of the order directing them to report for military service to obey the same. Franke v. Murray [C. C. A.] 248 Fed. 865, Bulletin 62, Interpretation of War Statutes. After they have been duly examined and passed as qualified for military service, have been ordered by the local board to report for military service at a designated camp, and have actually reported pursuant to such order, they are in active service within the meaning of the War Risk Insurance Act, and are, consequently, entitled to all of its benefits and subject to all of its obligations. So long as they are in such service, they must make such allotments as are required by the terms of article 2 of the Act. If they apply for insurance pursuant to article 4 of the Act and the regulations thereunder, they are entitled to have it granted; and separation from the service thereafter will not invalidate their policies so long as they comply with the terms thereof.

[Signed] S. T. Ansell, Acting Judge Advocate General.

28. MILITARY JURISDICTION OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES Discipline VIII G 2.

April 3, 1918.

From: The Office of the Judge Advocate General.
To: The Judge Advocate, Port of Embarkation, Hoboken, N. J.
Subject: Military jurisdiction of civilian employees.

1. The question presented is whether the military authorities have jurisdiction to try by court-martial a civilian employee at the Port of Embarkation who has committed a theft of government military stores. From the statements contained in your telegraphic communication of the 25th, supplemented by your letter of the 26th ultimo, it appears that William Norwood lives at 339 Gold Street, Brooklyn, N. Y., outside the limits of the Port of Embarkation; that on the afternoon of March 23, 1918, and prior thereto, he was a civilian employee of the Quartermaster Department at the Port of Embarkation,

having accepted voluntary employment as a laborer on the docks, presumably in connection with the handling and loading of military supplies for shipment along the line of communication to the theatre of actual hostilities in France. On the afternoon of March 23d he was apprehended while attempting to steal an army uniform and was taken into custody by the military authorities.

2. This office will take notice that the Bush Terminal, where Norwood was employed at the time of the alleged attempt at theft, is within the limits of the Port of Embarkation, at Hoboken, N. J.; that it is under the control of and is being operated by the Government having been commandeered for that purpose; that it is one of the termini of the lines of communication reaching from the Atlantic seaboard to the zone of war in Europe, where our Expeditionary Forces are engaged in actual warfare along the Western Front; and that this terminal is used by the military authorities as a base at which to assemble troops, munitions and military supplies generally, to be forwarded directly along the lines of communication to the Expeditionary Forces carrying on offensive and defensive military operations in Europe. Manifestly, Norwood was employed under a voluntary contract by the military authorities to work at this terminal in connection with the handling of the military supplies there assembled for that purpose. The question is, upon these facts, is a person subject to military law?

3. Subdivision (d) of the 2d Article of War (Comp. St. 1916, § 2308a) makes subject to military law "all retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or, in time of war, all such retainers and persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States in the field, both within and without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, though not otherwise subject to these articles."

Obviously, an army in the field must be supplied with troops, munitions, food, clothing, and other supplies from bases previously established and maintained. As a part of the operations in the field, the line of communication from these bases of supplies to the fighting front must be kept open and supplies assembled at the bases forwarded as necessity arises. The operation of the line of communication stretching from the bases of supplies to the battlefield is as essential as maintaining troops along the fighting line, and, indeed, the latter depends wholly upon the former. It cannot be well asserted that those who serve along the line of communication are not serving with the army in the field; and these lines must necessarily include the bases and extend thence to the zone of actual warfare. If an army were engaged in combat and supplies of necessary troops, food, clothing, etc., were assembled back of the line a distance of ten, fifteen, twentyfive or fifty miles, it would not be contended that those who served at the base and those who served on the line from the base to the battle front were not serving with the army in the field, and the application of the principle cannot be made to depend upon the length of line, it being once established, as in the present case, that the base is a part of the line of communication which supplies our troops in France.